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Abstract 
 This dissertation explores the decline of the packing industry in Chicago’s Back of the 
Yards neighborhood, the community several miles southwest of the loop, in which Upton 
Sinclair set The Jungle, that was almost entirely dependent on and defined by the meatpacking 
industry.  In particular, it examines how deindustrialization, beginning in the early 1950s, 
affected the workers’ definitions of themselves and their community and how it contributed to 
the neighborhood’s efforts to both attract new industry and prevent African-Americans from 
moving into Back of the Yards.  This study also plays close attention to the role of the built 
environment in the neighborhood’s transformation over the course of three decades from a 
community that was defined by one particular industry and labor in that industry to one that was 
defined spatially by race and racial exclusion. 
 Drawing on a variety of sources including community newspapers, United Packinghouse 
Workers of America (UPWA) publications, information from the Back of the Yards 
Neighborhood Council, and images of crumbling packinghouse and stockyard infrastructure, it 
argues that white ethnic residents of the community increasingly resented the growing Black 
labor force such that although community and union leaders fought to keep the packing plants 
from abandoning Chicago, the neighborhood also initially welcomed the shift of the meatpacking 
industry from urban areas in the North and Midwest to more rural (and anti-union) areas of the 
South, Great Plains, and Southwest.  The community had long been stigmatized as a polluted 
slum because of the presence of the meatpacking industry and associated rendering plants and 
although many residents took pride in the neighborhood’s association with meatpacking many 
were happy to see it gone.  As Back of the Yards grappled with the loss of thousands of jobs, 
however, it began to try to attract new industry but residents were hesitant to bring in industry 
  
iii 
 
that threatened the community’s efforts, beginning in the 1950s, to transform itself from a slum 
to a model of working class democracy.  At the same time it was struggling with these economic 
problems, which were beyond the community’s control, it also faced the twin threats of African-
American movement into the neighborhood and white flight to the suburbs, all of which 
threatened Back of the Yards’ tenuous stability.  As such, residents attempted to shore up their 
nascent privilege as whites to exert control over who and what could occupy the landscape.  
Finally, this study looks at a variety of photos of deteriorating packinghouse infrastructure to try 
to understand how Back of the Yards residents made sense of these transformations that seemed 
poised to bring blight back to the community and destroy all of the residents’ hard-won gains. 
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Introduction 
The identity of places is very much bound up with the histories which are told of them, 
how those histories are told, and which history turns out to be dominant. 
--Doreen Massey, “Places and Their Pasts”1 
 
  In early 1962 NBC produced a documentary on the nationwide problem of long-
term unemployment.  The news special featured Estes Payne, a former member of United 
Packinghouse Workers of America (UPWA) Local 347 who once worked in an Armour 
plant in Chicago.  Payne lost his job in 1957 as all of the city’s packinghouses steadily 
cut workers.  Eventually Armour closed the plant and demolished it.  After Payne lost his 
job he was only able to find odd jobs despite being retrained to paint with a spray gun.  
He had worked for 11 years at Armour in the hog kill, beef kill, and ham boning 
divisions, and ended up in the tank room because of successive departmental closings.  
He finally found himself at the bottom of the seniority list and ultimately out on the 
street.  Once a skilled worker, Payne was forced to rely on public assistance. 
 The magnitude of the problem of deindustrialization became apparent as Payne 
toured the site of his former workplace.  The documentary began with him “walking 
through the acres of emptiness that were once a beehive of activity peopled with 20,000 
packinghouse workers in the mile square ‘stockyards district.’”  He related his troubles 
since he had lost his job as he passed the “piles of burning timbers and pick[ed] his way 
through the broken bricks to see the skeleton of the building where he once earned $5,000 
a year.”  The industrial school where Payne was retrained was itself an abandoned factory 
that the welfare agency refurbished.
2
  This dissertation seeks to understand how workers 
such as Payne and residents of Back of the Yards—the working class Chicago 
                                                          
1
 Doreen Massey, “Places and Their Pasts,” History Workshop Journal,  Vol. 39, No. 1 (Spring 1995), 191. 
2
 Les Orear, “Ex-Armour Man is ‘Lead’ in TV Documentary; Tells Futile Search for Job since Close 
Down,” The Packinghouse Worker, May 1962, 5. 
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neighborhood that grew up around and owed its name to the meatpacking industry and 
stockyards— dealt with the economic problems associated with the decline of the 
packing industry and how they interacted with the built environment of the neighborhood 
as the packing industry infrastructure crumbled around them. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Demolition of a Swift & Company building.  Source:  Chicago History Museum, Stockyards 
Demolition Folder 1. 
  
 The Back of the Yards neighborhood came into existence in the aftermath of the 
Civil War when Chicago’s leading railroad companies came together to construct a rail 
hub, consolidating operations on the outskirts of the city and building the Union 
Stockyards in 1865.  Meatpackers soon began to build plants near the yards as breeders 
throughout the Midwest and Great Plains shipped livestock to Chicago for processing.  
Immigrant workers—first German and Irish then Poles, Czechs, Lithuanians, Ukranians, 
and Slovaks—began settling in the area south and west of the stockyards to work in the 
burgeoning packing industry.  Community life for these new immigrants centered on the 
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(Catholic, for the most part) church with each ethnic group establishing its own parish.  
Chicago eventually annexed the area in 1889.   
 Living and working conditions in the packinghouse district were deplorable.  The 
neighborhood became known for its poverty and squalor.  Substandard and overcrowded 
housing plagued the community and basic infrastructure was lacking—heavy rains meant 
flooded streets choked with mud and sewage which made travel difficult.  Packingtown 
developed a reputation as a crime-ridden cesspool.  Juvenile delinquency was seen as an 
ever-present problem.  The mostly immigrant, and uniformly poor, population of the 
neighborhood initially had little in the way of political power or ability to better their 
working and living conditions.  Pollution Blackened the air and assaulted the senses—the 
packing plants dumped tons of waste into a branch of the Chicago River that became 
known as Bubbly Creek because of the bubbles from decaying offal that broke the oily 
surface of the creek and which Upton Sinclair described in The Jungle:  “Here and there 
the grease and filth have caked solid, and the creek looks like a bed of lava; chickens 
walk about on it, feeding, and many times an unwary stranger has started to stroll across, 
and vanished temporarily.”3 
                                                          
3
 Upton Sinclair, The Jungle, James R. Barrett, ed. (Urbana:  University of Illinois Press, 1988) 92.  See 
also Louise Carroll Wade, Chicago's Pride: The Stockyards, Packingtown, and Environs in the Nineteenth 
Century (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2002) for some of the early history of the neighborhood.   
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Figure 2: Bubbly Creek with chicken standing on crusted sewage, 1911.  Source:  Chicago History 
Museum (DN-0056899) 
 
Sinclair’s exposé of the meatpacking industry and its profound pollution of the 
community did little to ameliorate the plight of the workers or better conditions in the 
neighborhood although it succeeded in thoroughly revolting the American public who 
blanched at the idea of consuming rat feces in their sausage.  While workers, led by the 
Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher Workmen of North America (which was an 
American Federation of Labor union), made some marginal gains in the years before 
World War I, the anti-radicalism of the 1920s saw the packers reassert their dominance.
4
   
                                                          
4
 See James R. Barrett, Work and Community in the Jungle:  Chicago’s Packinghouse Workers, 1894-1922 
(Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1990) for some of these early efforts at unionization. 
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 The Depression, however, brought a revival of unionism in the packing industry 
thanks, in part, to the New Deal’s more labor-friendly policies.  Most significantly, the 
Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) undertook an aggressive unionization effort, 
creating the Packinghouse Workers Organizing Committee (PWOC), which eventually 
resulted in the formation of the United Packinghouse Workers of America in 1943.   
 While the majority of the packinghouse workforce was composed of eastern 
European immigrants by the turn of the century, Black workers had been moving north to 
Chicago in great numbers in the post-WWI era and many found work in the packing 
plants (though they couldn’t find housing in Back of the Yards).   There was often a fair 
amount of tension between white ethnic and African-American laborers, however, as the 
packers consciously pitted the two groups against each other in an effort to control their 
workforce and hinder any efforts at organizing the packinghouse workers.  The PWOC’s 
(and later the UPWA’s) success, therefore, was based on its ability to transcend racial and 
ethnic boundaries, which had hindered past unionization efforts.  From its inception the 
UPWA was an interracial union that was devoted to furthering the cause of civil rights, 
not just in the union but nationally.  African-Americans made up a significant percentage 
of the labor force by the 1930s, provided much of the union’s strength and organizing 
capabilities, and a filled a fair number of its leadership positions, all of which would 
influence the packers’ dealings with the union and the neighborhood’s treatment of 
African-Americans.
5
 
                                                          
5
 See Rick Halpern, “Race and Radicalism in the Chicago Stockyards:  The Rise of the Chicago 
Packinghouse Workers Organizing Committee,” in Shelton Stromquist and Marvin Bergman, eds., 
Unionizing the Jungles:  Labor and Community in the Twentieth-Century Meatpacking Industry, (Iowa 
City: University of Iowa Press, 1997) 76-82; Rick Halpern and Roger Horowitz, Meatpackers:  An Oral 
History of Black Packinghouse Workers and Their Struggle for Racial and Economic Equality, (New York: 
Twayne Publishers, 1996); and Roger Horowitz, “Negro and White, Unite and Fight!”:  A Social History 
of Industrial Unionism in Meatpacking, 1930-90, (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1997), 63. 
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 Not only were the workers attempting to radically alter their work lives by 
organizing, the neighborhood itself was also undertaking a Herculean effort to transform 
itself from the foul-smelling, contaminated, crime-ridden, cesspool depicted in the pages 
of The Jungle (and which outsiders thought it to be) into a model working class 
community—one with clean, safe streets; good schools; immaculate front yards; 
refurbished houses; plentiful churches; healthy, happy, and well-fed children; and which 
was welcoming to business.  Central to these efforts was the Back of the Yards 
Neighborhood Council (BYNC), founded in 1939 by Joseph Meegan, a local park 
director, and Saul Alinsky, a community organizer from outside of the neighborhood 
whose tactics in organizing Back of the Yards would become a model for organizing 
other oppressed communities and make him a national figure in the fight for social 
democracy (and, more recently, a bogeyman to modern conservatives).
6
   
 The Neighborhood Council was made up of community organizations as diverse 
as the local Chamber of Commerce, churches, and representatives from the union who 
united around the common cause of democratically improving the neighborhood and 
doing so, ostensibly, without outside interference.  Indeed, the Neighborhood Council’s 
motto was, and is to this day, “We the people will work out our own destiny” reflecting 
the relative insularity of the neighborhood.  And while this obscures the community’s 
ability to successfully lobby for outside funding and political favors, it nevertheless 
highlights the fact that Back of the Yards was able to transform itself from a working-
                                                          
6
 James R. Grossman, Ann Durkin Keating and Janice L. Reiff, eds., Encyclopedia of Chicago (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2004). 
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class slum, rife as it was with crime, delinquency, and pollution into a prototype of 
neighborhood turnaround and social democracy.
7
    
 Structural changes to both the meatpacking industry and national infrastructure 
themselves began to radically alter the packing industry by the 1950s, however, which 
meant that the neighborhood’s gains were in peril and its future uncertain.  The advent of 
the interstate highway system and the refrigerated trucks that traversed those highways 
meant that livestock breeders no longer had to ship animals by rail to centralized urban 
locations like Back of the Yards and other urban meatpacking centers where the 
stockyards and packing plants were concentrated.  Instead, packing plants could relocate 
nearer the source of the livestock in the rural Midwest, South, and Great Plains.  New 
smaller packing companies took advantage of these changes to erode some of the market 
share of the traditional Big Four packers (Swift, Armour, Wilson, and Cudahy).  These 
new, modern, efficient one-story plants which complied with increasing governmental 
regulations (such as those which required more humane slaughtering techniques) soon 
made the old multi-storied plants in cities like Chicago prohibitively expensive to update 
and, eventually, obsolete.  In order to remain competitive, the Big Four had no choice but 
to abandon Back of the Yards.  According to the packers, the rational working of the 
market forced their hands—if they were to remain viable companies, they had to evolve 
with the changing times.
8
   
 Not surprisingly, the workers saw things a little differently.  To be sure, the 
industry was changing in some fundamental ways.  But workers in Chicago and 
                                                          
7
 See Robert A. Slayton, Back of the Yards:  The Making of a Local Democracy, (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1986) 189-205 on the formation and early years of the Neighborhood Council and 207-223 
for the Council’s role in helping to direct the community’s transformation.    
8
 See Slayton, Back of the Yards, 228 and Jimmy M. Skaggs, Prime Cut:  Livestock Raising and 
Meatpacking in the United States, 1607-1983, (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1986) 190. 
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elsewhere, as well as UPWA leadership felt that these changes didn’t necessarily require 
a wholesale abandonment of the city.  Instead, they saw the move to rural areas as an 
effort by the packers to pay fewer taxes, comply with fewer environmental regulations, 
pay lower wages, and ultimately to break the back of the union—which, in the end, the 
packers succeeded in doing.  The devastation that was dealt to the UPWA and 
neighborhoods like Back of the Yards seemed like even more of a slap in the face 
because the packers were making record profits and workers’ productivity was steadily 
increasing at the very time that the packing plants were fleeing Chicago.
9
   
 As the packers shuttered their plants in the city and headed to the countryside, 
workers, the neighborhood, and the union fought the loss of their livelihoods, a fight that 
was ultimately in vain.  By the time this industrial flight began in earnest in the mid-
1950s, however, the number of people who both lived in Back of the Yards and worked 
in the packing plants had declined dramatically as many found jobs with the city.  
African-Americans, who were forced to live outside of the neighborhood, now made up 
the majority of the labor force.  While the neighborhood, led by the Back of the Yards 
Neighborhood Council, dealt with the problems of declining tax revenue, the loss of jobs 
both in the meatpacking plants itself and in the ancillary jobs that relied directly and 
indirectly on the packing industry, it simultaneously tried to attract new industry and keep 
out industry—such as trucking terminals and slaughterhouses—that it felt had the 
potential to make the neighborhood slip back into slum-like conditions.
10
  
                                                          
9
 See, for instance, The Packinghouse Worker, January 1959, 8; June 1959, 8; June 1960, 2; and February 
1965, 9 for the union’s take on rising profits for the packers while they were cutting workers.   
10
 See Chicago Sun-Times, “Back of the Yards Out to Lure New Industries,” March 17, 1964, 18; David 
Anderson, “Yards Willing to Lose Hog Crown for New Industries,” Chicago Sun-Times, November 10, 
1958, 30; and Back of the Yards Journal, November 20, 1963, for some of the neighborhood opposition to 
certain industries. 
  
9 
 
 In addition, the community tried to keep out African-Americans and stanch the 
exodus of neighborhood residents to the burgeoning suburbs.  While Back of the Yards 
for the most part didn’t witness some of the most intense racial violence that plagued 
other white Chicago neighborhoods as they fought against integration, it nonetheless 
developed a reputation as unwelcoming of African-Americans who lived in the 
overcrowded Black Belt neighborhoods that bordered Back of the Yards.   This effort to 
prevent Blacks from moving in would ultimately lead Saul Alinsky to characterize 
neighborhood residents as segregationists.
11
   
 Back of the Yards, which is located several miles southwest of the Loop, owed its 
name and identity to the packing industry since the late 1800s.  It was also defined 
spatially by that industry.  Thomas Jablonsky argues “it is clear that community spirit in 
the Back of the Yards was dependent upon—indeed, was generated by—spatial forces.”12  
That is, the built environment of the neighborhood was dominated by packing industry 
infrastructure which played an elemental role in how residents viewed themselves and 
their neighborhood.  Back of the Yards was physically separated from other Chicago 
neighborhoods by the packinghouses and railroad tracks.  The Back of the Yards 
Neighborhood Council served the area bounded by Archer Avenue to the north, Racine 
Avenue to 55
th
 and Loomis to the Chicago Belt Line tracks south of 58
th
; on the west, 
Western Avenue to 49
th
 and California Avenue from 49
th
 to 55
th
.
13
  The Union 
Stockyards formed the northeast boundary; railroads with elevated embankments 
enclosed three sides of the Back of the Yards; the southern boundary, 55
th
 Street, was a 
                                                          
11
 Wilson J. Warren, Tied to the Great Packing Machine:  The Midwest and Meatpacking (Iowa City: 
University of Iowa Press, 2009) 80. 
12
 Thomas Jablonsky, Pride in the Jungle: Community and Everyday Life in Back of the Yards Chicago, 
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992) 192.                                                                                                                                                             
13
 “The Annual Report of the Back of the Yards Neighbohood Council,”  1960, 1.   
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six-lane highway—all of which limited mobility and gave the community a sense of 
isolation at least until the 1940s.   
Figure 3: Map of Back of the Yards.  Source:  Author 
 Nevertheless, the packing industry was the community’s defining feature and it 
dominated and shaped the landscape as well as the air—the stench of the stockyards and 
packinghouses carried well beyond the immediate vicinity.  The animal pens themselves 
covered several hundred acres.  Mazes of livestock runs, often several stories high, that 
moved animals from the stockyards to the slaughterhouses also crisscrossed the area.  
  
11 
 
Smokestacks figured prominently in the skyline of the Back of the Yards.  Sinclair 
described the smell as something “you could literally taste” and the landscape as marked 
by “half a dozen chimneys, tall as the tallest of buildings, touching the very sky—and 
leaping from them half a dozen columns of smoke, thick, oily, and Black as night.”14  By 
the 1960s, however, the landscape of the Back of the Yards had been radically altered.  
Packing plants that had once provided livelihoods for thousands of workers crumbled and 
disintegrated before finally falling to the wrecking ball.  The stockyards, which remained 
open until 1971, eventually met the same fate.   
 My central concern in this dissertation is how people reacted to this urban crisis, a 
large part of which were the plant closures that not only eliminated their livelihoods but 
also drastically changed the physical environment which was so important to their 
definitions of the community and themselves.  How did the residents of the community 
that led Carl Sandburg to call Chicago the “hog butcher to the world” make sense of this 
physical change in the environment of their neighborhood?  How did the physical 
environment affect people’s conception and definition of themselves, their neighborhood, 
and their history in the two decades (the 1950s and 1960s) during which the meatpacking 
industry declined and eventually all but disappeared from Chicago?  What role did the 
physical environment play in the formation of community resistance to integration in the 
1950s?  How did Back of the Yards, a working-class neighborhood that was defined by 
and identified with one industry and work in that industry come to be defined spatially by 
race?  It also seeks to answer John McGreevy’s question “what prevented the extension 
of an occasionally integrated public culture and industrial workplace into the residential 
                                                          
14
 Sinclair, The Jungle, 25. 
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communities of the urban North?”15  That is, why did an integrated workplace and union 
not prevent a vigorous defense of neighborhood segregation?    
 
Figure 4: Union Stockyards, Chicago, Illinois. Cattle pens in foreground, hog pens in back, 1941 
Source:  Library of Congress LC-USF34- 063074-D 
 
 
  
                                                          
15
 John T. McGreevy, Parish Boundaries: The Catholic Encounter with Race in the Twentieth Century 
Urban North, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996) 4. 
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Figure 5: Union Stockyards, 1941 
Source:  Library of Congress LC-USF34- 063073-D 
  
 Further complicating matters was the fact that residents of the community, whose 
whiteness was somewhat tenuous at the beginning of the 20
th
 century were almost 
uniformly viewed as white by the time that the packing plants began abandoning Back of 
the Yards by the middle of the century.  The changing nature of the community in some 
ways reflected this racial shift.  That is, the residents’ marginal racial status allowed for 
the horrible pollution and slum-like conditions of The Jungle and reinforced outsiders’ 
notions that these mainly immigrant Back of the Yards residents were not quite white, not 
yet American, and unfit for citizenship or decent living conditions.  But the achievement 
of whiteness coincided with an effort to shore up the residents’ white privilege which 
meant a wholesale cleanup of the neighborhood (including ridding the community of 
some of the worst industrial polluters which, not coincidentally employed large numbers 
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of African-Americans) and efforts to prevent neighborhood integration.
16
  Residents’ 
whiteness, therefore, had come to afford them the ability to transform their neighborhood.  
However, the loss of the packing plants had the paradoxical potential to simultaneously 
threaten and reinforce this transformation.
17
  That is, the flight of industry meant that 
large numbers of African-Americans would no longer be working in the neighborhood 
(seemingly in accordance with the wishes of a significant number of white ethnic 
residents) while, at the same time, the rise in vacant land and crumbling packinghouse 
infrastructure coupled with declining tax revenue threatened to plunge the neighborhood 
back into a slum.    
 Andrew Wiese contends that “suburban land became a focus of racial struggle in 
the postwar United States.  In the postwar era, whites of various social classes united 
along racial lines to restrict the benefits of suburban living to ‘Caucasians only.’”18  The 
debates over space in Back of the Yards, however, reveal that the city itself was also 
contested terrain and that residents sought to downplay any benefits of suburban living in 
order to maintain the neighborhood’s racial homogeneity.  Of course, this doesn’t mean 
that suburban space was not restricted to whites only.  Rather it shows that debates over 
residential space and who could occupy those spaces—debates that were fraught with not 
                                                          
16
 See Arnold R. Hirsch, Making the Second Ghetto:  Race and Housing in Chicago, 1940-1960, (New 
York:  Cambridge University  Press, 1983), 195-196 for a discussion of how neighborhood integration 
challenged urban immigrant communities’ newly achieved status as white, in particular how a concern with 
interracial marriage revealed this fear of losing a tenuous white identity. 
17
 See James R. Barrett and David Roediger, “Inbetween Peoples: Race, Nationality and the ‘New 
Immigrant’ Working Class,” Journal of American Ethnic History, Vol. 16, No. 3 (Spring, 1997); David 
Roedgier, Working Toward Whiteness:  How America’s Immigrants Became White, (New York:  Basic 
Books, 2006) for an overview of immigrants “learning” race in America and, by doing so, essentially 
becoming white as they sought to differentiate themselves from African-Americans. 
18
 Andrew Wiese, Places of Their Own:  African-American Suburbanization in the Twentieth Century, 
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2004), 95. 
  
15 
 
a little class tension—had the potential to pit white suburbs against the interests of white 
urban neighborhoods. 
 Further complicating the story of Back of the Yards is that racism and racially 
restricted neighborhoods themselves can be viewed as a form of blight.  Indeed, Stephen 
Grant Meyer argues that “racism, sadly, is probably a permanent blight on the American 
community.”19  While Meyer doesn’t necessarily mean the type of literal physical blight 
seen in the built environment of Back of the Yards and in the following pages, he 
nevertheless highlights something essential about the deleterious effects that racism has 
had and continues to have on communities.  Racism, whether of the institutional or 
individual variety, has undoubtedly contributed greatly to the disintegration of 
neighborhoods and towns and cities of various sizes, as well as the sense of community in 
these spaces.  That is, the urban crisis is fundamentally about race.  This is, perhaps, what 
is so tragic in Back of the Yards.  While the white residents labored steadfastly in an 
effort to prevent the supposed decline of their neighborhood that would come from 
allowing African-Americans to live in it, it was their very racism (as well as that of a 
variety of institutions) that ensured the neighborhood’s ultimate decline.  Whereas the 
residents feared integration, it was ultimately segregation that was the community’s 
undoing.    
 George Lipsitz also argues that “racialized space ultimately hurts everyone” for a 
variety of reasons, including the fact that “it promotes a suburban culture of contempt and 
fear that fuels opposition to sensible economies of scale, that encourages each subunit of 
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government to try to win gains against every other subunit.
20”  The story of Back of the 
Yards complicates this understanding, however, by showing that class antagonisms 
promoted the same type of fears.  Back of the Yards residents were fighting a battle on 
two fronts.  On the first, they sought to stem the flow of residents to the suburbs realizing 
the deleterious effects such flight would have on the community, its institutions, and its 
property values.  On the other, they attempted to keep African-Americans out of the 
neighborhood as a way of maintaining their privileged status due to their whiteness.  
Lipsitz goes on to argue that “perhaps most important, [racialized space] undermines 
democracy by isolating Black People and the spatial and social imaginaries they have 
developed over time from potential white allies who would derive great benefit from 
them—if they could only overcome their allegiances to racial privilege.”21  Increasingly 
they also blamed the government for siding with African-Americans in these disputes 
over housing (though it’s a charitable view to think that the federal government did much 
to end housing discrimination).  As Thomas Sugrue argues, white Detroit residents “grew 
increasingly critical of what they perceived as the growing disjuncture between federal 
social policy and their own interest, and the apparent acquiescence of an activist 
government in the demands of those who sought racial and economic leveling.”22   
This is the ultimate tragedy of the neighborhood’s history, particularly a 
neighborhood that served as such an important model of the power of social democracy 
and interracial unionism—its white residents were unable to overcome their allegiances 
to racial privilege and enlist the support of like-minded African-American residents of the 
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surrounding neighborhoods to fend off the challenges posed by suburbanization and 
deindustrialization.  These are some of the problems I will take up in the following 
chapters.  In particular, this project will examine why and the process by which white 
residents attempted to shore up their white privilege by maintaining the community’s 
racial homogeneity, which was closely linked to the crisis of deindustrialization.       
This dissertation will make important contributions to the historiographies of 
labor, social, and environmental history in examining the ways that race, labor, and the 
built environment interact with each other.  But it is also important in larger debates 
about the shift in how and what we eat as well as the recent literature such as Eric 
Schlosser’s Fast Food Nation, Michael Pollan’s Omnivore’s Dilemma, Jonathon Safron 
Foer’s Eating Meat, and others that document the radical changes within the last 50 years 
in how we produce and consume our food, namely meat.
23
  As Schlosser, Pollan, 
Bittman, and the local food movement in general argue for a more intimate connection to 
our food, it’s important to examine how we’ve become disconnected from the source of 
our food.  While some might argue for a return to the farm or at least a personal 
connection to the farmer who’s raising and slaughtering your chickens or growing your 
arugula it’s important to realize the logistical and economic limitations of such an 
approach.  This mythical past (if such a thing actually existed) is likely much longer ago 
than many would care to admit.  At least since the advent of the Union Stock Yards at the 
conclusion of the Civil War (and even before that with the development of Cincinnati as 
“Porkopolis”) much of the country’s meat production has long been done on an industrial 
scale.  The shift in production of meat from the city to the countryside has allowed for 
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this growing ignorance about the source of our food.  In essence, the decline of the 
packing industry in Chicago (and other urban settings) means that fewer and fewer 
Americans have any idea about where their meat comes from and how it is processed.     
Most Americans might also be multiple generations removed from slaughtering 
their own livestock but there is some truth to the notion that even residents of large 
metropolises like Chicago in the mid-twentieth century had a better idea of where their 
meat was coming from and that, indeed, meatpacking has become less local.  Residents 
of and visitors to Chicago once toured the packing plants, marveling at the modernity and 
ingenuity of the “disassembly” lines. Sinclair described one such tour in The Jungle in 
which the visitors gawked in amazement at the efficiency of the whole process (and 
philosophized about the barbarity of it as well):  “It was all so very businesslike that one 
watched it fascinated.  It was pork-making by machinery, pork-making by applied 
mathematics.  And yet somehow the most matter-of-fact person could not help thinking 
of the hogs…Now and then a visitor wept, to be sure; but this slaughtering-machine ran 
on, visitors or no visitors.”24  Rudyard Kipling was considerably less impressed on his 
tour of the packing plants, particularly with the apparent callousness of the female 
visitors who witnessed this slaughter.  He described one woman who “stood in a patch of 
sunlight, the red blood under her shoes, the vivid carcasses tacked round her, a bullock 
bleeding its life away not six feet from her, and the death factory roaring all round her.  
She looked curiously, with hard, bold eyes, and was not ashamed.”25  Even if they 
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weren’t slaughtering the animals themselves, they could see (and smell and hear) where 
and how it was done.  As the reception of The Jungle and subsequent government 
oversight of the meat industry indicated, there was a fair amount of concern with the 
conditions under which meat was produced and that oversight was easier to achieve when 
meat packing was concentrated in a few large urban centers like Chicago.    
Since, the middle of the 20
th
 century, however, this scrutiny is increasingly no 
longer the case—meatpacking is hidden in the countryside away from the eyes, noses, 
and consciousness of the vast majority of Americans due to decentralization.  How this 
has affected the typical American diet and American’s relationship to their food is a topic 
that is probably best left to these food philosophers but this dissertation can help to 
examine the process by which this disconnect from our food has taken place.  It can also 
help to re-focus our attention on the workers themselves.  Just as The Jungle 
(inadvertently) succeeded in turning the nation’s collective stomach rather than 
generating outrage about the condition of workers, these modern food philosophers 
concentrate on the middle- and upper-class consumers and their relationship with food.  
While there is much to be celebrated in the work of Pollan, Bittman, and others, this 
attention to the food necessarily elides the role of actual people and communities in 
producing that food.   This is one oversight that this dissertation seeks to address.  Those 
who lament the deterioration of the American diet are writing for an audience concerned 
primarily with their own health and well-being (and they have the luxury to be so 
concerned and the financial capability to address these concerns).  I hope, however, to 
refocus attention on those workers who suffered (and continue to suffer) economically 
from the changes taking place in the meatpacking industry.     
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This study discusses how these broad structural changes that have been ongoing 
since at least the middle of the 20
th
 century had an immediate effect on people in a 
particular neighborhood, changes that would continue to build until we have the problems 
with our food (and suburban sprawl) that these and other authors outline.  While this is 
certainly no wistful or sentimental longing for a mythical past that was somehow better, 
this study will examine the ways in which the large meatpacking corporations have 
cemented their power over their workers, the environment, their animals, and the 
American public.   
This dissertation also builds on academic works such as Rick Halpern’s Down on 
the  Killing Floor, Shelton Stromquist’s Unionizing the Jungles, and Roger Horowitz’s 
“Negro and White, Unite and Fight!” which examine how changes to the industry in the 
first half of the 20
th
 century led workers to greater political awareness and a willingness 
to unite across racial and ethnic lines in order to secure the necessary benefits of 
unionization.
26
  My work goes further to interrogate the unraveling of those coalitions as 
the continued evolution of the meatpacking industry fed—both purposely and not— 
working class segmentation by pitting Black and white workers against each other as 
whites sought to hold on to their hard-won gains and their neighborhoods.   
Some of these more celebratory works on union-building emphasize the 
progressive nature of the UPWA, particularly on civil rights matters.  However, they 
often leave unanswered the question of whether and how the interracial union altered the 
racial perceptions and values of white workers who weren’t active in the union or weren’t 
left wing like many in the UPWA’s leadership positions.  The post-war history of the 
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Back of the Yards seems to suggest that such workers might be willing to tolerate cross-
racial coalitions as long as times were good, but as soon as white workers were 
threatened by the dangers of deindustrialization they once again circled the racial wagons 
to protect their own white privilege.  Economic vulnerability, therefore, contributed to 
white resistance to integration.  Indeed, Thomas Sugrue argues that “a newly assertive 
working-class whiteness” was “eating away at the ‘liberal consensus,’ just as it reached 
its postwar apotheosis.”27  This was evident in other blue-collar northern cities as well.  
In Detroit, for instance, the 1949 mayoral election saw white union members vote 
overwhelmingly against the union-backed candidate who favored making decent housing 
available for African-Americans in favor of the conservative candidate who vehemently 
opposed “Negro invasions.”28  All of which shows that beginning in the immediate post-
war period racial concerns (particularly those dealing with housing) trumped class or 
labor affiliation.  White workers, who worked alongside Blacks, steadfastly refused to 
support candidates and policies that favored neighborhood integration which led one 
activist to lament that these white workers failed to “see the relationship between their 
life in the plant and their life in the community.”29  Fears of an integrated neighborhood, 
in other words, made it impossible to translate an interracial workplace into working for 
racial justice in the wider community.  
While the union and workplace were integrated by the time that the packing 
plants started leaving Back of the Yards, the neighborhood was most certainly not.  Those 
white workers who remained in the packing plants (along with the white residents of the 
neighborhood) were, therefore, less likely to find racial common cause with Black 
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workers as the number of jobs declined at the same time that African-Americans in the 
surrounding neighborhoods were potentially threatening to integrate the community. 
This is not to suggest, however, that the decline of the packing industry was the 
sole cause of resistance to integration in Back of the Yards.  Well before this process of 
deindustrialization began in earnest in the 1950s, the neighborhood (like other white 
Chicago neighborhoods) was inhospitable to African-Americans.
30
  For instance, the riots 
in November 1949 in Visitation Parish, on the southeastern edge of Back of the Yards, in 
protest against the incorrect belief that African-Americans had bought a home in the area 
reveals the degree to which white working class (particularly Catholic) neighborhoods 
resisted integration.  When a woman reported that eight African-Americans were in the 
home of a Jewish (and, it was eventually revealed, communist) labor organizer, crowds 
began to assemble outside his house, which was several blocks southeast of Back of the 
Yards.  Crowds of up to 10,000 gathered over the course of three nights hurling anti-
Semitic, anti-communist, and racist invective as well as projectiles.  White rioters 
stopped unfamiliar faces and doled out beatings to African-Americans as well as those 
from outside the neighborhood who were suspected of being Jewish and/or communist.  
Police only made minimal effort to control the white mobs.
31
  All of this was done with 
the tacit approval of parish priest Daniel Byrnes who had already organized parishioners 
against Black movement into the area.
32
  So while deindustrialization may not have 
caused resistance to integration in Back of the Yards, it did raise the stakes to a certain 
extent and made defense of the neighborhood even more significant to the white ethnics 
who felt as if there were a multiplicity of forces working against them which posed a 
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serious economic threat.  As Arnold Hirsch noted about the violence at the Trumbull Park 
Homes which began in 1953, white residents of the South Deering neighborhood felt as if 
“homes, savings, and the ability to maintain social and familial networks were at stake.”33  
The decline of the packing industry also highlighted the degree of privilege these 
residents had because of their status as white but also simultaneously revealed the limits 
of their privilege as members of the working class.   
As George Lipsitz argues, the racialization of space like that which took place in 
Back of the Yards, isolates Black people from their potential white allies in resisting their 
shared oppression at the hands of economic elites but only if whites could overcome their 
allegiances to racial privilege to do so.
34
  In this case, at least, whites were unable to 
overcome those allegiances.  In other words, the potential for a cross-racial response to 
the problems of deindustrialization was undone by white workers’ and the white ethnic 
Back of the Yards community’s desire to maintain their racial privilege. 
 The story of Back of the Yards also reveals something about post-Civil Rights 
political realignment and the shift of the white working class to the Republican Party.  
This is a transition that Jefferson Cowie admirably examines in Stayin’ Alive:  The 1970s 
and the Last Days of the Working Class.  According to Cowie, this move of the white 
working class from the New Deal coalition to the Republican Party was driven in part by 
the recessions of the 1970s, the apparent failure of unions to deal with the declining 
economic position of American industrial workers, and the loss of jobs overseas.  
Coupled with this decline was the sense among white industrial workers that the Civil 
Rights movement (and the political advancement of the movement’s goals) served to 
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further erode their position in American society.  As Cowie put it “Diversity arrived to 
American industry just as industry was leaving America.”35  This only tells part of the 
story, however, at least in regard to the packing industry which integrated much earlier.  
By the 1950s white packinghouse workers were already beginning to resent their Black 
fellow workers as jobs declined and packing plants fled the city.
36
   
This white animosity against both perceived underserving African-Americans and 
the government which was seen as supporting the rights of Blacks at the expense of the 
hard-won gains of white ethnics was evident elsewhere, too.  As Sugrue shows, the white 
working class in post-war Detroit embraced a politics that portrayed them as victims. And 
“many whites believed that civil rights for Blacks were won only at the expense of white 
rights.”37  Another white worker expressed support for racial equality but tempered that 
by stating “but I wouldn’t want them for a neighbor nor growing up with my children.”38  
In a process that would play itself out both nationally and in Back of the Yards, the white 
working class increasingly viewed itself as having achieved a measure of stability and 
respectability through hard work by the end of WWII and they resented efforts on the 
part of African-Americans to horn in on those gains.  According to this line of thinking, 
white workers had fought long and hard to secure better wages and working conditions 
that allowed for them to purchase homes in neighborhoods that they worked equally hard 
to build up.  Black migration into these neighborhoods threatened the sense of 
community, not to mention the property values, that these white ethnics had worked so 
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diligently to develop.  Moreover, they felt these Black newcomers were undeserving (one 
opponent of a public housing project in Detroit remarked “it looks as if, we the white 
people are being discriminated against.  Let the colored people make their own district, as 
we had to do.”) and only government intervention on the behalf of African-Americans 
allowed them entrance into these communities that they otherwise had no right to be in.
39
  
The white working class also resented their taxes being used to subsidize Black housing 
(which fit neatly with growing corporate anti-tax rhetoric) and, as Sugrue argues, they 
were “increasingly critical of what they perceived as the growing disjuncture between 
federal social policy and their own interest, and the apparent acquiescence of an activist 
government in the demands of those who sought racial and economic leveling.”40  To be 
fair, though, Black protestors against employment discrimination also argued that they 
had the right to jobs because “we pay as much taxes as everybody else.  We certainly 
deserve something for them.  We’ll keep marching peacefully until we get our rights.”41       
 George Lipsitz also argues that decades of counter-productive housing policy has 
pitted rich against poor and forced different groups of homeowners to fight against each 
other in a zero-sum game to maximize property values and minimize their obligation to 
the economic and social infrastructure that would ensure prosperity, stability, and 
security, the very things that groups like homeowner associations seek.  The result is a 
national “contempt for the oppressed”42 in which the prevailing ethos is “I got mine, 
screw everyone else.”  This desire to maximize their own economic well-being at the 
expense of the common good has, Lipsitz argues, “helped create what is surely the most 
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sullen, surly, embittered, and disgruntled group of ‘haves’ in the history of the world.”43  
 Moreover, because they are “unwilling to face the consequences of how three 
decades of tax cuts for corporations and wealthy individuals have undermined the 
material and moral well-being of this society, white property owners vent their rage 
against immigrants and inner-city residents, supporting policies that punish the poor and 
reward the rich, and in the process exacerbate the very problems they purport to 
address.”44  This study of the Back of the Yards helps explain, in part, how we have 
arrived at this point and contributes to the work of Arnold Hirsch, Beryl Satter, Amanda 
Seligman, and others that detail how decades of housing discrimination contributed to 
modern racial disparities in wealth.
45
   But when the packing plants began leaving the 
neighborhood in the 1950s, this outcome was by no means assured.  Back of the Yards 
residents, betrayed by the large packing plants which were drawn to the rural South, 
Great Plains, and Midwest by tax incentives, fewer regulations, and a more compliant 
workforce, initially turned their anger toward the corporations and the suburbs who 
sought to siphon off white ethnics from the community, agitating against the type of 
policies designed to benefit the powerful at their expense.  This story is more complicated 
than Lipsitz makes it out to be, then.  Back of the Yards residents, for decades looked 
down upon as slum-dwellers, backward immigrants, or labor agitators fought against the 
types of policies that privileged the suburbs and denigrated the inner-city.  As time 
progressed, however, residents of the neighborhood began to turn their indignation 
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toward keeping African-Americans out of the community, precisely the type of attitude 
that Lipsitz describes.   
 Those suburbs, with their private dwellings and private municipal services, may 
appear to be the product of rational market forces—that people in the post-World War II 
era wanted detached homes with large private yards and expanses of green spaces and the 
market was simply providing them with what they wanted.  But, Lipsitz argues, “in 
reality they reflect the coordinated manipulation of market forces by wealthy 
corporations and their allies in government” who influenced Federal Housing 
Administration policy to promote middle-class lily-white suburbs whose residents could 
physically separate themselves from the more unsavory aspects of city life.
46
  Not 
coincidentally these policies, coming at the height of the Civil Rights Movement when 
Black activists were trying to desegregate public facilities, promoted segregation.  Those 
in the suburbs didn’t have to share physical space with African-Americans and they 
didn’t have to pay taxes for public services or facilities that would be used by African-
Americans.   
 At the same time, corporations and their allies in government were manipulating 
public policy and market forces to facilitate the movement of factories from cities to rural 
areas.  While suburbanization/white flight and deindustrialization would appear to be two 
separate trends they were actually intimately entwined and driven by governmental 
policies, often enacted at the behest of corporations that stood to benefit from these shifts 
in housing and industrial development, and neither was the sole product of rational 
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market forces.  The same attitudes that saw middle and upper class whites remove their 
tax dollars from promoting the public interest also drove corporations to do the same.  
Suburban and rural areas’ lower tax burden was one of the most attractive features to 
meatpacking plants that were looking to abandon Chicago.  In the same way, the lower 
wages paid to workers in these new rural plants enabled the packers to keep a larger slice 
of the pie.     
 In some ways this illuminates the story of a changing America that George Packer 
tells in The Unwinding:  The Inner History of the New America.  The evolution of  Back 
of the Yards reflects larger national trends—the exploitation of immigrants and labor, the 
poor living conditions of the city, followed by a tenuous post-Depression and post-World 
War II consensus that promised a decent standard of living and a better life for future 
generations as long as you worked hard and played by the rules.  As Packer points out 
this consensus left out large segments of the population (women, African-Americans, 
etc.) but the general trend was toward a grudging acknowledgement that American 
injustice could and should be rectified.
47
  With the loss of industry in Back of the Yards, 
however, we can see that this consensus was unraveling much earlier than the 1970s 
(which is when Packer, as well as Cowie see this fundamental shift happening).  The 
country was becoming more individualistic, more corporate, less community-minded and 
less equal.  The fractures in the social contract that were clearly apparent by the late 
1970s were already in evidence by the late 1950s—the consensus was unraveling even as 
it was first materializing.
48
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 Likewise, Daniel Rodgers argues that the late 1970s and 1980s was a time of 
fracture in which the way Americans thought about foundational institutions was 
radically altered, driven by the rhetoric and war of ideas waged by the conservative 
movement.
49
  Ronald Reagan’s celebration of the individual, Jerry Falwell’s emphasis on 
personal responsibility, and economic conservatives’ valorization of the rational market 
all served to turn Americans away from the post-war consensus according to this line of 
thinking.  However, as we will see in the case of the Back of the Yards, this 
fragmentation was not simply a product of the economic downturn of the 1970s or a 
backlash against the supposed excesses of the 1960s.  In the 1950s the meatpackers were 
pushing these same ideas—they argued that the rational workings of the market, an unfair 
tax burden, and cumbersome government regulations all forced them to abandon Chicago 
and its workers.   
Moreover, the reaction of the white residents of the neighborhood shows that the 
backlash against the Civil Rights movement (and against the idea that government had a 
right and responsibility to ameliorate injustice) began much earlier than the 1970s.
50
  
Likewise Sugrue posits that the movement of working class whites away from the 
Democratic Party can’t simply be understood as a reaction against the Civil Rights 
movement and the excesses of the 1960s.  Rather, “urban antiliberalism had deep roots in 
a simmering politics of race and neighborhood defensiveness that divided northern cities 
well before Wallace began his first speaking tours in the snowbelt, well before Lyndon B. 
Johnson signed the Civil Rights Act of 1964, well before the long, hot summers of Watts, 
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Harlem, Chicago, Newark, and Detroit, and well before affirmative action and busing 
began to dominate the civil rights agenda.”51  Similarly, Arnold Hirsch claims that violent 
white opposition in “Trumbull Park, Marquette Park, Gage Park, Belmont-Cragin, South 
Boston, Charlestown, Bensonhurst, Howard Beach, and Canarsie [and, I would add, Back 
of the Yards] hardly rate as civil rights landmarks in the same sense as Montgomery, 
Selma, or Birmingham, but they are symbols, nonetheless.  More than mere examples of 
anti-Black animus, they exposed the political and ideological limits of the civil rights 
era.”52 In Chicago, for instance, Mayor Martin H. Kelly was essentially forced out of 
office before the 1947 election for his pro-integration stances which prompted one white 
resident to claim that Kelly was “too good to the niggers.”53   
 On the whole, this is the story of the urban crisis in Back of the Yards which, 
although it shares certain features with other cities and neighborhoods facing their own 
set of problems from the 1950s onward, is unique in several respects.
54
  For Back of the 
Yards the urban crisis consisted of the threats from deindustrialization and its attendant 
consequences—lack of jobs and tax revenue, the potential decay of the built environment, 
loss of residents to the suburbs, and the changing racial makeup of the neighborhood.  
Each chapter deals with a different element of this crisis. 
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 In Chapter 1 I examine the packing industry’s abandonment of Back of the Yards 
and how deindustrialization affected the union, the workers, and the neighborhood itself.  
I argue that the packers, despite rhetoric about the economic necessity of closing big city 
packing plants and relocating jobs to the countryside, were motivated primarily by a 
desire to break the union and pay lower wages to a mostly white rural workforce.  By 
looking at the decline of the industry, I am countering the dominant scholarly focus on 
the early decades of the twentieth century when workers toiled in the deplorable 
conditions described in The Jungle but eventually succeeded in unionizing the packing 
plants.  Moreover, I provide a more thorough examination of the effects of 
deindustrialization and how it influenced myriad historical actors, including the workers 
themselves, their neighborhood, and how they related to that neighborhood.  Indeed, 
Steve May and Laura Morrison argue that “the experience of deindustrialization is firmly 
rooted in the personal identities of manufacturing workers, the companies for whom they 
work(ed), and the communities in which they live(d).”55  That is, in order to fully 
understand the effects of deindustrialization, we must examine how the workers and their 
communities dealt with the loss of jobs and how this affected workers’ relationships with 
their neighborhoods.   
 While the story of meatpacking’s desertion of Chicago is not nearly as inspiring 
as the story of the workers’ successful fight against corporate behemoths for their rights 
and a decent wage as well as the community’s transformation from polluted slum to a 
model of working-class democracy, it is one that needs to be told.  Looking at the decline 
of the industry in Chicago and of the neighborhood in general reveals much about the 
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attitudes of the workers and about deindustrialization generally.  By focusing on the nadir 
of the meatpacking industry in Chicago rather than on the boom times, we can perhaps 
better understand certain facets of working class life.   
 One of the most important works on the neighborhood, Robert Slayton’s Back of 
the Yards:  The Making of a Local Democracy reveals the pitfalls of such an approach 
that celebrates the neighborhood’s development into a model working class community.  
Slayton, in an otherwise admirable examination of this transformation, characterizes the 
neighborhood’s turnaround as occurring at a time when the neighborhood should have 
been in a state of decline:  “all of this happened when the neighborhood, by standard 
social science criteria, should have died.  During the fifties most of the packers left 
Chicago, taking with them the jobs and the industries that had created the community 
west of the Union Stockyards—the result of decentralization of meat-packing and the 
increasing use of truck, rather than train, transport.  The removal should have signaled the 
death knell for Back of the Yards, a time of despair and deterioration.  Instead, the fifties 
and the sixties were boom decades, a period of renewal and growth.  This success, this 
triumph over disaster, was the greatest achievement in the Council’s history, and it grew 
directly out of democratic utilization of community resources.”56  In his haste to celebrate 
the Neighborhood Council and the transformation of the community Slayton ignores the 
fact that these decades were hardly boom times despite the apparent health of the 
community and its institutions.  Any appearance of progress was tenuous at best and an 
illusion at worst.  Far from a time of “renewal and growth” for the entire community they 
were a time of anxiety about the future and attempts to stave off the inevitable.   
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 In short, the workers and the union were unable to prevent the loss of jobs, plant 
shutdowns, and the transfer of jobs to more rural, less union-friendly areas of the country. 
Despite their intense efforts to prevent plant shutdowns and to lessen the effects of the 
packing plants leaving Chicago, the decline of the meatpacking industry would have 
tremendous negative consequences for workers, the union, and the neighborhood.  When 
it became clear that the industry was leaving, the community turned toward attracting 
new types of industry.  I argue that the type of industry they hoped to attract (or to 
prevent from moving into the neighborhood) had much to do with workers’ and 
residents’ attitudes toward the packing plants that had abandoned them.  Moreover, this 
relative powerlessness to control the industrial character of the neighborhood would also 
lead to efforts to exert influence over the types of people who could move into the 
community.      
 Jefferson Cowie and Joseph Heathcott argue that “the dominant method of 
studying deindustrialization is to trace the death of mills like Homestead [or the packing 
plants in Back of the Yards] and the workers’ experiences of that process.”57  While the 
first chapter adheres to that framework, subsequent chapters aim to “move the terms of 
the discussion ‘beyond the ruins’” but at the same time acknowledge the powerful role 
that the built environment (and its subsequent destruction) played in shaping people’s 
lives and their interactions with their community.
58
  The second chapter will analyze 
neighborhood revitalization efforts, in particular the community’s struggle to cope with 
the loss of jobs and efforts to entice new industry.  In the years immediately following the 
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meatpacking exodus from Chicago, Back of the Yards leaders tried to attract new 
business to replace the packing plants with varying degrees of success.   
 By the 1950s, however, most workers in the packing plant were African-
Americans who lived outside of the neighborhood which significantly influenced how the 
community approached the problem of job losses and the decline in tax revenue.  During 
World War II the packing industry had undergone a dramatic shift in racial composition.  
The labor shortage caused by defense mobilization allowed many white workers to find 
higher paying jobs in defense industries and many never returned to the packing houses.  
This provided an opportunity for thousands of Black migrants from the South to find 
work in the meatpacking industry.
59
  Despite the community’s long association with 
meatpacking and the pride most residents took in living in the neighborhood, increasingly 
residents came to resent the packing industry and resist any attempts for smaller packing 
plants and associated industries to remain in or relocate to the community.  In part this 
was driven by long-standing antagonisms between the neighborhood and the packers and 
the fact that the community felt abandoned by them.  But the desire to replace packing 
plants with different types of industry was also influenced by the fact that the 
composition of the work force had changed and residents of the community were less 
likely to work in the packing plants.  Because the majority of the packinghouse workers 
were Black and lived outside of the neighborhood by the mid-1950s, residents of the 
community were less inclined to see the packing plants return.  Additionally, there were 
other types of industry that were viewed unfavorably, such as trucking terminals, that 
residents viewed as threatening to their hard-won respectability.  The fact that residents 
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were also unsuccessful at keeping out some of these types of businesses reveals their 
relative powerlessness to exert full control over their neighborhood.   
Moreover, their responses were also influenced by a burgeoning anti-pollution 
movement that was closely tied to the community’s efforts to reinvent itself and 
transform the neighborhood from a polluted slum.  Many residents no longer wanted to 
be associated with the terrible contamination, horrible smells, and deplorable living 
conditions that came along with the packinghouses. Whereas once residents bore the 
stench with a sense of pride and resented outsiders who looked down upon them for it, 
they increasingly wanted to be seen as respectable and to be respectable meant, in part, a 
clean community that was free of the ills associated with the packing plants.
60
   
Coupled with the desire to draw in new industry was a desire to keep African-
Americans out of the neighborhood and to prevent whites from fleeing to the suburbs—
the subject of Chapter 3.  Although the neighborhood had long resisted integration, those 
pressures from the surrounding overcrowded Black Belt were increasing dramatically.  
As Back of the Yards residents found themselves powerless to prevent the flight of the 
packing industry and not entirely successful in drawing in other types of manufacturing 
to the neighborhood, they increasingly sought to exert some authority over one situation 
that they felt they could control—who lived in the neighborhood.  To be sure, this 
resistance to integration was not new.  The neighborhood and others that surrounded the 
Black Belt had a long reputation for being unwelcoming to African-Americans.  Nor was 
this resistance confined to Back of the Yards or Chicago.  Other neighborhoods and other 
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northern cities saw intense and violent reactions against Black pioneers moving into 
white neighborhoods.
61
  There was also some tenuous support among some in the 
neighborhood for orderly integration.  Overall, however, most of the white ethnics in the 
neighborhood wanted to maintain residential segregation even if they didn’t necessarily 
react violently.    
Amiri Baraka argues that the central problem African-Americans face on a day-
to-day basis is “the powerlessness of Black people to control their own fate or that of 
their families in capitalist America where race is place, white is right, and money makes 
and defines the man.”62  Indeed, this Black powerlessness coupled with the ability of 
white people regardless of social class to exert some measure of control over their 
neighborhoods is clearly evident in Back of the Yards.   While they may not have 
resorted to the extreme violence of other white ethnic neighborhoods in the city, residents 
of Back of the Yards nevertheless were able to promote an atmosphere that was 
unwelcoming to African-Americans, not only because of the individual actions and 
behaviors that were available to them as white people, but also because of the structural 
forces in place that served white interests and were arrayed against the interests of the 
African-American community.      
While Back of the Yards avoided some of the worst racial violence that 
characterized other Chicago neighborhoods in the middle decades of the 20
th
 century it 
nevertheless developed a reputation of being unwelcoming to African-Americans such 
that Saul Alinsky took to calling its residents segregationists.  At the same time the very 
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forces that led to the decline of the packing industry in the city threatened to siphon off 
white residents to the burgeoning suburbs.  As residents sought to shore up their 
neighborhood against blockbusting real estate agents, supposed declining property values 
if African-Americans moved in, and vacant industrial land, they feared a return to the 
slum-like conditions described in The Jungle that they had fought so hard to eliminate.  
The 1960s and beyond, then, was a time of transition in which the neighborhood, which 
had once been inextricably linked to a particular industry and pride at working in that 
industry, became defined by race and racial exclusion.  Complicating this story is the 
influx of Mexican Americans beginning in the 1920s.  As their population in the 
neighborhood increased they allied themselves with the community’s white ethnics to 
keep out African-Americans. 
Chapter 4 will examine a variety of images of the neighborhood, particularly 
those dealing with the deterioration and eventual demolition of the neighborhood’s 
packing plant infrastructure.  I argue that these images reveal quite a bit about how 
residents made sense of their neighborhood as it crumbled around them.  The 
photographs highlight the residents’ inability to exert control over the landscape and 
expose how the deteriorating packinghouse infrastructure had the potential to drag the 
community back into slum-like conditions.  The fears that many residents had about the 
tenuous nature of the community are quite evident in the neighborhood’s physical decay 
and in the fact that people sought to record the images of this decay in the first place.  
Finally, a conclusion examines the importance of this dissertation and anticipates other 
areas of inquiry that this study opens up.   
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Typically, studies such as this which examine a particular neighborhood, city, 
industry, or union tend to ignore the importance of the built environment in shaping 
people’s conception of themselves and their neighborhood, how they responded to 
problems within that neighborhood, and changes in the community.  But that is exactly 
what I want to accomplish here—to showcase the landscape and built environment as a 
historical actor that exerted tremendous influence on the history of Back of the Yards, its 
residents, and their actions.  The railroads, highways, and packing plants that separated 
the neighborhood from the rest of Chicago promoted a sense of insularity and a desire on 
the part of residents to take care of their own affairs.  The foul air and smoke that 
besmirched the community further isolated residents but at the same time promoted a 
sense of pride and an underdog mentality that resented outsiders who looked down on 
Back of the Yards because of its pollution.  And when that infrastructure that contributed 
so much to how both residents and those outside the community viewed it began to fall to 
the wrecking ball or were left to the elements, residents began to view the vacant land 
and crumbling buildings as a form of blight that threatened efforts to improve and 
transform Back of the Yards.   
One of the most salient elements of this neighborhood’s story is the contradictions 
inherent in its telling, contradictions that mean there are no easy answers and ensure that 
any history of Back of the Yards is sure to be a contentious one.  As the following pages 
will show, residents were quite adept at holding conflicting ideas about themselves and 
their neighborhood simultaneously as well as ideas that were at odds with reality.  The 
history of the community also reveals some of the fundamental tensions at the heart of 
the mid-twentieth century history of American deindustrialization, residential 
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segregation, fights over urban space, the decline of organized labor, political realignment, 
and suburbanization among other things.  Residents, for instance resented outsiders’ 
views of the neighborhood but at the same time sought to transform the community to 
make it more respectable and shake off the negative perceptions.  Despite professing a 
fair amount of insularity and pride in the community and its ability to take care of its own 
affairs, Back of the Yards nevertheless attempted to fundamentally remake itself and to 
do so with the assistance of local, state, and federal political leaders.  Although they 
claimed they had transformed the neighborhood on their own and exhibited distrust of 
outsiders, many community leaders had a fair amount of local political clout which 
allowed for city government to address the neighborhood’s problems and contribute 
significantly to its turnaround.  Residents both resented elitist outsiders and sought their 
approval.  They railed against government intervention in such matters as forced 
integration while at the same time expecting government to protect their supposed right 
to segregated neighborhoods.   
As industry fled the neighborhood, residents both lamented and celebrated its 
leaving.  On the one hand, the packinghouses stigmatized the neighborhood, while on the 
other, their abandonment meant a loss of jobs and a blighted landscape.  
Deindustrialization, therefore, had the potential to both enhance the neighborhood by 
eliminating pollution and contribute to its decline by increasing the amount of vacant 
land and deteriorating packinghouse infrastructure.  Residents and community leaders 
wanted to attract industry in the aftermath of deindustrialization, but only certain types of 
industry which they felt would not stigmatize and burden the community. Further, white 
packinghouse workers who acknowledged the need for an interracial union and worked 
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alongside African-Americans nevertheless didn’t want to live in the same neighborhood 
as Blacks and argued that it was actually white ethnics who were being discriminated 
against.  As such, Back of the Yards was particularly unwelcoming to African-Americans 
but also avoided some of the worst violence that plagued other Chicago neighborhoods.           
Ultimately, I hope to tell the story of a changing neighborhood and changing 
industry while trying to avoid the assumption that the neighborhood was historically 
static or that this change represented a departure from the community’s essential 
character.  That is, the neighborhood was always changing, always in flux, and always 
contested.  The transformation that took place as a result of deindustrialization was, 
therefore, not necessarily new.  The development and decline of the packing industry, the 
neighborhood, its built environment, and its demographics were products of particular 
historical moments and forces.  While the neighborhood has been fundamentally altered, 
it’s important to realize that despite the name of the community and its long association 
with the packing industry the time period that led to this identity for the neighborhood 
was a relatively short one for the geographic space that the neighborhood occupies.  The 
residents of the community and the types of jobs that are available to them therein may 
have changed but that doesn’t mean that they are any less legitimate occupiers of and 
definers of the landscape.  After all, those who first built the railroads and stockyards in 
the erstwhile swampland had fundamentally changed the environs.   
 Although the decline of the packing industry in Back of the Yards dramatically 
altered the landscape, who and what occupied that landscape, and had profound effects 
on the people living and working in the neighborhood, the changes taking place were just 
part of the long, unending, and continuing transformation of Back of the Yards and, 
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indeed, all places.  To be sure, there are heroes and villains in this story (although who 
plays those roles and at what time is itself a much more nuanced question) but just 
because the neighborhood has ceased to be the hog butcher to the world does not mean 
that it is no longer a vibrant, dynamic community.  Although its history should certainly 
not be ignored, the present community has value in its own right independent of its 
history.   
 However, the story told here is not entirely lacking in continuity.  Indeed, while 
some might think that these changes meant the loss of something fundamental about their 
neighborhood, Back of the Yards continues to serve as a home for vibrant immigrant 
communities just as it always had since the neighborhood became inextricably linked to 
and defined by the packing industry.  The ultimate lesson, therefore, is one of hope and 
that we should acknowledge the inevitable transformation of any space—whether it be 
urban industrial neighborhood or rural small town—while still calling attention to the 
histories of those places and understanding that these transformations benefit some 
people and not others.   In that sense, this study hopes to answer to Doreen Massey’s call 
to present histories of places as constrained by neither temporal continuity nor spatial 
simultaneity.  Instead she argues that a “‘radical’ history of a place would be one which 
did not try to present either simple temporal continuity or only spatial simultaneity with 
no sense of historical depth.  A way of understanding which, in the end, did not try to seal 
a place up into one neat and tidy ‘envelope of space-time’ but which recognised that what 
has come together, in this place, now, is a conjunction of many histories and many 
spaces.”63 This story of Back of the Yards, therefore, attempts to understand this period 
of transition between the boom times of the immediate postwar period and the hard times 
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that had descended on the neighborhood by the 1980s.  In telling that story of how Back 
of the Yards evolved from being defined by one particular industry and work in that 
industry to being defined spatially by race, though, I want to emphasize the unique role 
that the built environment has played in shaping residents’ conceptions of themselves, 
their neighborhood, and those who would seek to move into it.   
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Chapter 1 
 
“We Got One Man Where Three Men Was:” Deindustrialization’s Effects 
on Workers and the UPWA 
 
“Attributing deindustrialization not to the working of invisible hands, but to the very 
visible decisions made by governments and businesses, prompts the realization that it is 
possible to contest the social irrationality of capital flight.” 
--Mike Wallace, “Industrial Museums and the History of Deindustrialization”64 
 
Like many other Midwestern industrial cities and communities that thrived for 
much of the twentieth century, Back of the Yards is a shadow of its former industrial self.  
These communities drew life and economic sustenance from the factories and mills that 
provided employment for their newly arrived immigrants hoping to make better lives for 
their children.  Once a hive of activity, the center of the world’s meatpacking industry, 
this formerly vibrant and dynamic community became a desolate industrial wasteland 
much like Youngstown, Ohio, Gary, Indiana, and Flint, Michigan.  When the Big Four 
meatpackers—Armour, Swift, Cudahy, and Wilson—abandoned the city in the fifties and 
sixties, the community lost what had been for decades many of its major employers.  
Jobs, which had been so prevalent, were no longer easy to come by.  Unemployment 
swept the community and surrounding neighborhoods like an epidemic.
65
   
 To make matters worse, the Second Great Migration of African-Americans to the 
industrial north in the post-war period was swelling the ranks of urban workers.  These 
workers were arriving at precisely the time that the jobs were leaving.  As Ira Berlin 
noted, “they had joined the industrial working class just when a substantial portion was 
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being discarded as obsolete.”66  These people were also moving to cities like Chicago that 
were suffering from severe housing shortages, particularly for African-Americans.
67
  As a 
result, Blacks were forced into substandard, overcrowded, overpriced housing and faced 
violent reactions from white homeowners when they tried to move into white 
neighborhoods.
68
  Today about 35% of Back of the Yards’ population is African-
American but it would take until the 1980s for Blacks to make up significant portion of 
the neighborhood’s residents.69   
 Chicago wasn’t alone, however.  Throughout the middle part of the 20th century 
large meatpackers systematically left the major industrial cities of the Midwest in favor 
of rural locations and the South.
70
  Why they did so, as well as how the UPWA and its 
rank and file members responded to these plant closings is my concern in this chapter.  I 
will examine the packers’ rationale for these shifts in the industry and how these changes 
actually affected the union and its members.  Did the union and packinghouse workers 
view this transition through a purely economic lens?  Or did they see it as part of a larger 
battle over how work should be organized?  More importantly, I will look at how the 
workers viewed the changes that were taking place around them and that seemed beyond 
their control.  This lack of control over their livelihoods would have profound 
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implications for potential demographic shifts in the neighborhood, changes which they 
actually had some influence over.  
 Put simply, the union and its members didn’t subscribe to the large meatpacking 
conglomerates’ reasons for closing their Chicago plants—that older outdated plants, 
changes in shipping, and increased regulations made continued operation of urban 
packing plants unprofitable and, therefore, unfeasible.  Indeed, Swift’s Chicago plant 
manager wrote a letter to all Chicago employees in January 1957 that argued: 
 “Our experience has shown that it isn’t economically sound to continue… 
 Therefore, it has been decided to discontinue pork operations on the  
 Chicago plant….This was not an easy decision to make.  We fully appreciate the 
 effect it will have on the employment situation of many of our people… 
 Just as soon as we are able to work out more specific details, those of you who 
 are affected will be fully informed.”71 
   
 The workers resisted the loss of their livelihoods and this effort was, to a large 
extent, predicated on refuting the companies’ rhetoric that rational market forces 
necessitated closing the city’s meatpacking plants.  They argued that rather than losing 
money, the packers were making record profits thanks to escalating productivity due to 
increasing automation among other factors.  These efforts to counter the packers’ 
narrative and the workers’ ultimate failures to adequately halt or reverse the meatpackers’ 
abandonment of Chicago would, in turn, affect the neighborhood’s later efforts to attract 
industry and control who moved into and out of the neighborhood—subjects of 
subsequent chapters.   
 This chapter addresses several historiographic oversights.  First, it complicates the 
assumption, among scholars and in the popular imagination, that deindustrialization was 
mostly a phenomenon of the late 1970s.  For instance, the seminal work on 
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deindustrialization, Barry Bluestone and Bennett Harrison wrote The Deindustrialization 
of America:  Plant Closings, Community Abandonment, and the Dismantling of Basic 
Industry in response to the epidemic of plant closings that swept the country in this 
period.
72
  Much of the subsequent work spawned by this has also focused on the late 
1970s and early 1980s, ignoring, to a large degree, the historical roots of industrial flight.  
Jefferson Cowie’s Capital Moves:  RCA’s 70-Year Quest for Cheap Labor, however, is 
one example that places the beginning of urban industrial decline as far back as the 
1930s.
73
  Rather, the flight of industry to rural and suburban areas and overseas, regions 
where labor is cheap (and environmental and labor regulations are more lenient), has 
been taking place in various industries since at least the 1950s, contrary to the assumption 
that the decade was one of relative stability and economic prosperity for the working 
class. 
 Perhaps more importantly, however, histories of the Back of the Yards and the 
meatpacking industry (both nationally and in Chicago) have tended to focus on the first 
half of the twentieth century.
74
  Most of these are histories of institutions, celebrating 
either the UPWA’s unionizing of the packinghouses or the founding of the Back of the 
Yards Neighborhood Council.  These studies are mostly laudatory, and rightly so.  The 
UPWA was very successful in unionizing Chicago’s packinghouses and securing 
tremendous benefits.  Further, it was, since its founding, an interracial union that had an 
impressive record of fighting for civil rights.  The Back of the Yards Neighborhood 
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Council, founded in 1939 by Saul Alinsky and Joseph Meegan, was an important and 
dynamic part of the community that actively fought for workers’ and residents’ rights.  
However, this focus on the apogee of the meatpacking industry in Chicago skews our 
understanding of the neighborhood, the union, and the workers themselves.  It is 
important to acknowledge and even celebrate the victories of the union and the economic 
boom times.  However, to fully understand the community (and other working-class 
communities) we must also consider how people reacted to the loss of jobs and the 
dramatic altering of the landscape as well as residents’ resulting efforts to prevent 
integration.  
 While the UPWA’s response to plant closings was fairly progressive in that it 
advocated for increased governmental oversight of industry, it didn’t call for a radical 
reordering of society or attack the basic economic principle that privileged acquisition of 
wealth above everything else. Rather, the union simply called for governmental 
supervision whenever a company decided to close a plant.  For instance, a June 1961 
supplement to The Packinghouse Worker that addressed problems facing the union said 
of plant closings: 
 “Major national companies operating plants around which entire communities 
 have been built, and upon which entire communities depend, should not be 
 free to close, move, or consolidate their plants at will, leaving trails of  
economic desolation behind without some minimum degree of public 
accountability.  The very least that is needed is legislation to provide for  
governmental boards of inquiry in such situations to investigate and report 
upon the causes of, justification for, and effects of each such proposed closing 
before it is made effective.  Such legislation should confer upon these boards 
some degree of authority to consider and either recommend or carry out steps 
to meet the problems which may be involved in a proposal to close a plant.   
Such steps might include means for encouraging the continuation of the  
operation of the plant or discouraging its closing, such as the rendering of  
special financial assistance, where warranted, or the withholding of tax benefits 
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which the corporation may be seeking to achieve through the plant closing.”75 
      
The UPWA never suggested that plants shouldn’t be able to close if there was 
proof that remaining open would minimize the corporation’s profits.  The union’s 
acceptance of the packers’ economic rationale for closing plants colored the community’s 
ensuing response to attract or discourage certain kinds of industry and subsequently led to 
an effort by Back of the Yards residents to control the ethnic and racial makeup of the 
area.  The fact that they saw the packers’ decision to leave in purely rational economic 
terms meant that they viewed potential neighborhood transformation in the same way.  
The residents didn’t see themselves as racist.  Instead they just wanted to maintain their 
property values and the way to do that was to keep Blacks out (according to residents).  
While they didn’t have the power to prevent the packers’ abandonment of the 
community, they did have the ability to advocate in favor of certain industries and certain 
groups of people who could move to the neighborhood.  That is, the inability of the union 
and the workers to effectively counter the packers’ arguments for deindustrialization 
would have long-term implications for the demographic makeup of the neighborhood but 
I want to first focus on the arguments for and against disinvestment in Back of the Yards 
and the effects this would have on the union and the workers (particularly Black 
workers).    
 Perhaps ironically, it was the union’s success in inserting itself into the post-war 
political and industrial system that ultimately hindered its ability to counter the packers’ 
rights to determine plant closures.  As Paul Louis Street argues, unions made a bargain in 
which they traded a fair measure of their militancy for stability and safety:  “In exchange 
for union security, various restrictions on management freedom, and more money and 
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benefits for its workers, capital maintained its essentially complete control of the work 
process and the crucial investment, technological, and related business practices of the 
firm…[The union] acquiesced in management’s retention of its authority to determine the 
basic technological, investment, product, and marketing questions.”76  That is, the union’s 
success in becoming part of the system effectively stymied its ability to forcefully 
challenge the packers’ domination.  Even a rather militant union such as the UPWA 
could only make relatively tepid demands for economic justice instead of advocating for 
a wholesale revolution in relations between labor and capital.   UPWA president Ralph 
Helstein admitted as much, saying that winning certain concessions from packers such as 
transfers or retraining programs “represented no substantive dealing with the problem of 
job loss as the result of plant closure.  What it represented was our cushioning the blow.  
We weren’t creating jobs.  Employment in the industry was going consistently down.”77   
 In the years after World War II the meatpacking industry underwent significant 
changes that greatly impacted the Big Four.  New production methods allowed hundreds 
of new smaller firms to open meatpacking plants in the 1950s and ‘60s, seriously eroding 
the market share of the Big Four.  These plants were typically non-union, located in rural 
areas closer to livestock, and often not subject to governmental inspection.  Modernized 
and more profitable production methods that favored single story plants over the 
multistoried packinghouses of the city and less dependence on skilled labor forced the 
Big Four to adopt the innovations of these upstarts.  Increasingly they shuttered plants in 
cities in favor of new plants in rural areas where cheap land was plentiful and shipping 
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and utility costs were lower.
78
  Changes is transportation infrastructure also allowed for 
this decentralization.  The building of the interstate highways system meant that 
proximity to rail lines was less important.  Meatpackers were free to locate plants in the 
vicinity of livestock growers.   
 Roger Horowitz argues, however, that these innovations were not the primary 
reason for the Big Four’s abandonment of Chicago and other cities.  Any benefits 
achieved by technical advances and restructuring of production were short lived as other 
companies emulated these innovations.  In order to secure a competitive advantage, 
meatpacking firms had to lower the wages paid to their workers below those of their 
competitors.
79
  The key to the Big Four’s survival, therefore, was the weakening of the 
United Packinghouse Workers of America and the Amalgamated Meat Cutters and 
Butcher Workmen of North America, the UPWA’s more conservative AFL affiliated 
counterpart.
80
  As early as 1947 the large packers sought to diminish the gains the union 
made during the war when labor shortages and strikes diminished managerial control of 
the shop floor and gave workers a fair amount of informal power over work processes.
81
  
Moving to rural areas, away from the UPWA’s industrial base served to diminish the 
power and influence of the union and lower labor costs.
82
  The meatpackers never stated 
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these goals, but workers suspected that the companies were, in fact, seeking to undermine 
the union. 
 In a study of the decline of the steel industry in Pittsburgh in the late 1970s and 
early 1980s and how workers responded to plant closings, Dale Hathaway argues against 
market dominated economic pressures as the main reason for deindustrialization.  Rather, 
he says that the decision to close a plant, which we typically assume to be an economic 
decision beholden to market forces, is also political in nature as it will ultimately have a 
profound effect on the community and put a strain on government that must provide 
social services to the unemployed.  The decision to close a plant was not only to 
maximize profits but a conscious choice of the decision making elite to privilege other 
goals, such as increasing market share, over the goal of maintaining jobs and a presence 
in the community.
83
  This seems to be the case in the decline of the meatpacking industry 
as well.  The union and its members felt that the companies that were closing plants were 
making record profits and, therefore, had no need to eliminate what they considered 
unprofitable plants in cities such as Chicago.  Indeed, profits for the Big Four were rising 
at the very time that they were eliminating jobs in Chicago and other large cities.
84
 
 The loss of the meatpacking industry had profound effects on the community.  In 
lamenting the loss of jobs the Back of the Yards Neighborhood Council claimed in 1960 
that “the decrease in slaughtering and meat processing was responsible for the loss of 
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more than forty thousand jobs.”85  The Packinghouse Worker, the official publication of 
the UPWA, reported in 1959 that there were 23,700 fewer production workers in the 
meatpacking industry than there were in 1956 and that as many as 7,000 Chicago workers 
who had lost their jobs since 1955 (the year Wilson closed its Chicago operations) were 
still without work of any kind.
86
  According to the Illinois Department of Labor, in 
September 1954 there were 36,000 people engaged in the meat products industry in the 
Chicago area.  In September 1957 that number had fallen to 27,800 and by May of 1960 
only 19,100 were employed in meatpacking.
87
   
 Compounding the problem of unemployment in Chicago was the fact that there 
was little other industry in the packinghouse district where displaced workers could find 
comparable work and wages.
88
  These laid off workers were faced with a difficult choice.  
They could either move to other parts of the city where industry was more plentiful, 
abandoning the community that they had called home for several generations in many 
cases and the strong ties they had built there, or they could endure long commutes to 
work.   
 Black packinghouse workers faced even greater difficulties as segregation limited 
the areas of the city (and, in fact, of the entire country) to which they could move.
89
  
Indeed, the federal government’s housing policies ensured that African-Americans faced 
enormous constraints in determining place of residence.  As Kenneth T. Jackson argues, 
the FHA was extremely concerned about “inharmonious racial or nationality groups” and 
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its policies were designed to keep Blacks and whites spatially segregated because “it 
feared that an entire area could lose its investment value if rigid white-Black separation 
was not maintained.”90  In criticizing the FHA, urban planner Charles Abrams notably 
argued that the “FHA adopted a racial policy that could well have been culled from the 
Nuremburg laws.”91  Likewise, Beryl Satter shows that “through its appraisal system, its 
enthusiasm for racial covenants, and its refusal to insure mortgages for Blacks moving 
into white neighborhoods, the FHA effectively standardized and nationalized the hostile 
but locally variable racial biases of the private housing industry.”92   
 While Andrew Wiese argues that the rate of Black movement into suburban areas 
has generally been underestimated and understudied, such policies served to make it 
extremely difficult for Black pioneers to move into previously white neighborhoods—
either urban or suburban.
93
  Moreover, the policies of certain Chicago governmental 
agencies such as the Chicago Housing Authority and the Commission on Human 
Relations served to entrench the city’s already established segregated housing practices in 
the post-war period.
94
  Further, other industries, particularly the steel industry, were 
suffering from recession and unemployment.  When the Wilson plant closed in 1955, 
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young people could seek work in the steel mills of Gary, Indiana.  By 1959, however, 
these jobs were scarce as 100,000 steelworkers nationwide were without work.
95
 
 The closing of packinghouses also had a remarkable effect on the UPWA—
dramatically diminishing its strength and lowering its membership.  The latter part of the 
1950s saw UPWA membership enter a period of steady decline, mostly because of the 
changing nature of the packing industry.
96
  Cities such as Chicago were the source of the 
UPWA’s power in a number of ways.  Typically, Chicago’s packinghouse workers were 
among the most radical, militant, and vociferous.
97
  Furthermore, many of the most 
militant of Chicago’s members were Black—a fact with far-reaching implications as 
packinghouses left the city.  Indeed, by the 1950s African-Americans were the largest 
segment of workers in the other large Midwestern manufacturing centers of Omaha, 
Kansas City, East St. Louis, and Milwaukee and made up half to two-thirds of Chicago’s 
packinghouse workers.
98
  These jobs provided a decent living for Black Chicagoans and 
the hope of entry into middle class respectability.   
 Black workers in Chicago—who were typically better educated than workers in 
other industries—also provided the UPWA with much of its organizational strength.  The 
proportion of Black workers in the packinghouses and yards steadily increased 
throughout the 1920s and when agitation for union recognition resurfaced in the 1930s, 
African-American made up about 30 percent of the workforce.
99
  By the end of World 
War II, Black employment in the yards exceeded 40 percent.
100
  African-Americans 
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played a leading role in the formation of the Packinghouse Workers Organizing 
Committee (PWOC), the forerunner to the UPWA, and “provided the backbone and 
dynamism to a powerful interracial, interethnic alliance” in addition to supplying much of 
the leadership for the new union.
101
     
 Chicago packinghouse workers were also the most prone to wildcat strikes and 
were integral in building the union in the 1930s.  Later, Black workers were quite vocal 
in demanding civil rights improvements within the union.  White workers typically went 
along with such demands even if they didn’t actively participate in the movement to 
ensure equal treatment for Black and white workers.
102
 There were fractures in this inter-
racial unity, to be sure, fractures that would become deeper in battles over contested 
residential space.
103
  For instance, one worker at a Swift plant remarked in 1950 “I 
believe in the union, but not the CIO union we got…They preach too much about 
race…they’re hollering about a housing project…the colored are moving in other 
neighborhoods.  They should stay where they belong and be proud of their race.  My son 
is a Catholic and we’ll stay that way.”104  In fact, religion played a significant role in how 
these packinghouse workers viewed racial relations.  As John McGreevy points out, 
studies from the 1960s and 1970s found that Catholics were more “apt to form 
friendships and social networks based upon religious ties, as opposed to ethnic or 
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occupational connections.”105  Arnold Hirsch also points out that violence over issues of 
housing “at the dawning of the civil rights revolution was in sharp contrast to the 
emergent civility found in other areas….Indeed, the willingness to work with Blacks and 
the general absence of conflict in areas such as public transportation (where the shroud of 
urban anonymity could be pulled around oneself) made the violent reactions on territorial 
issues all the more striking.”106  That is, interracial workspaces by no means guaranteed 
white acceptance of integrated neighborhoods, a subject I’ll examine in greater detail in 
Chapter 3.   
 White packinghouse workers were becoming increasingly turned off by the 
union’s emphasis on civil rights by the 1950s.107  Indeed, a right wing faction left UPWA 
Local 28 in 1955.
108
  Moreover, tensions between the Back of the Yards Neighborhood 
Council and the UPWA started to develop as early as 1950 with the union withdrawing 
some of its support for the Council because the two groups did not see eye to eye on civil 
rights issues.
109
  By 1948 nearly half of the UPWA’s Chicago membership was Black.  
Almost three-fourths of the packinghouse workforce was African-American by the time 
the city’s plants started closing in the ‘50s.110  By 1960, those white workers that 
remained tended to be older with longer terms of service.
111
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 Indeed, racism and anti-radicalism may explain, to some degree, the Big Four’s 
departure from Chicago.
112
  That is, Black packinghouse workers were important leaders 
in the PWOC and UPWA, and they tended to be quite radical—either members of the 
Communist Party or at least sympathetic to its aims.  Any effort by the packers to 
diminish the power of the union and its leadership, therefore, would necessarily entail 
policies that would harm African-American workers in particular.  The fact that the 
interracial coalition that was instrumental in building the union was gradually breaking 
apart by the ‘50s made the process of abandoning Chicago that much easier.  Fewer and 
older white workers in the industry meant that those who remained were less likely to 
identify with a union that they saw as increasingly left-wing and unnecessarily occupied 
with national civil rights campaigns.
113
   
From the mid-’50s to the mid-’60s UPWA membership at the Big Four firms 
dropped precipitously.  Armour had 24,650 members in 1953 but only 9,300 in 1964.  
Cudahy’s membership dropped from 7,525 to 3,500.  UPWA membership in Swift plants 
fell from 18,680 in 1953 to 9,300 in 1964.  Wilson diminished from 8,375 to 4,500.  In 
total there were 59,550 UPWA members in the Big Four meatpacking firms in 1953.  By 
1964 those numbers dropped over 50% to 26,600.
114
  While these numbers represent the 
decline in UPWA membership nationwide, they speak to themes evident in Chicago.  The 
systematic closing of meatpacking plants by Armour, Wilson, Cudahy, and Swift eroded 
the membership base of a powerful and influential union, thereby hindering its ability to 
prevent or at least slow down the packers’ shuttering of their big city packinghouses.  As 
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older urban plants were closed and newer plants typically employing fewer workers 
replaced them, the ability of the union to negotiate concessions like worker transfers to 
new plants was also diminished.  These trends in the packing industry were mirrored in 
other industries throughout the nation and are emblematic of labor’s slow decline in 
power and influence.  The national rates of union membership peaked in the mid-1950s 
and began to diminish at precisely the same time that packinghouses were abandoning 
highly unionized urban centers for the more anti-union suburbs and rural areas.  
 Predictably, the Big Four never cited the desire to weaken the union as one of its 
main goals in phasing out older big city packinghouses.  There is no doubt that the 
position of the Big Four in the industry was declining as smaller companies such as 
Morell, Hygrade, Oscar Mayer, and Hormel began to eat into their market share.  In 1937 
the Big Four produced almost 78% of the meat products sold in the United States.  By 
1962 that number fell to 38%.
115
  The largest companies pointed to several reasons for 
this decline—including fundamental changes in the nature of transportation and 
shipping—but all had to deal with the viability of older packinghouses in cities such as 
Chicago.
116
  In their estimation the changes they needed to make in order to remain 
profitable and regain lost market share all involved closing older plants since they could 
not be retrofitted or adapted to these changes. 
 One of the main ways the Big Four sought to remain competitive was through 
increased automation.  They were constantly looking for innovations that could increase 
output and machines that could replace workers outright or at least require fewer workers 
to operate.  In the late 1950s Swift News, a monthly management publication that dealt 
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with all aspects and operations of the Swift conglomerate, was filled with stories about 
the latest innovations in the meatpacking industry.  One optimistic story concerned a 
mechanical hot-dog stuffer which would, it was hoped, increase output exponentially.  
This job typically required several workers to force meat in the hot-dog casing and 
separate the links at specified intervals.   The picture that accompanied this story, 
however, depicts a lone worker operating the new machine with a smile of contentment 
on his face.
117
  At the annual Swift shareholders meeting president Porter M. Jarvis also 
stressed that improved methods of operating resulted in greater productivity and lowered 
costs.
118
    
 The packers themselves understood the serious problems that automation and 
plant closures wrought, however.  In response to the decline in the number of 
meatpacking jobs throughout the 1950s due to automation and plant relocation, unions 
began to demand job security and a shorter work week to spread out jobs.  Unwilling to 
give in to such demands during contract negotiations in 1959, Armour unveiled its 
“automation fund” plan.  The Armour Plan called for the company to contribute $500,000 
over the next two years for programs to retrain and relocate workers and to “cushion 
whatever unemployment may arise through the introduction of automation.”  It also 
provided for a special committee made up of both labor and management to oversee these 
efforts.
119
  Both the UPWA and the Amalgamated endorsed the plan in their 1959 
negotiations.  Most of the other major packers accepted a variation on the Armour Plan.  
Swift, however, felt its own seniority system and plan for retraining workers was 
sufficient.  Its unwillingness to implement an automation fund and committee to deal 
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with the loss of jobs automation entailed was one of the major reasons the union struck 
Swift in 1959.
120
 
 Not all improved methods of operating or all forms of technological innovation 
were welcomed by the meatpacking industry, though, particularly those designed to make 
slaughtering more humane.  The Big Four felt they were being handcuffed by such 
examples of growing governmental regulation over meatpacking in general.  Indeed, 
when the government ended compulsory meat grading in 1946, Wilson “rejected the 
purple government stamp as an unacceptable intrusion into private enterprise.”121  The 
‘50s also brought increasing calls to make the slaughtering process more humane.  The 
slaughtering of pigs was particularly gruesome.  The favored method of slaughter was to 
make a cut on one of the hog’s legs while it was still alive.  A worker poked a hook 
through the cut and the hog was hoisted by one leg.  Another worker then slit the hog’s 
throat and the animal bled to death hanging upside down.  Workers on the hog kill 
remember the hogs’ loud incessant squealing.  Eventually government regulations 
required packers to employ more humane methods of slaughter and many newer 
companies installed carbon-monoxide gas chambers to incapacitate the animals.  Packers 
argued that it wasn’t economically viable to retrofit existing multi-story packinghouses in 
cities with such expensive new equipment and when “humane kill” laws were in the 
planning stages warned that the proposed legislation would lead to the closing of older 
plants that couldn’t comply.122  To them it was easier to build plants that incorporated 
such innovations as gas chambers with new labor saving devices. 
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Figure 6: The remains of Wilson’s Chicago plant.  The packers argued that such urban multi-storied 
packinghouses were obsolete which necessitated a move to rural areas. 
Source:  Orear and Diamond, Out of the Jungle. 
 
 
Figure 7: A new, efficient, one-story Swift plant in North Carolina 
Source:  Purcell, Blue Collar Man (unnumbered page) 
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 Packers also bristled at the expense of employing humane ways to kill cattle.  
Cattle were often slaughtered by hitting them over the head with a mallet.  There was no 
assurance that they died painlessly or even with the first mallet strike.  Many new packers 
bought equipment such as a hydraulic device that fired a metal bolt into a cow’s brain 
killing it instantly and relatively painlessly.  To the large packers this was yet another 
expense that they could little afford.
123
 
 The packers often cited governmental regulation as a hindrance to their ability to 
make a profit.  Nowhere was this more evident than in the Big Four’s attempt to alter the 
Consent Decree they signed with the United States government in 1920.  In order to 
avoid charges of operating a monopoly, the Big Four meatpackers signed this binding 
agreement prohibiting them from entering into other food sectors such as the fish, fruit, 
and vegetable industries.  Feeling that the Consent Decree was outdated and a serious 
threat to their survival, the Big Four, working in concert, undertook a lobbying effort to 
get the U.S. Supreme Court to alter the decree.  Swift’s assistant general counsel, A.C. 
O’Meara, explained that “we will emphasize (1) the very important changes that have 
occurred in the food industry, (2) the tremendous growth of other food companies and 
retailers, (3) the entry of retailers into the processing and distribution phase of the 
meatpacking business, (4) the great increase in the efficiency of grocery wholesalers, and 
(5) the sharp increase in the sale of meat products packed for retailers under their own 
private labels.”124  President Jarvis, in his annual meeting with shareholders, complained 
that the Consent Decree “restrains competition” and “hampers progress.”125  This desire 
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to overturn the Consent Decree reveals a feeling among the Big Four that they were in 
imminent danger from the upstart packing companies.  They encouraged workers to write 
to their Congresspeople to encourage a reworking of the decree, implying that jobs were 
at stake if it remained in effect. 
126
  
 Swift also felt that taxes were responsible for its declining role in the meatpacking 
industry and what it portrayed as its troubled finances.  A story in the Swift News in 
November 1957 (usually grievances about taxes were reserved for April tax season) 
exhorted readers that “we can do something about taxes,” which Swift considered a 
“national headache.”127  Again Swift implied that high tax rates for the corporation would 
have a profound effect on its workers:  “Taxes affect the family market basket.  They 
affect the pay envelope.  And they affect the number of pay envelopes there will be in the 
future (emphasis added).
128
  That is, unless Swift and its workers were able to influence 
the federal government to lower corporate taxes, workers would pay more for their meat, 
be forced to accept lower wages, and face the prospect of layoffs.  Notably, Swift said 
nothing about the sacrifices that salaried employees would have to face.  Swift’s stance 
on taxes was emblematic of the other large packing companies. 
 The Big Four were justifiably concerned about the effect that strikes had on their 
finances.  The 1956 strike that closed 39 Swift plants for 10 days was one reason 
president Jarvis gave for the company’s drop in earnings from $22,893,155 in 1955 to 
$14,012,210 in 1956.
129
  He went on to state that the new contract that ended the strike 
“preserves freedom of choice for employes [sic] and properly provides that responsibility 
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for plant operations will continue to be in the hands of management” (emphasis 
added).
130
  This implied that only management had the ability to operate a plant 
successfully and profitably and that strikes interfered with the company’s ability to make 
money.  While intentional or not, this had the effect of implicitly arguing that any 
potential efforts to preserve packing plants through governmental or worker control were 
doomed to failure.   
 In another example of the stunning impact strikes could have on packer profits, a 
109-day strike at Wilson that ended in February of 1960 cost the company an estimated 
$9,130,580.  First half profits plunged compared to the first half of 1959 while other 
packers such as Morrell, Rath, Swift, and Armour posted net profit gains of 30%, 625%, 
36%, and 56% respectively.
131
  (It is interesting to note that Wilson didn’t object to 
governmental intervention when it could claim a $780,000 income tax credit because of 
the losses it incurred during the strike, however.
132)  Strikes didn’t only hurt meatpacking 
companies in terms of workdays lost.  Union papers often carried reminders to boycott 
products produced by companies that were being struck.  No doubt the resulting loss of 
revenues also hurt the companies. 
 The Big Four also took pains to point out the high costs of labor in their operating 
budgets.  In the breakdown of Swift’s finances for 1956, payroll accounted for the second 
greatest expense—$363,876,270—behind only the cost for raw materials.  However, this 
failed to distinguish between management salaries and production workers’ wages.  Often 
during contract negotiations packers claimed that they would be unable to meet demands 
                                                          
130
 Ibid.  See also Horowitz, “Negro and White, Unite and Fight!” 178-194 for a discussion of increasing 
worker control over production in the post-war era. 
131
 The Packinghouse Worker, June 1960,2. 
132
 Ibid. 
  
65 
 
for higher wages.
133
  They also argued that if they raised wages they would be compelled 
to raise the price of meat, thereby fueling inflation.
134
  Armour executive vice-president 
Robert Borchers reported to other executives at a conference of the American Meat 
Institute that “the built-in costs of excessive maintenance, high motive power costs, 
unsound product flow and excessive handling are too great to overcome.  For these 
reasons most of our investment in the older facilities has been closely tied to our ability to 
achieve savings in labor and product that would permit a quick payout on the 
investment… [A]ll of these savings have been needed to keep pace with the increased 
costs created by higher hourly wages and fringes.”135  Indeed, those sympathetic to the 
UPWA even acknowledged the growing bureaucracy associated with labor relations 
resulted in “union contract books” that “are often more than 100 pages thick”—although 
certainly this had more to do with rules governing work processes than wages.
136
  
 During the ‘50s and ‘60s the Big Four gave the impression of being in financial 
trouble.  To be sure, there were signs that fundamental changes to the packing industry 
threatened their market dominance but they still remained highly profitable.  According 
to the packers, in order to compete in the changing meatpacking industry they needed to 
become more streamlined, efficient, and cost effective.  This involved many things but 
ultimately their arguments were used to justify the closing of older packinghouse in 
Chicago and other Midwestern cities and open new meatpacking operations in rural areas 
and the South.  The reasons they gave for closing these plants was economic in nature, 
determined by rational market forces that were beyond their capability to change.  Older 
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plants were no longer profitable.  Government regulation made them obsolete.  The 
Consent Decree of 1920 allowed smaller companies to rise up and take on the Big Four.  
Taxes were hurting profits.  Strikes were hurting profits.  All of these arguments served 
to limit the packers’ culpability.  It wasn’t their fault that they were closing 
packinghouses.  Economic conditions necessitated it.  The union’s responses to these 
arguments were, not surprisingly, shaped by the company discourse. 
 And while the Chicago packing plants and the machinery in them were certainly 
growing old and outdated, forces other than mere economic necessity also prompted the 
Big Four to leave Chicago for rural areas and the South.  Without explicitly stating it, the 
companies betrayed profound anti-union bias in their desire to leave Chicago.  One of the 
most effective ways to lower costs and maximize profits was to substitute machines for 
workers and weaken the loyalty to the union among those workers who remained.  By 
diminishing the number of workers and weakening the strength of the union, packer 
profits would increase.  That is, the packers didn’t have to break the union in order to 
remain in business or to generate profits, but destroying the UPWA would certainly serve 
to increase profits.       
This desire to weaken the UPWA was quite evident in meatpacking companies’ 
support for so-called Right to Work Laws.  Despite the relatively benign-sounding name, 
these laws effectively outlawed union shops by stating that it was illegal for a worker to 
be required to join a union as a condition of employment.  During the ‘50s and ‘60s there 
was a strong push by the Republican Party, supported by large corporations, to pass Right 
to Work Laws in individual states and to pass a national version.  In an interview 
published in Swift News entitled “Right to Work Laws….good or bad?” Swift General 
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Superintendent J.L. Fike dramatically declared that “a right-to-work law protects a man’s 
right to work….When we are denied this right to choose we have lost our freedoms.”137  
In an attempt to assure the readership that these types of laws were not anti-union he 
stated that they would, in fact, result in stronger unions.  Fike reasoned that a “better 
relationship is established between union and members if they are persuaded rather than 
coerced to join.”138   
Illinois did not have a Right to Work Law at this time but many other 
Midwestern, Southern, and Plains states did.  Iowa, Indiana, Nebraska, South Dakota, 
North Dakota, Arkansas, Missouri, Tennessee, Alabama, Georgia, Texas, Mississippi, 
Florida, South Carolina, North Carolina, and Virginia had all passed Right to Work Laws 
throughout the 1950s and ‘60s.139  Not coincidentally, these were among the very states 
to which packinghouses were increasingly relocating.
140
  Unsurprisingly, these states had 
lower factory pay rates than the national average and the rates in Southern states were 
particularly low.
141
  Deborah Fink points out that Iowa’s becoming a Right to Work state 
was actively advertised to attract industry:  “Iowa could sell itself to industrialists in that, 
unlike the corrupt Chicago-based politics on its eastern border, Iowa was pristine territory 
ready to receive the benefits of industrial development.  ‘There are no Big City political 
bosses or machines in Iowa!’ crowed a 1950 publication of the Iowa Development 
commission which went on to advertise that Iowa was 99.3 percent white and 94.7 
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percent native born.  An intelligent, yet well-behaved workforce would boost production 
without introducing extraneous matters like workers’ rights.”142 
 This highlights another likely motivation of the packers for leaving Chicago.  As 
Rick Halpern and Roger Horowitz have shown, the UPWA was an integrated union from 
its earliest days with a strong civil rights record and Blacks made up a significant portion 
of its Chicago locals and served in prominent leadership positions.
143
  In contrast to the 
racial composition of Iowa, the city’s packinghouse workers were almost three-fourths 
Black by the 1950s.
144
  It seems plausible to assume that Iowa’s boosters trumpeting its 
status as an almost lily-white state was seen as an attraction by industries that employed 
large numbers of African-Americans as they would likely be seen by management as 
easier to control and less likely to unionize.  Surely this appeal was not made to industries 
that were dominated by whites.    
 Moreover, Herb March, who was instrumental in building the UPWA in Chicago 
and was District Director of the Packinghouse Workers Organizing Committee, recalled 
that companies tried to foment racial animosity among workers but “from the very 
inception one of the things that was paramount to the union was Negro-white unity.”145  
The UPWA’s logo was, in fact, a Black and white hand shaking in solidarity.  The union 
was also awarded the Dorrie Miller award by the NAACP for its outstanding civil rights 
record.
146
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 When plants moved from cities to predominantly rural areas, Blacks were 
disproportionately left behind.  The UPWA was able to ensure that some workers could 
transfer to the new plants, but Blacks (and many whites) were often unwilling or unable 
to move, especially to the all white hinterlands.  The union was essentially powerless to 
preserve jobs but tried to do what little it could.  However, this often meant that white 
workers were better able to transfer to new packing plants in rural areas.  With the 
decline of the meatpacking industry in Chicago then, Blacks lost a major source of 
employment and a means of upward social mobility.
147
  In fact, UPWA president Ralph 
Helstein noted the futility of retraining programs:  “What you were doing was training 
people so that they could be unemployed at a higher level of skill because they couldn’t 
get jobs.”148  Moreover, Black workers (and women) “who had benefited from the 
superior job opportunities in meatpacking, had to reenter a segmented labor market where 
discrimination severely constrained their options” according to Roger Horowitz.149  
 Other factors most likely played a role in packinghouses leaving the city, as well.  
The meatpacking industry in Chicago had a strong communist presence dating back to 
the 1930s.  The Communist Party was instrumental in first organizing the union in 
Chicago.  Indeed, Herb March was a committed Communist.
150
  In the mid to late ‘50s 
with the Red Scare and the House Un-American Activities Committee in full swing, the 
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UPWA came under increasing scrutiny.
151
  Wary of any “subversive” activities, the 
House held hearings to determine the threat posed by communist “infiltration” of the 
industry during which it was reported that communist activity within the meatpacking 
industry was designed to control the production of meat in the event of an outbreak of 
war.
152
  While I can only speculate, it seems likely that the packers would have wanted to 
distance themselves from any associations with communism and would have been more 
than willing to try to root out any communist-leaning labor leaders to do so.   
 At these hearings Carl Nelson, a former member of the Communist Party who 
was active in the UPWA and worked at Wilson as a pipe coverer testified about the 
supposed communist infiltration of the industry and the union.  Nelson identified various 
UPWA leaders and workers as communists (including Les Orear, editor of the 
Packinghouse Worker; Leon Beverly, a UPWA field representative; Jack Souther, the 
secretary-treasurer of UPWA District 1; Gloria Wailes, a secretary in the international 
office of the UPWA; and Charles Hayes, District 1 Director and future Congressperson—
all of whom declined to answer questions about their activities) and testified that the 
Chicago meatpacking industry was “saturated” with communists and was a very 
important component of Communist Party operations.
153
  Another former communist, 
John R. Hackney who was an Amalgamated representative, testified in 1959 that “from 
my most current information and my experience in my activity in the party I would say 
that the party is stronger now in the meat industry than it ever has been.”154  An FBI 
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informant, Joseph A. Poskonka, testified that the penetration by Communists of the 
packinghouse industry was “very serious because they are dominating and any decent 
person of any kind that might be a decent American citizen that would want to represent 
labor as a decent leader or decent citizen, if he is not a member of the Communists or in 
sympathy he could not be elected to office because he would be slammed as a union boss 
or racketeer of some kind.”155    
The UPWA was quick to dismiss rumors of Communist infiltration spawned by 
the HUAC investigation.  In a letter sent out to labor and civic leaders nationwide, Ralph 
Helstein stated that  
“No policy, program or action taken by this union was alleged to have been  
the product of communist influence.  All three witnesses whose testimony 
was turned into such dramatic headlines had, by their own admission, left 
the communist party by or before 1949 and were testifying to knowledge of 
communist party affairs only with respect to a period ending a decade ago. 
The hearings disclosed no evidence of current or even recent communist 
Membership or influence….Lest there be any doubt, our union has made a 
clear declaration of its opposition to Communist doctrine.  We have adopted 
and are enforcing the Ethical Practices Codes, including the ban of office 
holding by Communists.”156 
 
Just three years earlier the question of communist influence in the UPWA stymied a 
proposed merger between the UPWA and the Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher 
Workmen of North America.  In its official paper, The Butcher Workman, the 
Amalgamated reported that many locals were skeptical of the merger and that “the 
question of communism should be explored thoroughly before completion of the merger 
is made.”157  Stating that it owed “an obligation to its membership” to “analyze every 
possible subversive activity” the Amalgamated “requested that the entire staff of the 
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UPWA, as well as our own entire staff, and subordinate bodies, sign and file non-
Communist affidavits whether such staff personnel are salaried or non-
salaried….specifically for the purpose of clearing the atmosphere regarding this question 
without going into unnecessary witch hunts.”158  
 Despite efforts to distance themselves from communism and concerted efforts to 
minimize communist influence earlier in the decade, meatpacking workers were still seen 
as having communist leanings.  This was particularly true among packinghouse workers 
in Chicago.
159
  The anti-communist tenor of the early Cold War era no doubt had an 
influence on the Big Four’s decision to close their meatpacking operations in Chicago.  
They had no desire to spend vast amounts of money to make improvement to old plants 
in Chicago, especially when some of the workers in those plants were strongly suspected 
of harboring communist sympathies.  At the very least the union’s radicalism and 
militancy made it an even bigger nuisance to the packers and its ties to communism made 
it an easier target for repression.    
 How the UPWA responded to the spate of plant closings reveals the extent of the 
corporations’ control.  Indeed, in a memorandum concerning the proposed merger 
between the UPWA and the Amalgamated, union leaders acknowledged that “the 
industry is undergoing profound changes.  New distribution processes have appeared.  
New labor-saving devices are being daily installed.  Markets are shifting.  There is great 
flux in this county’s economy, and all of these changes operate to reduce the number of 
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jobs available, and the conditions under which these jobs are performed.  The statistics 
almost shout danger.”160    
 While it didn’t buy the packers’ arguments for abandoning the large packing 
centers such as Chicago, the union employed the same economic arguments.  That is, the 
union didn’t dispute the economic justification for closing unprofitable plants.  It just 
thought the packers weren’t being truthful about their profitability.  For the most part the 
union systematically refuted the packers’ contentions point by point without ever truly 
questioning their right to abandon the city they called home for decades, leaving 
thousands of workers without jobs.  This shows that even the most progressive labor 
organizations in the country didn’t call for a radical reordering of the relationship 
between labor and capital or question assumptions about who ultimately controlled (or 
had the potential to control) the production process.  The UPWA wasn’t calling for state 
(or worker) ownership of industry; it was merely seeking to achieve a fairer and more 
equitable form of capitalism.  The union also didn’t question the economic necessity of 
certain changes in the industry.  For instance, a 1963 report about packing plants leaving 
cities for rural areas stated: 
 “You will notice that all these additional plants seem to have germinated at 
 interior points, away from the traditional livestock terminal markets.  The  
 urge to set up shop close to the source of supply of raw materials is  
 understandable, of course.  In recent years it has become a practical matter 
 because of the network of hard roads which reaches into every farmer’s 
 barnyard, and because of the refrigerated truck and the high speed interstate 
 highway system which connects almost any corner of the country with the  
 big population centers.  A third element in the cold, hard economics of the 
 situations is the fact that a modern packinghouse no longer requires a large  
 supply of labor.  Whatever labor is still essential is readily available by  
 automobile from the surrounding countryside.”161   
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The union seemed to argue that it was an employer’s right to close a plant if there 
were actual economic reasons that demanded doing so, but in the case of the meatpacking 
industry the packers were simply being greedy, unwilling to share profits with their 
workers. 
 According to the union the meatpackers were actually making record profits while 
at the same time eliminating jobs.  As early as 1950—even before much of the plant 
relocation—the UPWA was reporting on the unprecedented profits of Armour and Swift, 
stating that earned surplus “soared 73 percent from 1939 to 1949—from $81.8 million to 
$141.7 million.  This represents the amount, after paying income taxes and dividends, of 
excess profit which is retained in Swift’s financial setup.”162  This money was the result 
of underpaying workers and livestock growers and overcharging consumers, according to 
the union.
163
  Swift’s profits also rose close to $70 million in 1953 as sales rose while 
Swift’s costs dropped dramatically.  Again, the money saved on costs was not passed on 
to the consumer.
164
  In the supposedly slow year of 1958 packer profits again rose, 
although less than they had in previous years:  Armour’s increased by $2.2 million; 
Cudahy’s by over $600,000; Morrell’s and Wilson’s both by over $2 million.165  Swift’s 
profits fell for the year but according to Lyle Cooper, the UPWA’s research director, this 
was due solely to creative accounting and inventorying procedures.
166
  To be sure, some 
of the changes taking place in the packing industry affected the Big Four’s collective 
bottom line.  While profits might not have been increasing at the same level that they 
were in the past, they were rising nonetheless.     
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 Cooper also noted that packer profits were increasing dramatically during the first 
half of 1959.  In the first half of 1958 Armour made $3,504,004 in profit.  In 1959 its 
profits had risen to $9,224,983.  Swift’s profits rose from $2,474,851 in 1958 to 
$12,474,851 in 1959.
167
  According to Cooper “soaring profits for Armour make all the 
more startling the closing of a number of its plants including the big ones at Chicago and 
East St. Louis.  If the ‘loss’ of $8 million per year on the closed plants is accepted as 
correct (and there could be a lot of juggling of figures to show this much loss) it is 
obvious that the remaining Armour Packing plants have been big money makers.”168  
Profits were up again during the first half of 1960.  After tax profits were up 35% for 
Cudahy, 36% for Swift, 56% for Armour, 66% for Hormel, and 30% for Morrell.
169
 
 Furthermore, the UPWA reported that dividends paid out to shareholders of the 
large meatpackers jumped 15.6% in 1960.  The meager raise production workers received 
paled in comparison.
170
  These trends continued throughout the early ‘60s with Swift’s 
after tax profits increasing almost $8 million from 1963 to 1964, Armour’s rising over $6 
million, and Wilson’s profits increasing over $5 million.  While the Big Four continued 
to grow, however, they were doing so at a less rapid rate than the rest of the industry.
171
  
But the message these figures conveyed to the UPWA’s membership was a simple one—
packers were seeing profits rise every year but were continuing to close plants in Chicago 
and elsewhere.  One striking worker’s wife summed up workers’ understanding of 
company policy:  “Their policy is ‘We’ll take everything you can give us but we’ll give 
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you nothing in return.’”172  Indeed, the union’s Executive Board labeled as “propaganda” 
management claims that high labor costs were responsible for plant closings.  Rather, 
they said, “managerial incompetence, obsolete structures, inadequate livestock supplies 
and submission by big meat packers to arm-twisting by the retail chains” were to blame 
for plant shutdowns.
173
  The implication was that packers were being unnecessarily 
greedy.   
 Whether or not the individual big city plants were profitable was largely 
irrelevant.  According to the union, the packers and their shareholders as a whole were 
making plenty of money.  Shuttering old plants and putting thousands of workers out of 
work was unnecessary and irresponsible.  Horowitz writes that “although not opposing 
technological change as such, the UPWA insisted that ‘progress should not mean 
enrichment of a few and misery for many.’  The union repeatedly rejected company 
pressures for concessions that allegedly would have kept a plant open and contended that 
‘the true test was the profitability of the company’ not any individual facility.”174   While 
the Almagamated generally agreed to wage concessions, typically in Southern plants 
facing closure, the UPWA argued that such concessions were unlikely to save individual 
plants and that they would only serve to weaken national wage standards.
175
 
 This notion that the packers were raking in obscene amounts of profit while the 
workers suffered is best exemplified in the following cartoon, published in The 
Packinghouse Worker in 1965: 
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Figure 8:  
It typifies the thinking among the union and the workers that the packers were not being 
completely honest in their arguments for why they needed to close urban packing plants 
such as those in Chicago.  Rather than high taxes, increased governmental regulation, and 
exorbitant wages resulting in decreased profits necessitating plant closures as the packers 
argued, the packers’ earnings had actually “soared to a new high peak!”176  To the 
workers this must have seemed like the perfect encapsulation of their sentiments—while 
workers were expected to make do with less (grin and bear it), corporate leaders (all 
depicted as corpulent white men) were living a life of excess.  The entire system was 
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profoundly unfair and tilted in favor of corporations despite the packers’ protestations to 
the contrary.      
Moreover, the union and the workers saw that increased profits were due in large 
part to increased productivity as a result of expanding automation.  From 1954 to 1958 
labor productivity rose by almost 15% while total man hours declined by 13%.
177
  Fewer 
workers were doing more work, producing more meat, enabling packers to make more 
money, yet their wages were not increasing accordingly.  The result was again a sense 
that the packers weren’t treating workers fairly.  Indeed, the “B system,” the changes in 
the industry that increased productivity while eliminating workers named after scientific 
management pioneer Charles Bedaux, spawned a sardonic workplace song:  “the B’s they 
hum, the B’s they buzz.  We got one man where three men was.”178  Workers in other 
cities and in other industries also recognized corporations’ ulterior motives in increasing 
automation.  A worker at Ford’s River Rouge plant in 1950, for instance, argued that such 
changes were “part of a pattern that calls for taking these jobs to new unorganized 
sections of the country to be manned by green workers at higher speeds and less pay.”179  
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Figure 9: This automatic sausage stuffer, for instance, did the job of five women. 
Source:  Purcell, Blue Collar Man, (unnumbered page). 
 
 
 
Figure 10: Similarly, automatic hide removing machines like this one displaced skilled workers. 
Source:  Purcell, Blue Collar Man, (unnumbered page). 
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Steve May and Laura Morrison have shown that this attitude is apparent in other 
declining industries and among workers facing similar effects from deindustrialization.  
Indeed, they argue that unemployed workers “view deindustrialization—at least at the 
local level—as a breach of the social contract between employer and employee.  They 
believe corporate leaders overemphasize the rationales of ‘global competition,’ ‘customer 
service,’ and ‘the market’ in their decision making; in turn, they underemphasize the 
human capital of workers and the social relations to the community.”180  These aggrieved 
workers, moreover, feel that this violation of the social contract fails to take into account 
the ways that plant closures affect individual workers, their families, and the community 
as a whole.  This leads to a new social contract, May and Morrison argue, that is the 
result of multiple forces including “global competition, domestic deregulation, and 
technological change.”181  Regrettably, however, workers accept many of these forces 
“without question, as justifying decisions that negatively affect large numbers of workers 
and, in turn, their families and their communities.”182    
This seems to be the case among packinghouse workers and the UPWA as well—
they more or less accepted the packers’ arguments about the economic rationality of 
shutting down unprofitable or outdated plants if it affected the company’s bottom line 
but, at the same time, they felt the packers were overstating their case and that profits 
were not actually being minimized (or, at the very least, not enough to justify the 
tremendous problems that plant closures would bring to Chicago packinghouse workers 
and Back of the Yards as a whole).   This, in turn, had the potential to promote a sense of 
helplessness in the community as a whole which, as John Russo and Sherry Lee Linkon 
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argue “may develop as deindustrialization is normalized as part of the ‘natural’ economic 
order of shifting capital and competition.”  Moreover, “after deindustrialization, 
communities face the loss of self-esteem as the population declines, efforts to attract 
reinvestment fail, and social and economic conditions decay”—a process that played 
itself out in Back of the Yards.
183
 
Union papers of the time are rife with figures proving that increased profits 
weren’t resulting in higher wages.  Taking Armour as a representative example, the union 
reported that after tax profits rose from $5,560,000 in 1958 to $16,221,000 in 1960 while 
the amount Armour paid to employees declined from $304,438,000 in 1956 to 
$243,128,000.
184
  An editorial in The Butcher Workman directed at Secretary of 
Agriculture Ezra Taft Benson, who asserted that wage demands in the packing industry 
resulted in drastically reduced earnings for farmers, explained “Here Are the Facts, 
Secretary Benson”:   
Using 1952 as a base, we come up with some very interesting conclusions which 
Mr. Benson apparently failed to consider.  Average hourly earnings between 1952 
and 1955 increased 15.3 percent, while output per manhour in the same period 
increased 17.7 percent.  Increased mechanization in the meat packing industry 
became more active since 1952, and this has resulted in tremendous productivity 
increases which have offset all of the wage increases received during that period.  
In 1952, 191,500 productions workers in meat packing, wholesale, produced more 
than 21 million pounds of red meat.  In 1955, 193,400 workers produced more 
than 25 1/2 million pounds of red meat.  The wage cost per pound of meat in 1952 
was 3.42 cents, while in 1955 it was 3.41 cents.  In spite of all of the wage 
increases received by the wage earners in the meat industry, the wage cost per 
pound since 1952 has actually decreased slightly....The farmer and cattle raiser 
did not pay for the wage increase.  The wage earners, themselves, paid for it in 
terms of increased productivity.
185
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Indeed, the union posed the question “who gets the main benefit from increased 
manhour output—corporate employers or wage earners?  Since Korea, profits for the few 
have gone up much more than wages for the many.”186  Swift president Porter M. Jarvis 
even happily reported that in 1958 “wage rates in meat packing plants increased 15 1/2 
cents per hour.  For the second year, however, total employment costs were reduced.  
This year the reduction was $13,969,000.”187  Higher productivity as a result of 
automation was to thank for this reduction in labor costs.   
The greed of the packers hurt not only packinghouse workers, but also 
consumers.  The UPWA reported that “although the cost of meat to the housewife has 
gone up about 20 per cent since 1956, the same amount of her meat dollar—about 3.5 
cents—goes to packinghouse workers.”188  The Meat of It also reported that in 1955 
wages paid to production workers accounted for only 7% of total costs.
189
  The following 
statistics from the U.S. Departments of Labor and Agriculture illustrate how the number 
of jobs in the meatpacking industry had fallen while total production and production per 
man hour had risen. 
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Table 1:  Production, Employment and Man Hours in the Meat Packing Industry
190
  
Year Meat Production 
(Millions of Lbs.) 
Number of 
Production 
Workers 
Average Weekly 
Hours 
Number of Lbs. Output per Man Hours 
% Increase over 
1956 
1956 26,643 187,600 42.2 63.7 -- 
1957 25,567 176,200 41.2 66.0 3.6 
1958 24,378 170,400 40.9 67.3 5.7 
1959 26,017 163,000 42.6 71.9 12.9 
1960 27,016 164,800 42.0 75.1 18.0 
1961 27,438 158,700 41.9 79.4 24.7 
1962 27,891 154,500 41.9 83.0 30.3 
1963 28,846 150,500 41.8 89.2 40.0 
 
The union felt, as the table above illustrates, that workers were not receiving their fair 
share of the record profits that the industry was reaping and that plant closures were 
unwarranted and driven by packer greed.  
The UPWA also understood plant closings and the industry’s shift from urban to 
rural production in terms of efforts to weaken the union.  Moving production to the South 
or rural areas in the North were met with charges of wage cutting, as Southern and rural 
wage rates were substantially below those of the North. The packers also argued for wage 
and benefit reductions in their unionized Southern plants to allow them to better contend 
with local smaller non-union competitors.
191
  Swift, for instance, expressed the desire to 
open new plants which would not be admitted under the terms of the master agreements 
that covered all of a packer’s plants nationwide.  During the 1959 strike, for instance, 
Swift argued that its southern competitors paid wages between 69¢ and 95¢ below Swift 
wages and offered no fringe benefits.
192
  Union leaders, however, didn’t see regional 
wage differentials as the significant problem that the packers did.  According to a 
September 1959 strike bulletin, “the Swift plants can…compete effectively with 
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nonunion firms because Swift workers have considerably higher productivity.  Wage 
costs might be higher in these plants, but total production costs are not.  And it is total 
production costs which count.”193  For his part, UPWA president Ralph Helstein feared 
that “if unchecked, Swift could close down all its older plants and replace them with new 
units at substandard conditions.”194   
Efforts by the big packers such as Swift to cut wage rates in the south were also 
understood by Lyle Cooper, the union’s research director, to be an attack on the union’s 
strength in the north:  “Obviously, the purpose is to use such a cut as an entering wedge 
to hold back—and eventually beat down—wage rates in the North where the great bulk 
of Swift’s workers have jobs.  What Swift is after is cut-throat competition against the 
wage rates in its northern plants.”195  Explaining that Armour was not at a competitive 
disadvantage in the south as it claimed, Cooper wrote:  “first we should get clear that if 
Armour, for instance, can soften us up to the point of making major concessions on 
wages, they will skim off more profits.  This corporation is in business to make money--
and if it is able to squeeze more out of the production workers in its southern plants, so 
much the better.”196  A blatant example of jobs moving from Chicago to other parts of the 
country in order to lower wages is evident in the following example.  A glue machine in 
an Armour plant in Chicago was dismantled and sent to Omaha.  At the new plant its 
operation was classified as a new job and the pay rate was cut 27 cents an hour.
197
  At a 
new Swift plant in Rochelle, Illinois the minimum starting pay was $1.85 an hour 
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compared to the $2.36 minimum Swift paid at all of its other plants including those in 
Chicago.
198
  
In 1965, average hourly wages for factory workers in Southern states with right-
to-work laws were much lower than the national average of $2.46 per hour.
199
  Virginia 
($1.96 an hour), North Carolina ($1.68), South Carolina ($1.71), Tennessee ($1.96), 
Georgia ($1.83), Florida ($2.06), Alabama ($2.11), Mississippi ($1.69), and Arkansas 
($1.72) all fell well below the national average.
200
  Among the Southern states with right-
to-work laws only Texas, which had many skilled workers in the oil and chemical 
industries, approached the national average ($2.39 an hour).
201
    
Wages were not only lower in Southern and rural plants.  There was also a dearth 
of pro-union sentiment in these areas. The UPWA found it more difficult to organize in 
the smaller towns and rural areas that the packers were moving to.
202
  For instance, when 
Swift opened a new plant in North Carolina in 1959, it was operated as a non-union 
plant.  Members of a nearby UPWA local were refused work in the new plant even 
though the company had recently permanently shut down a branch plant where they used 
to work.  They were instead given severance pay.
203
  When the UPWA lost a certification 
vote at a packinghouse in West Point, Mississippi, the union attributed its loss to the 
“brute strength of boss terror in this southern country town” despite strong union 
spirit.
204
  George Thomas, the director of UPWA District 8 (which included much of the 
South), also reported that “bosses in the south will go to great lengths to flim-flam their 
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workers out of having a union.”205  The union also saw through attempts by the industry 
to pass Right to Work Laws as a blatant attack on the union.  
The UPWA’s arguments against leaving cities such as Chicago were also couched 
in terms of race.  The union met efforts to move to areas of poor race relations with 
reproach, although it typically refrained from leveling charges of racism at the 
meatpacking companies.  Charles Hayes, Director of District 1(which included Chicago), 
lamented that “we packinghouse workers are hurt worst than most [by unemployment in 
the city] because most of us live in the wrong part of town to find a job; second, because 
so many of us are Negroes and can’t move freely into those neighborhoods where there 
are jobs; and third, because the skills we learned in the packinghouse are not in demand 
by other industries.”206  As Hayes noted, African-Americans employed in the industry 
still faced housing discrimination in Chicago.  Black packinghouse workers typically put 
half of their take home pay toward rent and were faced with crowding and slum-like 
conditions.
207
  The closing of the meatpacking industry in Chicago only exacerbated 
these problems.  The union sarcastically spelled out the best way of escaping the poverty 
caused by plant shutdowns:  “Be white.  Be between the ages of 25 and 45.  Be married 
with two children, but not more.  Live in a Northern city.  Have as much education as 
possible.  Be in good physical and mental health.”208  Nationwide, unemployment rates 
for Blacks were often one-and-a-half to double that of whites from the end of World War 
II through the late 1960s.
209
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When plants closed very few workers were able to or wanted to transfer to new 
plants.  They often had few options and programs meant to ease the transition to 
unemployment were rather inadequate.  Unemployment benefits and severance packages 
lasted only so long.  Retraining programs for the unemployed were not very successful.  
Since the packing industry was the main source of employment in Back of the Yards, any 
jobs displaced workers were trained to perform were located in other parts of the city.  
Often these industries were not hiring regularly.  The packinghouse workers became 
essentially well-trained unemployed.  Those workers who were fortunate to find work 
lost any seniority status they had acquired in the long years they worked for the packers.  
Concomitant with this was a decrease in pay with the move to a new job as well as the 
fact that these newly hired were the first fired during economic downtowns.  Moreover, 
other manufacturing jobs were also leaving Chicago during this time period which meant 
fewer options for unemployed packinghouse workers. 
Often, however, workers remained unemployed for several years after they 
initially lost their job in a plant shutdown.  Marcus Byrd was 55 when Wilson closed its 
Chicago plant in 1955.  Over three years later he was still without a job.  Madeline 
Jackson had been working for ten years at Armour’s Chicago plant when it closed in 
January 1957.  In March of 1959 she too was still unemployed despite being retrained as 
a sewing machine operator, which paid only $1 an hour—a fraction of her previous 
wage.  Although she was 45, she always gave her age as 35 when applying for a job or 
she’d “be dead.”210  
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Compounding the problem was the fact that older workers who had put in as 
much as 25 or 35 years of service to a company were ineligible to receive a pension if 
they hadn’t reached 55 years of age when they were laid off.  A member of UPWA local 
28 in Chicago questioned the justice of this policy:  “Don’t you think that when a person 
puts in 25 years of his life, he or she should receive a pension?  He put in the best years 
of his life for the company and that is the thanks he receives for it.  I believe the company 
will think twice before they move or close down if they had to put a person on pension 
with 25 years of service.”211 
One displaced Chicago worker, Estes Payne—the subject of the NBC 
documentary—was a skilled worker at Armour who once made $5,000 a year but was 
ultimately reduced to collecting public assistance and doing odd jobs.  He was retrained 
to paint using a spray gun, but, as UPWA president Ralph Helstein warned in the 
documentary, there weren’t always jobs available to the retrained workers.  Giving voice 
to the approximately 50,000 able-bodied Chicagoans who found themselves on welfare, 
Payne stated “it hurts a man to see his wife go off in a corner and cry when you come 
from looking for a job and have to say, ‘nothing today.’  And then your little kid asks for 
a quarter to buy some paper for school and you have to say you haven’t got it.”212 
Countless families in Back of the Yards and throughout Chicago faced similar dim 
prospects.
213
  
Numerous protests called attention to the plight of such unemployed 
packinghouse workers, however.  In early 1958 President Eisenhower appeared at a 
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fundraising dinner in the heart of the stockyards district.  Unemployed packinghouse 
workers, who lost their jobs when Wilson closed in 1955 and when Swift abandoned its 
pork operations in 1957, passed out leaflets at the dinner.  Their open letter to 
Eisenhower began “Dear, Mr. President.  We welcome you to the stockyards where we 
used to work.”  It continued “haven’t these companies a greater responsibility to their 
workers who have created their wealth, and to the communities in which they live, than 
to dump them into the streets in wholesale displacement?  We request that you give this 
alarming situation high priority as you guide the destiny of our country.”214  
When Swift announced the closing of its pork operations, the 1,500 workers who 
would be left without a job published an open letter to the people of Chicago in the 
Defender.   The ad took Swift, “the richest meat packer,” to task for the “despair” they 
were causing the workers who had “helped Swift pile up more than $400 million in 
profits” over the last 10 years because they decided it was “economically sound’ to throw 
the workers out.
215
  The workers appealed to all Chicagoans to write to Swift to protest 
the decision warning that “it is our jobs today, but it may be your job tomorrow for the 
very same reasons Swift hands us now.”216  The workers depicted in the ad were an older 
woman wearing a head-scarf, a young man who appears to be Latino, a matronly-looking 
African-American woman, and a white man wearing decidedly working class garb.  The 
message conveyed by the ad was that plant closings affected all working class people and 
families regardless of race, age, or ethnicity.  It also conveyed the fears of the workers 
that they were too old to find decent new jobs but too young to retire.
217
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Other forms of protest were slightly more theatrical.  Chicago Local 347 called a 
mass meeting in 1963 of the city’s unemployed for the purpose of organizing the jobless.  
UPWA Field Representative Leon Beverly observed that “one of the biggest problems 
the unemployed have is that they have no voice of their own, and no muscle 
either....Welfare officials, politicians, employers can ignore the needs of these people.  
They don’t even have to be bothered with thinking up excuses and ducking 
committees.”218  As part of the build up for the mass meeting a group of union members 
held a wreath laying ceremony and delivered a memorial prayer at CIO Corner, the site of 
organization speeches and rallies during the 1930s unionizing efforts, in remembrance of 
“20,000 dead jobs.”219  This group was also responsible for a demonstration in 1964 in 
which unemployed workers dressed as Depression-era apple peddlers to spread leaflets 
throughout the loop.
220
  
Despite the best efforts of the union and its members, they were ultimately 
unsuccessful.  By 1965 the Big Four meatpackers left Chicago.  While Armour, Swift, 
and Wilson remained headquartered in the city, their main offices had left the 
packinghouse district for more comfortable digs downtown.  When Swift headquarters 
left the unpleasant smell and sights of the stockyards in 1961 it sounded an ominous 
death knell for the industry in the city.
221
  No longer would Chicago’s packinghouse 
workers produce the meat that found its way to tables across the nation.  A community 
that was almost entirely defined by a single industry was abandoned by that very 
industry.  
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By 1965 the Big Four meatpackers had left Chicago, once the center of the 
meatpacking industry, hog butcher to the world, in favor of rural areas and Southern 
states.  The large meatpackers justified this on the grounds that it was an economic 
necessity that they close packinghouses in the city and relocate to the countryside.  Older 
plants were no longer viable because of changes in the industry including the need for 
increased automation, rising labor costs, and the desire to be closer to livestock supplies.   
This isn’t the entire story, though.  While these plants were closing, the packers 
were making record profits.  Fewer workers were producing more meat.  Wages paid to 
production workers remained but a small fraction of the cost consumers paid for meat.  
The packers desire to leave the city was, in fact, based on the desire to break the union 
and was most likely compounded by racism and anti-radicalism.  At the very least the 
racial makeup of the packinghouse workforce and the UPWA’s militancy and links with 
communism meant the workers and union were at a significant disadvantage in trying to 
resist plant shutdowns.  The Big Four’s contention that economics played a primary role 
is, however, partially true.  The preference for profits over people also factored into their 
decision.   
The union’s response to the packers’ reasoning reveals just how pervasive the 
rhetoric of industry was.  The UPWA never disputed the right to close plants.  Rather, 
they stressed that there should be governmental oversight when a meatpacker decided to 
close a plant to make sure there were sound economic reasons for doing so.  Workers’ 
responses, to a certain degree, reflect this industrial capitalist hegemony.  While they and 
the union protested imminent plant closings and attempted to call attention to 
unemployed packinghouse workers, their arguments were not couched in terms of 
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restructuring the capitalist system.  This isn’t to say that this was the reason for their 
ultimate failure to keep the Big Four from leaving Chicago.  Perhaps such a reaction 
would have even resulted in significant backlash.  Ultimately, the fate of the Back of the 
Yards and other industrial communities reveals the almost unlimited power exercised by 
large corporations, which is still quite evident today.  This once vibrant community that 
was the heart of an entire industry was simply abandoned when higher profits could be 
made elsewhere with little concern for the welfare of the workers or the loyalty that they 
had shown to the meatpacking industry for generations.  
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Chapter 2 
“The Right Kind of Industry in the Right Kind of Place:”  The Industrial 
Landscape of Back of the Yards 
 
 This chapter will examine the myriad ways in which the community came to grips 
with the changing landscape and the flight of industry.  Essentially, community leaders 
and residents alike at first appeared to welcome the decline of the packing industry for a 
complex set of reasons—including the fact that packing plants were seen as a form of 
blight that tainted the neighborhood and offended the senses; the notion that the plant 
owners and managers cared little for the neighborhood and actively contributed to the 
perception that the Back of the Yards was a slum; and because by the 1950s fewer 
(white) people from the neighborhood worked directly in the packing plants and the 
majority of the workforce was made up of African-Americans from outside of the Yards.   
 Over time, however, community leaders sought to attract new types of industry as 
the problem of massive job and tax revenue loss jeopardized the community’s stability.  
Interestingly, however, they actively resisted industries that they felt had the potential to 
further pollute the neighborhood or threaten to erase its hard-won fight against slum-like 
conditions.  The fact that they often weren’t successful in these efforts to keep certain 
industries out of the neighborhood highlighted the degree to which they were powerless 
to exercise control over the landscape and what types of industries would occupy it 
(reinforcing the same lesson learned when they were unable to prevent the packing plants 
from leaving in the first place).  By the end of the 1960s and into the 1970s, however, 
unemployment, loss of tax revenue, and a new form of blight—vacant land and 
abandoned, crumbling industrial infrastructure—threatened to return Back of the Yards to 
a slum.  This lack of control over the fate of the neighborhood and the sense that its 
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industrial past hindered its future contributed to residents’ efforts to control what people 
could occupy the landscape of Back of the Yards, the subject of Chapter 3. 
Back of the Yards had long been associated with slum-like conditions—extreme 
poverty, dilapidated housing, industrial pollution, disease, vermin, crime, vice, and 
juvenile delinquency.  Upton Sinclair described the scene that awaited newcomers to the 
neighborhood:   
“the children played, and rolled about in the mud of the streets; here and there one 
noticed them digging in it, after trophies which they had stumbled upon.  One wondered 
about this, as also about the swarms of flies which hung about the scene, literally 
Blackening the air, and the strange, fetid odor which assailed one’s nostrils, a ghastly 
odor, of all of the dead things of the universe.  It impelled the visitors to questions—and 
then the residents would explain, quietly, that all of this was ‘made’ land, and that it had 
been ‘made’ by using it as a dumping-ground for the city garbage.  After a few years the 
unpleasant effect of this would pass away, it was said; but meantime, in hot weather—
and especially when it rained—the flies were apt to be annoying.  Was it not unhealthful? 
the stranger would ask; and the resident would answer, ‘Perhaps; but there is no telling.’” 
222
    
 By the 1940s, conditions had improved somewhat from the period of The Jungle 
with its filthy streets and homes and its filthier packing plants, but not much.  Since the 
first workers built homes around the stockyards and packinghouses in the 1860s, the 
Back of the Yards had always been considered a rough neighborhood.  Waves of poor 
immigrants—Irish and Germans initially, followed by Poles, Czechs, Slovaks, and 
Lithuanians around the turn of the century, and Mexicans in relatively small numbers 
beginning in the 1920s—flooded the area to work in the packinghouses, overwhelming 
the available housing stock.  Living conditions around the turn of the century were 
deplorable as workers were poorly paid.
223
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 Conditions didn’t improve much over the next few decades.  One juvenile 
delinquency expert reported in 1929 that “main high rate areas—near the Loop, around 
the Stock Yards, and near the steel mills—have had high rates [of delinquency] 
consistently over a long period of years.”224  Even local clergy condoned some vice in the 
neighborhood.  One long-time resident of the neighborhood reminisced in 1980 about 
running a gambling operation during the Depression—“I ran 40 guys organizing three 
churches on a percentage basis.  We’d set up the tables and supply the cards.  It was 
illegal, but the priests didn’t mind as long as they got money for the church.”225  Even 
after the successful unionization efforts of the Packinghouse Workers Organizing 
Committee in the late ‘30s and the founding of the Back of the Yards Neighborhood 
Council in 1939 (which Saul Alinsky said was founded to attack “unsanitary and 
dilapidated housing, juvenile delinquency and racial discrimination”226), the 
neighborhood still had a reputation for being crime-ridden and run down.  Indeed, 
Alsinsky was fond of describing the community as “a slum across the tracks from across 
the tracks.”227  One journalist in the early ‘40s reported on the “row after row of 
colorless, rat-infested shacks” that had “only cold water, no bath, no sinks, inadequate 
toilets, some of which are in the back yards.”228 
 The neighborhood was also geographically isolated because of physical barriers 
such as the stockyards and train tracks that hindered travel outside the neighborhood.  
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Residents became particularly territorial, viewing themselves and their neighborhood as 
distinct from the surrounding area and Chicago as a whole.
229
  The residents, and the 
Back of the Yards Neighborhood Council in particular, developed an isolationist attitude, 
arguing that they could take care of their own problems without any interference from 
outsiders.  Indeed, the Neighborhood Council’s motto was (and still is) “We the people of 
the Back of the Yards will work out our own destiny.”230  Alinsky later boasted, “show 
them [the underprivileged] how to get power to achieve what they want, not what 
somebody else thinks is sufficient for them, and they’ll uplift their community 
themselves.”231   
 Another neighborhood activist, G. Howland Shaw, testified before a Senate 
committee investigating juvenile delinquency in 1955 “I think that that type of 
community organization [BYNC], the essence of which is the belief that even in a slum 
area, the worst slum area, people can do things for themselves, if you give them an 
opportunity of doing those things, I think that that is basic in any program for the 
prevention of delinquency….Those people are convinced they don’t need to wait for 
somebody to come down and tell them what they ought to do.  They go ahead and do it 
themselves.”232  According to one Back of the Yards Neighborhood Council publication, 
“they [immigrant workers in the community] achieved a certain degree of security, of 
belonging, and with it a resentment at a city holding its nose at the odors of the 
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stockyards industry, and looking down its nose at the people who produced the meat.”233  
In part this sense of neighborhood unity was actively cultivated by the Neighborhood 
Council in order to downplay ethnic tensions.  Moreover, as one local church official said 
“if you’re going to gain any power, if you’re going to gain any leverage in the City 
Council or anyplace…you have to present a united front.”234  This insistence on 
community autonomy and knowing what’s best for their neighborhood would have long 
term implications as the neighborhood sought to deal with integration. 
 In the postwar period, however, the neighborhood had begun to transform itself 
under the leadership of the Neighborhood Council.  The Council, made up of delegates 
from a wide range of neighborhood organizations including church and ethnic 
organizations, businessmen’s clubs, fraternal societies, and unions, represented nearly 
every sector of the community.  Thomas Jablonsky argues that “most Back of the Yarders 
never participated actively in the Council, but they tacitly endorsed its actions because it 
struck the right chords, said the right things, asked for the right improvements.”235  In this 
way, neighborhood residents’ attitudes toward the Council mirrored packinghouse 
workers attitudes toward and participation in the union.  Generally, those workers and 
residents who didn’t play an active role in union or Council affairs still supported their 
goals.  
  One of these improvements was the rehabilitation of old housing and the building 
of new houses on vacant lots.  In 1953 the Neighborhood Council established a 
Conservation Committee to oversee the physical rehabilitation of the community.  
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According to the Executive Director of the Council, the committee was established 
because “there’s a sickness in our cities and its name is blight.  Blight is overcrowding, 
decay and all those characteristics which spell slums.  Federal, state and municipal 
agencies are desperately mapping strategy to try to cope with the present emergency of 
blight.  However, the issue will be decided by the local people themselves—only they can 
save our cities—their cities.”236  The Council, then, was clearly steeped in the discourse 
of blight and urban renewal which was coming to dominate urban policy nationally.  
Rather than rejecting the premises of urban renewal with its emphasis on wholesale 
removal of urban communities, the Council felt merely that it should be the neighborhood 
residents themselves who should oversee the process of renewal and removal of blight 
and for them to determine what exactly constituted blight.  Again, this attitude was 
representative of the neighborhood as a whole which resented efforts on the part of 
outsiders (whether they were federal officials, packinghouse management, or city 
bureaucrats) to determine the neighborhood’s future.   
 In one of the earliest efforts to clean up the neighborhood, the Council 
implemented a program in the mid-‘50s to distribute garbage cans to residents at cost, 
reminding residents, “Don’t blame your garbage man—get a garbage can.”237  The 
message was clear—residents shouldn’t rely on governmental services to address 
problems.  They would have to solve problems themselves.  The Council also encouraged 
residents to rehabilitate their homes.  The Neighborhood Council distributed pamphlets 
such as “Good News from the Office of Your Cook County Assessor P.J. Cullerton For 
Home Owners and Owners of Business Properties Also Good New From Your Mayor 
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Richard J. Daley For Buyers of Older Homes” in the mid-‘50s which advised residents 
about such things as upkeep of property, what types of home repairs they could do 
without paying higher property taxes, and what tenants could require landlords to do to 
keep up property values and ensure adequate living conditions.
238
 
 The Council leaned on local banks to provide loans for home improvement 
projects arguing that banks and local business leaders had a financial interest in 
rehabilitating the community.  They typically reasoned that improvement to the 
neighborhood would improve profits for the banks themselves while also appealing to 
management’s sense of local pride—banks and other local businesses were represented 
on the Council highlighting the different (and at times opposing) constituencies that 
comprised the Back of the Yards Neighborhood Council.  Indeed, one speaker at the 
BYNC’s 25th anniversary celebration was sure to thank “the banks and home loan 
associations for their faith in the community.”239    
 Throughout the 1950s the Council also encouraged the building of new homes 
(directing work to local contractors and businesses) on the few vacant lots zoned for 
housing in the neighborhood, the removal of substandard housing, and the conversion of 
abandoned storefronts into living space.
240
  To do so, it often enlisted the help of city 
authorities to enforce building codes while also putting pressure on one of the Council’s 
main bogeymen—out of town landlords—who failed to keep up their properties.  The 
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Tribune reported that by 1961 6,500 of the neighborhood’s 8,000 homes had been 
remodeled.
241
  
 The Neighborhood Council also encouraged residents to report any neighbors 
who didn’t have a garbage can or didn’t maintain their property as well as landlords who 
illegally converted single-family housing into apartments.  This type of community 
policing of the landscape would presage later attempts to regulate the type of industry 
that would be allowed in the neighborhood after the decline of the packing industry, as 
well as what types of people would be allowed to move in.  The Council even partially 
financed a new housing project in the mid-‘50s called “Destiny Manor” which it 
advertised as having “neighbors who love GOD and welcome children.”242  While this 
selling point can certainly be read as a product of Cold War paranoia over godless 
communism, it also highlighted the fervent (often quite conservative) religiosity of many 
Back of the Yards residents, which would play a strong role in the debates over 
neighborhood integration. 
 Residents took particular pride in their ability to transform the community from a 
slum that was destined for urban renewal to a model neighborhood that earned the praise 
of national leaders such as President Lyndon Johnson who congratulated “all who have 
contributed to the efforts to eliminate blight and rehabilitate decaying neighborhoods.”243  
National publications ranging from Time to Reader’s Digest celebrated the 
neighborhood’s dramatic turnaround that prompted one resident to boast that “some of 
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the things that have happened here are hard to believe and when you talk about them, 
people think you’re bragging.  But they’re true.  They’re true!”244  In an editorial titled 
“They Refuse to be Slum Dwellers,” the Tribune claimed that “many of its people were 
born in the area and have lived there all their lives.  They don’t want to move to the 
suburbs.  They won’t live in a slum.  They are working people who are willing to give 
their time and spend their money to keep their neighborhood from slipping into slum 
status.”245   
 Despite these efforts to physically transform the neighborhood, the community’s 
industrial identity was nevertheless quite apparent—the stockyards and packing plants 
were still the defining physical features of its landscape and marked many people’s day to 
day activities in the neighborhood.  For instance, “How You Do It,” a booklet that the 
Back of the Yards Neighborhood Council distributed to residents beginning in the mid-
‘50s, gave information about how to obtain a wide variety of municipal services. It 
provided a number for residents to call if they saw any stray cattle from the stockyards 
roaming the neighborhood, highlighting the area’s rather odd mix of urban and rural 
elements.
246
  After the packing plants left the neighborhood by the 1960s, it was such 
reminders of the community’s past that residents and neighborhood leaders tried to erase 
from the landscape.  But at least in the 1950s, efforts to beautify and improve the 
neighborhood tended to coexist with the pollution and stench generated by the 
packinghouses and stockyards. 
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 The decline of the meatpacking industry and increasing suburbanization, 
however, threatened all of the progress that had been made in the neighborhood in the 
post-World War II period.  The Back of the Yards Neighborhood Council and its 
Conservation Committee in particular remained resolute in their efforts to improve the 
appearance of the neighborhood.  Often this effort had a racial component—that is, part 
of the effort to maintain the neighborhood was focused on excluding African-Americans 
in addition to trying to attract (or reject) certain kinds of industry and businesses. (See 
Chapter 3).  Throughout the 1950s and into the ‘60s, as the meatpacking industry 
disappeared, the community continued to rehabilitate housing and combat blight.  For 
instance, in the “25th Annual Report of the Back of the Yards Neighborhood Council,” 
published in 1964, the Council adopted the following resolutions:  “We pledge to 
continue our efforts to build new homes on the remaining few vacant lots available in our 
area, and also to continue our campaign for the remodeling and modernization of all 
existing older homes” and “Where it is evident that there are numerous violations on the 
exterior of multiple dwellings, we urge the Building Commissioner to order a task force 
inspection to make a complete investigation outside and inside.”247  
 The neighborhood was still the object of national and citywide admiration 
throughout the 1960s for its stunning turnaround, but this progress was nowhere near as 
assured as it was when the packing companies were the main source of employment in 
the neighborhood.  Neighborhood stability was rather tenuous which explains to a large 
extent the effort to control which people and industries could move into the area.  
Residents feared a return to the slum-like conditions that characterized the neighborhood 
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in the first half of the 20
th
 century.  Indeed, they were almost Puritanical in their efforts to 
combat blight.  For instance, the Conservation Committee reported that it had “compiled 
a fact sheet, by street and house numbers, giving a detailed description of the exterior of 
every building in the community, as well as the condition of every vacant lot.”248   
 The committee also recorded each building’s owner, his address, “violations to 
the outside of the building such as defective gutters and downspouts, defective siding, 
sagging porches and foundations…Everything that can be seen by an observer without 
entering the building is recorded.”249  As the packinghouses abandoned the city, they left 
behind vacant land and empty buildings that residents feared were the harbingers of 
neighborhood decay.    
 In order to combat the potential physical decline of the neighborhood brought on 
by deindustrialization, the Neighborhood Council attempted to keep people from moving 
to the suburbs to be nearer to jobs or to escape the undesirable urban environment.  
Indeed, one billboard asked “WHY MOVE AWAY?   You’ll be sorry!  Where else are 
there 20 churches paid for-20 schools-nearby jobs-23 places to play-children wanted-2 
shopping centers-paved streets-clean alleys-friendly neighbors-places to save-low rents & 
taxes-good transportation?”250  Throughout the 1960s the Back of the Yards Journal 
published rather comical attacks on suburban living that highlighted the advantages of 
remaining in the community.  For example, a series of pictures of flooding (one of which 
included a submerged car) was titled “Ah, Suburbia!”  The caption read, “these pictures 
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of the suburbs are two more reasons why Back of the Yards living never looked so good.  
Even in the recent downpours, no streets in this area flooded.  Yet suburban streets, 
which often lack proper sewers, curbs, and drainage systems, can be prey to torrential 
rain waters.  Deluged streets and basements are suburban ‘advantages’ not too often 
mentioned.  But they exist.”251  Another article was headlined “Yards Shine Over 
Suburbs:  Dream of Suburbia Becomes a Nightmare to Residents.”252  Stories of this type 
emphasize, of course, that flight to the suburbs was perceived, at least by the editors of 
the Back of the Yards Journal as a real problem that threatened to destabilize the 
neighborhood and is a subject to which I’ll return in greater detail in the next chapter.   
 Stories such as these reveal ideas about proper use of the land, demographic 
shifts, and the changing nature of land use in the Chicago area.  The features of the 
neighborhood’s geography that once made it attractive to the packing companies—
proximity to rail lines, Midwestern livestock growers, the Chicago River, and to the city 
of Chicago itself (as well as the large pool of workers living in the area surrounding the 
packing plants)—now, in the post-war period, threatened to be the Back of the Yards’ 
undoing.  But community leaders and residents were fighting a battle on multiple and 
often contradictory fronts.  On the one hand, the loss of jobs in the packing industry was 
potentially crippling to the community.  But, on the other, many in the community did not 
want those jobs to come back.  However, this meant that abandoned packing plants, 
decaying packing industry infrastructure, and vacant land became a new form of 
pollution, one that threatened to both keep more attractive industries from moving in and 
to drive residents out of the neighborhood.    
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 The community was also in jeopardy due to suburbanization.  Increasingly, and 
thanks to a host of factors, the perils of living in the city were seen as outweighing the 
benefits.  The negative views of the neighborhood (both those in the past and potentially 
in the future)—that it was a crime-ridden, dirty, stinking slum—made suburban living 
seem more attractive to many residents and potential residents.  As a result, community 
leaders began to play up the features of Back of the Yards that made it more appealing to 
the sensibilities of those who might flee to the suburbs while simultaneously denigrating 
the suburbs and highlighting the disadvantages of suburban living. 
 This shift in ideas about what the landscape should look (and smell) like and what 
the proper use of the land should be was essential to the neighborhood’s changing 
conception of itself.  No longer was it a victim of the polluting and poorly-paying 
packing industry.  No longer was its fate out of its residents’ hands.  It had the power to 
influence outsiders’ perception of Back of the Yards.  Residents increasingly saw 
themselves as something other than packinghouse workers as that work no longer defined 
their lives.  As such they felt empowered to influence decisions about what to do with the 
land.  Back of the Yards residents weren’t going to be compelled to accept new industry 
into the neighborhood that was going to stigmatize and pollute it in the same way that the 
packing industry had.  They felt they had the authority to force home-owners and 
industrial tenants to comply with zoning laws in order to uphold community standards of 
propriety.  But at the same time they expressed anxiety over the future of the 
neighborhood.  They feared that an inability to control the landscape (and who would 
reside on it) could destabilize the community and make it regress back to its previous 
deplorable state.     
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 On the whole, then, the battles over terrain in Back of the Yards exemplify 
shifting American attitudes over land use in the post-war period.  The same processes that 
made industrial flight possible and even desirable likewise allowed for the mass exodus 
of people from the city to the suburbs.
253
 The interstate highway system allowed for 
packing plants to be situated closer to livestock producers rather than adjacent to railroad 
hubs in cities such as Chicago.  It also allowed for more workers to live farther away 
from their jobs in the city and the unpleasantness of the city itself as well as for the jobs 
to relocate out of the city.  Governmental policies that encouraged and subsidized 
suburban and exurban building (of both houses and industries) exacerbated the problem 
of flight from the cities.  Back of the Yards was by no means unique in this regard.  
Rather is serves as an example of the problems facing inner-city neighborhoods as they 
dealt with the flight of both people and industry.        
 Flight to the suburbs was not the only perceived threat to community stability, 
however.  As the packing plants began to abandon the neighborhood, residents and 
workers sought to keep them from fleeing, fearing that not only would the loss of jobs 
and industry threaten the neighborhood’s tax base, a significant source of income for 
many residents, and the identity of the neighborhood, but also that the abandoned 
industrial landscape would be a new form of blight that had the potential to tarnish the 
community.  Whereas once the packing industry stigmatized the neighborhood for its 
horrible pollution, now it paradoxically threatened to stigmatize the community by its 
absence.  Residents feared trading one form of pollution for another.  That is, the 
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abandoned structures, crumbling infrastructure, and vacant land that remained after the 
packinghouses left the neighborhood—tangible reminders of the community’s former 
conditions and subsequent abandonment—were themselves of form of pollution that 
residents sought to get rid of.   
 But the efforts of the union and the community to prevent the loss of jobs, and the 
abandonment of industrial land that went with it, were in vain.  By 1958, the amount of 
vacant land was rising in Back of the Yards.  The following year the Department of City 
Planning published a report on vacant land that broke the city down into over 200 one-
mile square sections.  Two of the four sections that made up Back of the Yards contained 
more acres of vacant land in 1958 that they had when a previous study was conducted in 
1939-1941 (two whole sections fell within the neighborhood’s boundaries while only half 
of the other two sections did).  This increase in vacant land was true of only 12 of the 
over 200 other sections.   These other sections that saw an increase in vacant land were 
mostly located on the southern edge of the city, not a couple of miles from the central 
business district as Back of the Yards was.
254
  That is, these areas of the city were less 
dense and a rise in abandoned land would have been less of a problem.  The mile square 
section that was home to most of the abandoned packinghouses contained 33 or more 
acres of vacant manufacturing land in the 1958 study.  This was the highest concentration 
of vacant land zoned for manufacturing that the Planning Department recorded.  
However, other sections throughout the city contained as much total vacant land but these 
were areas that were not zoned for manufacturing. This rise in vacant land occurred while 
the city as a whole saw a decline from 46 square miles of vacant land in 1939-1941 to 21 
                                                          
254
 “Vacant Land in the City of Chicago-1958,” (The Chicago Department of City Planning, 1959). 
  
108 
 
square miles in 1958.
255
  So, even though the amount of vacant land in the city was 
declining from the early 1940s to 1958, it was actually increasing in Back of the Yards.    
 In the follow-up study that the Department of City Planning conducted in 1963, 
the two Back of the Yards wards were ranked 14
th
 and 15
th
 out of 50 wards in total area 
of vacant land.  The New City community area that encompasses the Back of the Yards 
(along with the Canaryville neighborhood) ranked 18
th
 out of 76 in total area of vacant 
land.  Most of this vacant land was zoned for manufacturing.  That is, it was land that 
local officials would likely have wanted to be occupied by tax-paying industries.  Not 
only was this vacant land an eyesore, its emptiness signaled the neighborhood’s declining 
economic fortunes as well.   
 After the large packinghouses had left the community, however, there was an 
effort to remove all reference to the neighborhood’s meatpacking history as many thought 
it a hindrance to its industrial future, keeping tax-paying industries from setting up shop 
in Back of the Yards.  For instance, in early 1961 the last of Wilson’s plants were 
demolished.  The Back of the Yards Journal published a series of photos on the front 
page above the banner detailing the demolition.  It was headlined “Dynamite Last Wilson 
Building to Clear Way for Industrial Sites.”256  No article accompanied the pictures, just a 
caption that explained that the buildings, “built like a ‘stone fortress’ were more than a 
challenge to the firm clearing the property” and that the new owners “will divide and 
build to suit in this 20-acre area zoned for manufacturing.”257  In some ways this 
highlighted a sense of anxiety over the neighborhood’s industrial future.  The Journal 
editors were essentially advertising the availability of this land for future industrial 
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tenants.  However, it also revealed an erasure of the community’s meatpacking history.  
In order for the neighborhood to progress, community leaders felt it had to remove all 
reminders of the meatpacking past. 
 That erasure was made more explicit in 1969 with the building of an industrial 
park on former packinghouse land.  In summarizing the work that had been completed to 
that point, the Journal published photos of old buildings being demolished and new ones 
being erected in their stead under the headline “Industrial Park Erasing Old Stockyards.”  
The stockyards were old.  They belonged to the past and had no place in the Back of the 
Yards’ future.  The new buildings were rising phoenix-like “from ground that not long 
ago was scarred with the shattered remnants of demolished buildings, desolate broken 
skeletons that marked the passing of an era.”  The language is telling.  The 
packinghouses, whose time had clearly passed, were associated with death and decay.  
Where once they dealt in death as a way of making the community prosperous, however, 
now they threatened to kill the neighborhood with their absence and the callous way that 
the plants were left to decay on and degrade the landscape leaving only rotting shells to 
remind people of that former prosperity and simultaneously drive potential industrial 
newcomers away.  But the new industrial park promised hope and signaled rebirth in the 
community.  Or, as the Journal rather grandiosely put it, “the rubble of yesterday is gone, 
blown away by man’s will to create.”258   
 In 1964, the Back of the Yards Journal published another series of pictures of the 
demolition of a meatpacking plant.  It wasn’t identified by name, only as “an old meat-
packing building” that was “once proud and sturdy.”259  The implication was that it was 
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no longer proud nor sturdy but simply an anonymous structure that would almost 
inevitably fall to the wrecking ball.  No effort was made to eulogize these plants or erect 
any kind of memorial to the industry or the workers.  Instead, the packinghouses were 
something that stood in the way of future development, an unpleasant reminder of the 
past.  Indeed, their destruction was often something to be celebrated as the Back of the 
Yards Journal did some years later in remarking that the stockyards were “now 
experiencing a rebirth as an industrial park.  Gone are the vacant cattle pens, rusting 
equipment, and the silence.  Moderns buildings are springing up to replace them.”260   
 In Corporate Wasteland: The Landscape and Memory of Deindustrialization 
Steven High argues that “the demolition of landmark industrial structures, highly 
ritualized and widely represented, dramatized the changes underway.  At a local level, the 
ceremony and ritual surrounding industrial demolition lent authority and legitimacy to the 
idea that specific towns and cities were making the transition to a post-industrial era.  The 
message seemed to be that there was no going back.”261  While this might be true in the 
more recent past that High is describing, it is only partially true of the demolition of 
structures in Back of the Yards.  Rather than being “highly ritualized and widely 
represented” demolition of packing industry structures was often almost hidden.  While 
the workers who toiled there may have watched the wrecking ball bring down the 
buildings there was almost no effort on the part of the media (either the Back of the Yards 
Journal or the Tribune) to find out what the workers thought as they watched the 
wrecking ball and dynamite do their work, or to transmit images of the destruction, or 
attempt to discern any sort of larger meaning in what was going on.  To be sure, there 
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was some coverage of certain demolitions and the ultimate closing of the stockyards but 
most of that coverage focused on the more mundane aspects of the closures (“it will take 
seven months to wreck 50 acres of animal pens, auxiliary buildings, and the eight-story 
Exchange building”262) and the coming of other industries rather than a lamentation for a 
lost way of life or a celebration of the workers.
263
  Indeed, one stockyards official told the 
Tribune that the lack of fanfare was by design:  “We decided to let it go quietly.  We 
didn’t want to conduct a wake.”264  A Washington Post article from a few days before the 
closure of the yards noted that “no special events have been planned for the demise of the 
345-acre tract on Chicago’s South Side, once a maze of animal pens and slaughterhouses 
which in recent years has become a ghost of its former bustling self.”265  This lack of 
sentimental reflection highlights how emotionally charged the closing of the stockyards 
was while at the same time reflecting the degree to which these transitions were allowed 
to pass without much acknowledgment, without the input of workers, and denying them 
the ability to formally mourn the passing of a way of life.  While it is certainly true that 
these type of industrial demolitions represented a transition and signified that there was 
no going back, these sentiments would have been by no means assured (or readily 
acknowledged) in the 1950s and ‘60s as workers and community leaders were optimistic 
that some new industry would arrive to take the place of the packing plants.  By the time 
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the stockyards closed in 1971, however, it was becoming abundantly clear that any 
industry that might return to the neighborhood would not be on the same scale as the 
packing industry.     
 One of the few efforts to examine the views of the workers as the packing 
industry caved in around them came on the last day of the Union Stockyards in 1971 
when film student Mark Mamalakis, a young man who grew up in the area, took his 
camera to capture the scenes as the Stockyards closed for good.  Curiously, there was 
little interest on the part of local or national newspapers (although I should note that the 
Chicago Tribune had a brief article about the final day of the stockyards which featured 
some people who seemed to understand the importance of the occasion—souvenir 
hunters tried to remove some of the antique brass latches from the gates to the livestock 
pens and two people were arrested for trying to steal a bronze bust of Abraham Lincoln 
that sat on a pedestal outside of the Exchange Building).
266
  Mamalakis focused on the 
workers themselves, some of whom had been employed in the yards for 50 years, who 
uniformly expressed sadness at the end of their employment and way of life and lamented 
the termination of the close friendships they’d made with their fellow workers.267  As one 
worker noted, “they’re beautiful memories in the past, but very sad today.”268 
                                                          
266
 Richard Orr, “Great Chicago Era Comes to End,” Chicago Tribune, July 31, 1971, 3. 
267
 http://chicagotonight.wttw.com/2011/12/20/chicagos-union-stockyards-40-years-closing (Accessed Jan. 
15, 2014). 
268
 Ibid. 
  
113 
 
 
Figure 11: Union Stock Yards Gate.  Source:  Chicago History Museum. 
 The Union Stock Yards Gate is one of the few tangible reminders that the 
neighborhood once produced most of the nation’s meat.  Built in 1879 and located on 
Exchange Avenue, the gate served as the entrance to the Union Stock Yards.  It was 
commissioned by John B. Sherman, superintendant of the yards at the time, designed by 
the architectural firm Burnham and Root, and features the bust of Sherman’s prize-
winning bull.  The city assumed possession of the gate in 1971 when the stockyards 
closed and it gained recognition as a Chicago Landmark in 1972 and a National Historic 
Landmark in 1981.
269
   
 This type of unsentimental removal of urban landmarks was certainly a 
nationwide trend during the post-war period of urban renewal and Back of the Yards was 
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not unique in this regard, by any means.  For instance, the Journal reported in 1967 that 
the Boulevard Theatre building (later the Boulevard Ballroom), which had “long been a 
neighborhood landmark” was demolished to be replaced by a new Shell gas station.270    
Again, the overall tone of stories like these was lacking in any kind of nostalgia—these 
types of demolitions were necessary for the progress of the neighborhood.  In this case 
the corner would “soon be brightened by the erection of a large, modern gas station.”271  
 This erasure of the community’s industrial past was further evident when, in early 
1961, developers announced plans to build a new modern shopping plaza that would 
“bring modern shopping techniques and conveniences to the Back of the Yards.”272  This 
new development was part of neighborhood leaders’ efforts to stem the tide of people 
moving to the suburbs.  The land, which had been zoned for trucking purposes, was 
rezoned for commercial use.  The Back of the Yards Journal reported that this land “was 
considered a community eyesore and dumping ground for debris” and that “elimination 
of the trucking hazard and use of the land for a modern shopping center is being hailed by 
community leaders as another step forward in the remoulding of the community.”273  
Again, vestiges of the community’s history as an industrial center were increasingly 
unwelcome and seen as a form of blight that had to be eliminated.  Instead, the 
neighborhood was undergoing a transition that would make it more appealing to people 
who might be tempted by the allure of suburban living. 
 One of the only demolitions that generated any kind of sentimental reflection or 
efforts at preservation was the razing of the Stock Yards Inn.  The Inn was built in 1912 
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and housed many wealthy and famous guests throughout its history due to its proximity 
to the International Amphitheater which played host to the annual International Live 
Stock Exhibition as well as musicians such as the Beatles and Elvis Presley.  When the 
Union Stock Yard and Transit Company ordered the tenants out of the building by 
Christmas 1976, the building housed the Sirloin Room restaurant, a men’s clothing store, 
and most importantly the Saddle and Sirloin Club Ballroom which was a club for leaders 
in the meat industry and which still maintained a collection of 350 paintings of livestock 
breeders and packers.
274
  Most likely because of its affiliation with these types of industry 
leaders, this was the only building in the neighborhood that was deemed to be important 
enough to make an effort to save.  Although by 1976 is was also clear that the 
neighborhood and industry were irreversibly changing which likely engendered a fair bit 
of nostalgia that would have been lacking in the preceding decades.  The Union Stock 
Yards and Transit Company argued that “we deeply regret having been forced to make 
this decision but the cost to repair and maintain these older buildings in good condition 
has become too excessive and very uneconomical.”275  The businessmen who frequented 
the Saddle and Sirloin Club nevertheless made an effort to purchase the building and run 
it themselves.
276
  The Stock Yards Inn clearly was deemed more worthy of preservation 
because of its importance to those with power and money whereas most of the other 
packinghouse structures that were demolished generated no similar sentimentality.    
 Despite such efforts to preserve it, the Stock Yards Inn was ultimately razed in 
early 1977.  On its demise, the Back of the Yards Journal sentimentally reflected back on 
its history, however, something it was loathe to do for other packing structures that fell to 
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the wrecking ball.  These stories did not focus on the mundane or the day to day activities 
of the workers in the packing plants, though.  Rather, one story examined the famous 
guests who stayed at the Inn and performed at the International Amphitheater.
277
  The 
other was a lament by one neighborhood resident at the way the neighborhood was 
changing.  But rather than mourning the loss of jobs or celebrate those who toiled in the 
packinghouses, it offered the writer an opportunity to mourn the passing of his childhood.  
Indeed, he wrote that “the demise of the Stock Yard Inn awakens a feeling of nostalgia in 
those of us for whom the stockyards served as a source of interest and entertainment on 
many occasions during boyhood.  Those of us who lived on the periphery of the 
stockyards in the ‘30s found that sprawling space just perfect for adventuring on days off 
from school.”278   
 The actual work done in the packing plants was noticeably absent from such 
memorials, however.  The stockyards were only a source of entertainment for children, 
not a place where thousands of men and women ceaselessly labored in order to make a 
living.  The removal of certain structures didn’t lead to a celebration of these innumerable 
nameless and faceless workers, only an opportunity to highlight the neighborhood’s 
connections to the famous.  There were no testimonials from any of these workers 
lamenting the loss of their livelihoods or even the camaraderie they felt with fellow 
workers inside those plants which merely highlights the degree to which it seemed to be 
in everyone’s best interest if those times were merely forgotten, brushed aside so as not to 
hold back the neighborhood’s progress.  The Journal was more or less the official organ 
of the Back of the Yards Neighborhood Council and any effort to memorialize the past or 
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romanticize the work done in the packing plants (work that, by the late 1970s, was clearly 
not coming back) would likely have been seen as hopeless romanticization—an effort to 
live in the past and a hindrance to the community’s future.    
 The packinghouses were mostly razed by the mid-60s (except for a few small 
holdouts) and the stockyards themselves closed for good in 1971.  As members of the 
community struggled to bring jobs and new industry to the area, the neighborhood’s 
history (and the visible reminders of that history) was viewed as a hindrance to progress.  
A 1964 report from the Back of the Yards Neighborhood Council stressed “now that the 
stockyards is finally cleared of old and obsolete buildings, we must leave nothing undone 
to attract new industry into the yards area.”279  Indeed, Joseph Meegan, in response to the 
death of the meatpacking industry, even claimed “we’re delighted about this, not at all 
disheartened.  Many of the packers did nothing to help improve the community.  The 
improvements in the economic status of the workers came through the union.  What 
we’re looking for now is the coming of other industry to take up the space that is being 
created in the yards.”280   
 This claim was somewhat dubious, however, considering that as late as 1954, the 
meatpacking industry employed 36,000 Chicagoans.
281
  While it might be true that the 
packers themselves didn’t do much for the community other than pollute it, the industry 
(and the union) were responsible for raising the standards of living for the workers.  
Meegan’s words, however, revealed animosity toward the packers that may, in part, have 
accounted for the community’s desire to remove all reminders of the packing industry 
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from the landscape.  The workers and community as a whole had always had an 
antagonistic relationship with the packers and while the packing industry’s abandonment 
of the community meant a loss of tax revenue and wages, in some sense it was also 
welcomed.   
 As far as many residents were concerned, the packing industry served only to 
stigmatize the neighborhood and cast a foul-smelling pall over it.  In that sense, it is 
entirely understandable that there would be minimal effort to commemorate the industry 
that had so recently abandoned the neighborhood.  It is also likely that community leaders 
and residents were unduly optimistic about their chances of attracting industry or jobs 
that they felt would benefit the neighborhood as a whole.  While the decline of the 
packing industry and its movement to less unionized rural areas was part of a larger trend 
that had been taking place in a variety of other industries, this was not a trend that was 
readily apparent in the heady days of the post-war economic boom.  Indeed, the pages of 
the Back of the Yards Journal would continue to be awash with optimistic reports on the 
latest efforts to attract industry and the number of jobs that were expected whenever a 
company opened or was planning to open a new building in the area.  
 For instance, in the summer of 1966 Mayor Daley and local developer Harry F. 
Chaddick unveiled plans to open the Chicago International Food Market on former 
railroad land just north of Back of the Yards.  While this proposed food and produce 
wholesaler and distribution center was not actually in the neighborhood, the Journal 
nevertheless celebrated the 10,000 jobs that it would bring to the area, jobs that would no 
doubt be filled in part by Back of the Yards residents.  The expansive $86,000,000 300-
acre project was to include a 200-room hotel, a farmer’s market that would be open to the 
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public, parking for 3,300 trucks, and (curiously) a heliport.
282
  While this ambitious plan 
wouldn’t come to fruition until decades later (and on a much more modest scale) it 
reveals the optimism that many in the community (and surrounding ones) felt about the 
potential return of jobs. 
 There were, in fact, reasons to be optimistic.  The neighborhood’s location within 
the city, its proximity to both rail lines and expressways, as well as its ready supply of 
labor seemed to suggest limitless possibilities for industrial expansion.  Indeed, the 
developer of a new 70-acre trucking terminal in the neighborhood (which was projected 
to employ 5,000 people) said that the proposed site was “the best location for a motor 
freight terminal in the United States” due to its proximity to the Stevenson 
Expressway.
283
 Likewise, when a 58-acre portion of former Armour property was sold in 
early 1967, the Journal claimed that because of the neighborhood’s “access to 
expressways, the availability of rail service and the fine labor supply the location has 
been regarded as prime metropolitan industrial land.”284    
 Indeed, the Charles Ringer Company had been buying up such land or presiding 
over land transactions in the neighborhood throughout the 1960s including the purchase 
of about 77 acres of former Armour property in 1960 by Berkshire Foods, Inc. (from 
which it subsequently tore down almost 70 packinghouse structures) and overseeing a 
deal for some former Swift property in 1962 which was used for a $1,000,000 cold 
storage and freezer warehouse.
285
  In discussing such transactions, the Ringer Company 
touted the benefits of the neighborhood—“The stockyards area is one of the most 
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centrally located tracts of vacant land in the city today” and is zoned for “the heaviest 
type of manufacturing and processing operations and intense land use.”286  Moreover, “a 
proven distribution center for scores of years, it offers cost savings to distributors due to 
its location in the center of a large labor pool, members of which in many instances have 
been employed in this area for a number of years.”287  In other words, the geography and 
demographics of the neighborhood, which had been so instrumental in the packing 
industry leaving the community, could also play an important role in attracting new 
industry to the area.         
 There was even more reason to be confident in the return of jobs with the 
announcement of federal funding for the redevelopment of the stockyards in late 1967 
and a subsequent plan to attract industry to the community—which prompted the Journal 
to declare that “after several years of study and cooperative planning, the rebirth of the 
Stockyards will now be realized.”288   
 Meegan’s and other community leaders’ optimism notwithstanding, the loss of 
jobs no doubt affected the community, though.  In fact, in 1960, two years after Meegan 
expressed delight at the decline of the packing industry in Chicago, the Neighborhood 
Council lamented that “the decrease in slaughtering and meat processing was responsible 
for the loss of more than forty thousand jobs.”289  The Packinghouse Worker also 
reported that as many as 7,000 Chicago meatpacking workers who had lost their jobs 
since 1955 (the year Wilson closed its Chicago operations) were still without work of any 
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kind.
290
  Meegan himself cited the loss of 40,000 jobs as a major factor in obtaining 
federal funding to revitalize the stockyards area in 1967.
291
   
 The small rendering plants that remained near the stockyards were also roundly 
criticized for giving off noxious odors that prevented new industry from locating in the 
community.  The smell that infused the community (as well as other nearby 
neighborhoods) was once borne by workers and their families with a certain measure of 
pride.  One resident reported that “it clears out your brains.”292  Beverly Tannen, though 
not a Back of the Yards resident, reported that “it is a good odor, and a hunger inspiring 
one.”293  Another resident remembered “the odor of meat processing never killed anyone.  
It meant jobs, and we grew accustomed to it.”294  Meegan claimed “we don’t mind 
industry.  The smoke and smell of it have been good to us” (which rather contradicts his 
other statements that he was delighted that the packing plants were leaving).
295
  In 1984, 
he fondly recalled that “to some people it was an offensive odor, to us it was perfume.  
That smell meant 40,000 people were working.  Sweat was like holy water.”296   
 These attitudes mirror those of other working class communities, particularly ones 
that were dependent on one main industry such as Youngstown, Ohio, whose residents 
welcomed the fine gray soot from the steel mills that accumulated on window sills and 
front porches as a symbol of their prosperity.
297
  Pollution that was not only tolerated but 
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celebrated when times were good became symbolic of industries’ disregard for the well-
being of the neighborhoods when those industries left.   
 Indeed, after the meatpacking industry’s abandonment of the Back of the Yards 
the smells associated with it were held in contempt.  For instance, Rev. Roman Berendt, 
president of the Back of the Yards Neighborhood Council praised James Fitzpatrick, head 
of the city’s Department of Air Pollution Control, for his efforts to control the odors 
emanating from the stock yards as well as the Chicago Daily News reporter who 
publicized Fitzpatrick’s actions.  Fitzpatrick was successful in getting the Union Stock 
Yards and Transit Co. to reduce the size of its huge open manure piles from 60 feet high 
and 100 feet long to half that size and to reduce the number of such piles from eight to 
four.
298
  This was a marked improvement, to be sure, but it highlighted the degree to 
which the stockyards and the few remaining packing plants still dominated the 
neighborhood’s air even by the mid-‘60s.   
 Further, a local businessman praised the Back of the Yards Neighborhood Council 
and Meegan in particular for “incurring the enmity and even the wrath of those who 
would bring undesirable industry into this area, of those who would promote the right to 
fill the air with sickening odors and smoke, and with those whose only interest was 
personal gain from promoting their own pet projects within the Back of the Yards.”299  
The implications were clear.  Certain types of industry—those that harkened back to the 
pollution of the past—were no longer welcome in the neighborhood and those greedy 
individuals who attempted to ignore the wishes of community residents would be met 
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with a tremendous amount of opposition from Meegan and the Council, acting at the 
behest of those residents.       
 Earlier in 1962 Fitzpatrick, the head of Chicago’s Department of Air Pollution 
Control, also spoke at a BYNC meeting about air pollution and the city’s recent 
ordinance that made his department (formerly called the Smoke Department) responsible 
for such things as “radioactive fallout, toxic fumes, waste odors, odors of many natures, 
fumes of any nature from processing, residences, gases of all types, exhausts from 
automobiles and trucks or manufacturing equipment, vapors from factories in 
neighborhoods…”300  No doubt some of the increasing concern in the neighborhood 
about pollution owed as much to the growing national environmentalist discourse as it 
did to community resentment toward the meatpacking plants that polluted the community 
and then abandoned it.  At the very least the burgeoning environmental movement 
provided the ability and the language to voice that displeasure with the packers and 
ensured that the concerns of the residents would be taken seriously (indeed, the Back of 
the Yards Journal began to regularly publish articles in the late ‘60s with such headlines 
as “Sabotaging Ourselves:  Are We Being Bombed Out of Chicago by Pollution?”301).  
 Residents and the Council continued to voice opposition to air pollution generated 
by animal processing plants that remained in the area.  In 1967 the Neighborhood 
Council filed a letter of complaint with the Chicago Department of Air Pollution Control 
over offensive odors emanating from the Brush and Weaving Hair Manufacturing Co.  In 
its complaint the Council argued that the company “has nothing in common with the 
community, that it must comply with the city ordinances governing air pollution or else 
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close its plant.”302  One resident, Mrs. George Paulik, who had lived in the same house 
near the plant for all of her 43 years, objected to the smells coming from the plant saying 
that “if it offends me, you know it’s getting pretty bad!” which lends some credence to 
the notion that community residents at one time took pride in the smell.
303
  A reporter for 
the Sun-Times who investigated found “blood-clotted patches of hair lying in the roadway 
and an uncovered, outdoor bin full of scraps of repulsive smelling animal matter.”304  
Joseph Meegan opined that “the odors emanating from this building are sickening” while 
Mrs. Paulik claimed that “it’s worse than when the slaughtering was going on.”305  The 
Sun-Times reporter tellingly pointed out that it had been eight years since the last of the 
slaughtering plants and packinghouses had left the neighborhood along with 40,000 jobs 
and “with the loss of those paychecks, the surrounding neighborhood has lost its 
tolerance for animal odors.”  Mrs. Paulik eventually testified before the City Council’s air 
pollution hearings telling the Committee on Health “I don’t have to make excuses for my 
home.  Why should I have to make excuses for the air in my neighborhood?”306  In 
discussing her testimony she told the Back of the Yards Journal “you make a nice home 
and do a good job of raising your kids, but when you tell someone you’re from the Back 
of the Yards, they wrinkle up their nose.  That shouldn’t be.”307     
 Ultimately, this was one battle against one of the industrial residents of the 
community that the neighborhood and the Council won.  In response to the complaint 
lodged against it by the Council with the city’s Department of Air Pollution, the Brush 
and Hair Weaving Manufacturing Co. sent a letter to the Neighborhood Council in which 
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it acknowledged the problem and pledged to work with the city to see it resolved.  Part of 
the program the city implemented to curtail the foul odors necessitated that the company 
secure custom-made pollution control devices which, because they weren’t standard and 
had to be specially engineered and tested, would not be ready for installation for several 
months.  Brush and Weaving assured the Council, however, that “our firm is doing 
everything possible to expedite this program and that if it is physically possible, an even 
earlier installation will be made.  In the meantime, please note that the material that you 
had objected to being stored out of doors has been permanently removed.  Further, for 
purposed of overall cleanliness, the strictest housekeeping measures have been 
instituted…It is our desire to have this situation properly taken care of and we are 
specifically following the indicated program of the Department of Air Pollution 
Control.”308   This incident, aside from revealing the degree to which pollution was 
increasingly seen as a problem, and one that affected residents as well as potential new 
industry, also highlights how the Council often relied on assistance from governmental 
agencies despite its contention that the community could take care of its own problems.  
Meegan also admitted as much at a luncheon celebrating Mayor Daley when he claimed 
“we always work through our public officials.”309  While the Neighborhood Council and 
residents were certainly capable of exerting pressure on organizations or people that 
failed to live up to community standards, here the possibility of governmental sanctions 
was required to make Brush and Weaving comply with the law.       
 This concern with pollution did not translate into a distrust of industry in general, 
however.  In fact, community leaders felt that the continuing problems with air pollution 
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in the neighborhood actually hindered further industrial development.  This development 
became increasingly necessary in order to deal with budgetary problems.  In 1977, for 
instance, the Deputy Assessor of Cook County spoke to the Back of the Yards 
Neighborhood Council explaining that residents could look forward to lower taxes as a 
consequence of luring new industry to the area with tax incentives.  New industries, he 
argued, would further economic development, improve neighborhood stability, provide 
more jobs, and create more spending.  As a result, sales taxes would increase which 
would provide increased funding for education and governmental services.
310
  The 
Neighborhood Council also officially supported a reduction in industrial tax rates in order 
to bring jobs to the community.
311
  According to an editorial in the Sun-Times, such a 
plan, which “would cut property taxes for business that erect new commercial or 
industrial building in decaying areas,” was necessary “to lure companies to reclaim the 
city’s blighted industrial sites.”312  
 While community leaders and residents in the decade or so following the 
packinghouses’ abandonment of the city felt hopeful about the potential return of jobs 
and felt a fair measure of control over what type of industry would be welcomed to the 
neighborhood, by the 1970s and economic downturn the neighborhood’s fortunes were 
less secure.  Several projected industrial developments failed to materialize or fulfill their 
potential.   
 A decade earlier, however, a report on the effort to attract new industry to the 
community observed that “the main reason new industry shies away from the yards is 
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because of the odors emanating from the three or four refineries which perpetuate this 
nuisance.”313  Meegan also testified before the City Council Committee on Health about 
how air pollution prevented new industry from relocating to Back of the Yards claiming 
“I vividly recall a visit from executives of a firm manufacturing women’s clothing.  The 
company had to find a new plant location.  This industry would have provided us with 
five hundred jobs for women.  They were pleased with the location in our Stock Yards, 
but the sickening odors and smoke from refinery plants caused them to move elsewhere.  
In the past 15 years, Chicago lost hundreds of industries that moved out of our city, in 
spite of the fact that the vast Stock Yards area was vacant.”314    
 In response to these concerns, in 1964 the Council passed the following 
resolution:  “We pledge our cooperation to support the efforts of the Department of Air 
Pollution Control to eliminate sickening odors emanating from buildings in the vicinity of 
the Stock Yards.  We urge that owners of plants be compelled to comply with health and 
sanitation ordinances, with specific reference to sanitation outside the plants where 
bloody carcasses, bones, and hair from cattle are exposed.  Specific reference is made to 
Darling and Co., Wilson Rendering, General Rendering, American Bristle and Hair 
Drawing Co., and Eagle Hair Company.  It is common knowledge that this problem is a 
deterrent to new industry coming into the Yards while these conditions prevail.”315   
 The Council expressed its concern yet again the next year when it resolved “to 
intensify our efforts to attract new industries into our community.  In this connection, we 
shall, with renewed vigor, continue our program to completely eliminate sickening odors 
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from specific buildings in the vicinity of the Stock Yards.”316  The Council’s 1965 report 
observed that “the main deterrent” to attracting new industry to the area “as expressed by 
industrial executives looking for plant sites, is dissatisfaction with the strong sickening 
odors emanating from rendering plants.
317
  While the Council seemed less concerned 
with the health of the residents and the neighborhood than it was with jobs, it 
nevertheless sought to eliminate polluting industries in order to attract jobs in non-
polluting industries.   
 The Council also carried through on its pledge to involve the Department of Air 
Pollution in trying to force industrial sites into compliance with city codes.  Throughout 
1965 the Journal published pictures of pollution emanating from Darling and Company 
meant to shame the company into cleaning up its operations and building a new modern 
facility that would comply with modern air pollution standards.  For instance, a picture 
published with the headline “Typical Sight at Darling & Co.” showed a “Darling and 
Company truck being loaded with bloody bones from [a] boxcar near 42
nd
 and Ashland.  
Scene, in violation of the city’s health ordinance, is one of the objects of complaint 
against the rendering firm made by area residents and the Back of the Yards 
Neighborhood Council.”318   
 Later in the year the paper asked “Stock Yards Remain Undeveloped…Why” 
above a picture of the “once bustling area of the stock yards” that “now lies dormant with 
high weeds growing on cleared, vacant site” and directed readers to photographic 
evidence of why companies were hesitant to relocate to the Yards.  Under the headline 
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“Why Stock Yards Lie Vacant…” was a picture of the “stench emanat[ing] from Darling 
and Co. rendering plant at 43nd and S. Ashland.  Bloody carcasses fall to ground as they 
are shoveled from box car to trucks.  This condition has existed unabated for years and is 
a deterrent to companies that would otherwise relocate in the Stock Yards area.”  Another 
picture of Darling (bearing the headline “Polluting the Air…”) showed “open windows 
and powdered particles of fertilizer polluting the air and staining side of building.  This 
condition has been reported to the Chicago Health Department and the Department of Air 
Pollution.”319   Here, then, was a tidy summary of the community’s problems with the 
packinghouses and associated industries—they polluted not only the air with their foul 
smells but also the landscape with their bloody carcasses and deleterious effects on the 
built environment.  Moreover, these companies seemed immune to any sort of pressure.  
After all, the Council had reported violations to the city but the unsanitary conditions 
continued unabated.  The right kind of industries—those that would be good citizens of 
the neighborhood—were effectively kept out by two forces:  the unresponsive, polluting 
industries, and the rest of the city (and city government) that supposedly looked down on 
the community and was unwilling to effectively intervene on its behalf.  This further 
threatened Back of the Yards’ slide back into slum-like conditions.  
 Curiously, even though Darling was identified as one of the primary offenders in 
terms of pollution, by the 1970s it was being hailed as a model member of the 
community, primarily because it built new office space and a new rendering plant in the 
Stockyards district, which speaks to the changing fortunes of the neighborhood in the 
intervening decade.  No longer was the community attempting to keep packing-related 
industries out or welcoming the closure of those that remained.  Instead they were now 
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celebrating corporate loyalty.  In 1977 the company invested over $10 million in 
upgrading and modernizing its plants which would make its rendering plant more 
efficient and compliant with existing ecological standards.
320
  In doing so, it demolished 
the old rendering plant that had been the source of complaints.  Darling had also garnered 
some good will earlier in the decade when it signaled its intent to stay in the 
neighborhood by building the new office building.  At the dedication ceremony for the 
new headquarters in early 1972 Darling’s vice president wanted “to assure our neighbors 
that we are working very closely with the Chicago Department of Ecological Control on a 
program that we feel will make Darling a leader in the field of ecological control and 
domestic appearance.”321 
 In addition to the stench, the community also viewed the abandoned industrial 
land as a form of blight and, consequently, as one of the neighborhood’s main problems.  
While it became the home to some light industry in the 1960s, such as a 60,000 square 
feet manufacturing and warehouse facility that produced flavorings and seasonings for 
the sausage and meat industry
322
 and a Schlitz warehouse
323
, there was still a significant 
amount of vacant land to which the Back of the Yards Neighborhood Council and others 
in the community sought to draw industry.  According to the “25th Annual Report of the 
Back of the Yards Neighborhood Council,” “the Council is vitally interested in bringing 
new industry and business into the one square mile that formerly was known as the 
largest Stock Yards in the world.  We are continuing to work with those who own 
property in this area, public planning agencies and urban renewal specialists in a joint 
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effort to bring new industry and business into the area.  We have had meetings with 
federal and city officials to expedite the demolition of more than one hundred outdated 
and outmoded buildings that once were part of the packinghouse operations.  Several 
large firms are purchasing space for construction in the Stock Yards.”324   
 The Council, much like the union, agreed with the packers’ rhetoric about the 
unfeasibility of remaining in supposedly outdated plants.  Rather than trying to attract 
industry that could make use of the existing infrastructure, the Council argued that these 
buildings had to be demolished.  They were largely unsuccessful, however, despite 
efforts to secure urban renewal funds to bring in new industry and combat this “industrial 
blight.”325  Even Mayor Daley admitted that “we have made many trips to Washington to 
point out the advantages of the area but to date we have been unsuccessful.  However, we 
shall never stop trying.”326  Inherent in such optimistic pronouncements, however, was an 
air of resignation that the neighborhood was being fundamentally and irreversibly altered. 
 Daley and other leaders were eventually able, however, to secure financing from 
the federal government to pay for infrastructure improvements as an inducement for 
industry.  Under a plan passed by the City Council in 1968, the federal government 
would pay 80% of the estimated $6.5 million cost of improvements with the city 
contributing the rest.  The plan initially met with opposition from several aldermen who 
felt the improvements would only benefit the 11
th
 Ward.  However, alderman Joseph 
Krska defended the measure, arguing that “this is not just for the 11th Ward.  It’s for the 
12
th
 Ward, the 13
th
 Ward, the 14
th
 Ward, the 15
th
 Ward, the 16
th
 Ward, the 17
th
 Ward, and 
the 18
th
 Ward.”  He went on to ask “who suffered when we lost all those jobs in the Stock 
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Yards?  Who starved?  We did.  Is it a crime to ask for a few measly crumbs to get jobs 
back into the vicinity?  We’re the ones who live here.  Why should someone from the 
North Side decide what we need?  We on the South Side are capable of deciding what we 
need and asking for it.  And we’re not asking for anything to be squandered.”327  The plan 
promised to bring 5,000 to 10,000 new jobs to the area but the squabble over the funding 
highlighted how much residents of the neighborhood (and the surrounding communities) 
resented outsider influence.
328
 
 Despite the community’s efforts to attract new industry, it actively opposed 
industry that it felt was detrimental to the environment of the neighborhood.  In early 
1961, the City Council passed a measure that rezoned several areas in Back of the Yards 
from heavy to light manufacturing and from manufacturing to residential.  Neighborhood 
alderman Joseph Burke proposed this measure in response to an attempt to build a sheep-
slaughtering plant near a residential area the previous summer.  His proposal also placed 
slaughterhouses in a special zoning category that required the builder to appear before the 
Zoning Board of Appeals to obtain a special permit.  All of this served to make it very 
difficult to build a slaughterhouse in Back of the Yards.
329
   
 In a little over five years from when the first packinghouse in the neighborhood 
began the process of shuttering its doors, local politicians, presumably acting on the 
wishes of a great many of their constituents, were trying to legally restrict the movement 
of the packing industry back into the area.  Whereas workers initially vehemently 
protested the loss of their jobs, residents came to actively prevent the return of those 
types of jobs.  The reasons for this switch are complicated.  By the time that the plants 
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began leaving the Yards residents of the neighborhood were less dependent on the 
packing industry than they had ever been.  Put simply, any new jobs in packing plants or 
associated industries would likely be taken by a large number of Black non-residents, a 
topic which I’ll explore in the following chapter.  Many white workers had found work in 
defense industries during World War II and never returned to the packing plants.  
Increasingly residents also found work in governmental jobs. 
 The community, Alderman Burke, and Alderman Arthur Zelezinski also 
strenuously opposed a proposed zoning change that would have allowed a motor freight 
line terminal and a rendering plant to be built in the neighborhood.  Zelezinski argued 
that “we already have several truck terminals and we don’t want any more.  It would be a 
hazard to the community, to the children and the residents.”330  The Neighborhood 
Council provided bus service to the public hearing on the rezoning proposal for residents 
who wanted to voice their opposition, apparently signaling that the proposed changes had 
significant opposition amongst the community as a whole.
331
  William C. Evers, the 
president of the Back of the Yards Businessmen’s Association, and presumably someone 
who would tend to support measures such as this, even said that “it has been our 
experience that truck terminals cause moral, health, housing, and safety problems.”332  It 
seems residents objected not only to the air and noise pollution and potential physical 
dangers for children that the trucking terminals would bring, but they also objected to the 
supposed immorality of the truckers themselves. 
 Despite local opposition, City Council’s building and zoning committee 
eventually passed the proposal which prompted alderman Mathew Danaher to voice his 
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displeasure saying “although I do and will continue to favor industry and jobs coming 
into the ‘Yards’ district, I believe in the right kind of industry in the right kind of 
place.”333  One resident affected by the terminal complained “I do not mind having 
industry across the street from me:  decent, clean factories or office buildings, but truck 
terminals bring in undesirable elements.”334  Another resident told a reporter, “I’ve lived 
in this neighborhood all my life; this is my home.  Now look at the trucks across the 
street.  They sneaked in overnight.  Where once there were a few trucks, now there’s 
150.”335  Another community member asked “don’t the politicians downtown care about 
the people who put them in office?  I never heard of a corporation casting a vote.  I never 
met one when I went to cast my vote.”336  Attitudes such as these would play a strong 
role in efforts to stem white flight and keep African-Americans from moving into the 
neighborhood.  That is, residents resented outside forces conspiring against them and 
imposing their will to diminish the quality of life in the neighborhood.  However, they 
would be more successful in preventing Blacks from moving in than they were in keeping 
certain industries out. 
 This particular incident also reveals the ways in which the fight against pollution 
was often couched in gendered terms.  That is, women, and mothers in particular were 
often given a certain amount of moral authority in resisting pollution and polluting 
industries.  Reporters often discussed how pollution affected the health of the family and 
the performance of a housewife’s duties.  For instance, Mrs. Paulik, who testified about 
the odors coming from Brush and Weaving Hair Manufacturing Co., was identified as a 
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housewife with three of her four children still living at home.  As a mother, her duty was 
to protect the health of those three children, a duty that was extended by the 1960s to 
include protection from the ill effects of pollution, even in working class neighborhoods 
like Back of the Yards with its loss of jobs where, presumably, jobs would be given 
preference over potential problems with pollution.
337
   
As much as they feared the actual living conditions associated with a slum, they 
also feared outsiders continuing to perceive them as slum-dwellers and gendered notions 
of propriety were often deployed to guard against that perception.  For instance, Mrs. 
Paulik testified that the stench from the plant got into the washing as she lamented that 
“you can’t even hang the wash out to dry in the back yard.  The smell gets on the 
clothes.”338  After she had testified before the City Council, the Back of the Yards Journal 
emphasized that it was her role as mother and housewife that allowed Mrs. Paulik the 
authority to speak out against pollution, noting that “she and her husband were raising a 
fine, upstanding family of four children and remodeling their home for $10,000” and that 
by discussing her family and her home “she was demonstrating that the Back of the 
Yards is not a slum—in which pollution is to be accepted.”339  Mrs. Paulik herself played 
up this role when she remarked that “you make a nice home and do a good job of raising 
your kids, but when you tell someone you’re from the Back of the Yards, they wrinkle up 
their nose.  That shouldn’t be.”340  Community residents were ever-vigilant in policing 
attitudes toward Back of the Yards.   
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The director of air pollution control programs for The Tuberculosis Institute of 
Chicago and Cook County also revealed the ways that air pollution supposedly affected 
women in particular:  “A housewife who fights the dirt on her windowsills, curtains, and 
furniture every day, the motorist whose visibility is cut by smog and haze, and the career 
girl plagued by damage to nylons from sulpher [sic] dioxide are all witnesses to air 
pollution as a costly nuisance.”341  These sentiments reveal the intersections of gender 
and class in the fight against pollution in Back of the Yards.  Although there were high 
numbers of women employed in the packing industry, residents seemed more accepting 
of women who occupied the traditional middle class role as housewives to speak out 
about the ill effects of pollution.  Moreover, while the burgeoning environmental 
movement allowed for a growing awareness of the problem and the rhetoric to attack it, 
many in Back of the Yards still relied on conservative definitions of middle class 
womanhood to justify their opposition to industrial pollution.  
 In 1978 the community faced another zoning battle over an unwanted industry.  
The owner of an abandoned building that had once operated as a slaughterhouse but that 
had recently been restricted to boning and meat cutting sought a zoning variance that 
would allow it to be used once again as a slaughterhouse and rendering plant.  Residents 
and local aldermen strongly opposed the measure, primarily because of fears of pollution 
and “foul smells” as well as noise, traffic, and parking problems.342  One resident who led 
the drive to oppose the plant said “no matter how much they say it will not stink, this 
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place will stink.  It doesn’t matter what they promise they will do prevent it.”343  Another 
critic of the plan argued that “this is not an area where a slaughterhouse should be 
built.”344  Although there was tremendous resistance, community residents lost this fight 
as well.  The Zoning Board approved the plan despite opposition from an unlikely 
source—the American Meat Packers Corporation (AMPAC), a small local packing 
company.  A lawyer for AMPAC said “we filed an appeal on behalf of all those people 
[community members opposed to the slaughterhouse].  The neighborhood, during the 
past 20 years has changed dramatically.  It’s no longer an area where live stock and 
animals roam the streets.  A slaughterhouse is simply not ideal for a residential area and 
this will definitely not help the image of the slaughtering business.”345   
The Zoning Board justified its decision, however, saying that the area already had 
a large amount of commercial property, the “building has been used as a cattle 
slaughtering plant since the year 1908 which use continued until the year 1965,” “the 
proposed use will not cause substantial injury to the value of other property in the 
neighborhood,” and “trucks shall not be permitted to await unloading except on the 
subject premises.”346  In other words, the wishes of the residents, many of whom voiced 
their complaints in several hearings before the Zoning Board, to move away from the 
perceived stigma of the community’s past were irrelevant.     
 The comments of these residents and those who opposed the trucking terminal 
fourteen years before revealed much about community attitudes.  Many residents did not 
object to industry, but they didn’t want those, such as the packinghouses or trucking 
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terminals, that they felt detracted from the environment of the neighborhood to return to 
the community.  They also revealed a distrust of both corporations and politicians from 
outside the neighborhood, who residents felt, not without reason, didn’t look out for the 
community’s best interest.  Residents seemed frustrated by the lack of control they had in 
determining how space would be used.  In light of these attitudes, we can better 
understand residents’ attempts to maintain racial segregation.  If they couldn’t always 
control how the space was to be used, they could at least try to control who could occupy 
the land.   
 In a sense this attitude was a function of the different historical uses of space in 
the neighborhood and who exercised control over them.  Residents and workers had a 
degree of authority over their dwelling spaces whereas the packers held dominion over 
the industrial land.  This duality was evident even after the meatpackers’ abandonment of 
the neighborhood and highlights differing conceptions of physical space.  To city leaders, 
residents had minimal right to determine the use of land zoned for industry.  It was 
industrial land and would always be such regardless of residents’ efforts to dictate what 
type of industry was deemed acceptable to occupy that land.  The act of abandoning the 
land also highlights the degree to which the packers viewed the land as a commodity and 
one that was eminently disposable.  When the land failed to enable a sufficient profit, the 
packers sought out new land and washed their hands of the old.   
 To residents, however, the land was part of their identity and history.  Their 
homes, churches, family, and friends were here even if their jobs no longer were.  When 
they left the neighborhood the packers also left the physical reminders of their 
superiority—they were free to leave behind the decaying infrastructure and abandoned 
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buildings and the residents were forced to deal with the consequences of that 
abandonment, as the packers moved on to greener pastures in the suburbs and rural areas.  
Residents lived in the neighborhood and keenly felt the stigmatization of 
deindustrialization on a daily basis.  They had to drive, walk past, or live across from the 
abandoned and crumbling factories; they had to come to terms with the lack of tax 
revenue and jobs; and they had to deal with prospect that the neighborhood might return 
to a state like that described in The Jungle.  These were daily reminders of Back of the 
Yards residents’ relative powerlessness compared to wealthy corporations and their allies 
in government.  One of the only things they could legitimately control, then, was who 
would live in the neighborhood.      
 Throughout the history of Back of the Yards, the physical environment of the 
neighborhood was central to how residents thought of themselves and their community as 
well as how outsiders viewed the community.  The relative isolation of the neighborhood 
caused by both natural and man-mad barriers such as the railroad tracks, the stockyards, 
and the packinghouses led to a sense of autonomy, a feeling that the community had to 
take care of itself.  The stench that permeated Back of the Yards also gave the community 
an identity.  Workers endured the smell with a sense of pride and dismissed those 
outsiders who turned their noses up at it.   
 As the meatpacking industry abandoned the neighborhood and residents began to 
see the effects of deindustrialization, efforts to maintain the stability of the community 
and resist integration centered on concern for the environment and proper use of land.  
The residents of Back of the Yards would no longer tolerate industrial pollution, partly 
because of the mistrust of industry that deindustrialization generated.  Deindustrialization 
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also had negative consequences, however, beyond the loss of jobs.  The decline of the 
meatpacking industry, as well as the decline of the union, hindered cross-racial working-
class identity formation.  Residents sought to assert some control over the landscape and 
they did so by excluding African-Americans from the neighborhood.  Over time, as the 
community erased reminders of the area’s industrial past from the landscape, Back of the 
Yards became defined spatially by race and racial exclusion rather than by class or a 
common occupation.    
         
          
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
141 
 
Chapter 3 
 
Who Are the People in Your Neighborhood?  The Racialization of Space 
 
“What about us, who cannot afford to move to a better location and are surrounded by 
colored?...Most of us invested our life’s savings in property and now we are in constant 
fear that the neighbor will sell its property to people of a different race.”347 
 
Other studies of white flight, suburbanization, and neighborhood racial transition 
typically focus on the role of white racism, deindustrialization, and certain white working 
class neighborhoods’ lack of the political clout necessary to prevent white flight.348  
Others, less charitably, focus on supposed Black pathology or a culture of inner-city 
poverty to explain white abandonment of the city and the resulting neighborhood 
deterioration.  As Beryl Satter argues, these approaches “point to a lack—of culture, of 
jobs, of resources, or of courage to fight one’s racist impulses and stay put in a racially 
mixed area.”349  In this chapter, I’ll examine the process by which white residents of 
Back of the Yards attempted to halt flight to the suburbs while simultaneously trying to 
keep African-Americans out.  The exclusion of African-Americans was influenced by a 
variety of factors including residents’ outright racism which blamed African-Americans 
for neighborhood deterioration and ignored the important role that panic peddlers played 
in destroying communities (not to mention Black home buyers’ credit).  In doing so, 
however, I want to emphasize the role that the built environment of the neighborhood 
played in shaping opposition to African-American migration into the community.  This 
opposition was partly fashioned by residents’ racism but it was also animated by a desire 
to preserve the economic status, political power, and gains that residents had made over 
the preceding decades to transform the physical space of the neighborhood and bring 
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order and cleanliness to the filth and squalor that had long been associated with Back of 
the Yards.
350
      
Unlike many other urban areas in the industrial Northeast and Midwest that 
suffered from the associated problems of deindustrialization and declining populations, 
Back of the Yards actively resisted residents’ movement to the suburbs and strenuously 
tried to counter white flight rather than people resigning themselves to the inevitability of 
racial change.  In large part this was due to the community’s Herculean transformation 
and the potential for its undoing if people fled the neighborhood.  Whereas whites in 
other cities and in other Chicago neighborhoods tried to, often violently, prevent African-
Americans from integrating their neighborhoods, the Back of the Yards was relatively 
unscathed by this racial violence that was, unfortunately, so common beginning even as 
early as the 1940s but which increased significantly in the 1960s.  For instance, in 1944 a 
“stench bomb” was thrown into the home of a Black ex-soldier who was trying to 
integrate a neighborhood on the periphery of the Back of the Yards.
351
  Rather, the 
residents of the Back of the Yards sought to exercise some measure of control over their 
neighborhoods by preventing people from leaving in the first place.
352
 
David Roediger also details the importance of home-buying to white ethnic 
neighborhoods which explains much of this resistance to integration.  Initially, however, 
these spaces populated by immigrants (which were often ethnically mixed but still closed 
off to African-Americans) were viewed as ethnic communities rather than white 
communities that nevertheless had to be defended from the intrusion of Blacks.  The 
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consciousness of residing in a white neighborhood was something that developed over 
time but home buying was one of the main ways that white ethnics became white and 
solidified their status as better off than African-Americans.  Moreover, the home and the 
defense of it were so important to these immigrant communities precisely because they 
lacked control over such things as jobs and public schools.  The home and by extension 
the physical space of the imagined immigrant community were some of the only things 
over which these white ethnic neighborhoods like Back of the Yards could exert some 
control.
353
    
 Thomas Sugrue argues that “urban whites responded to the influx of millions of 
Black migrants to their cities in the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s by redefining urban 
geography and urban politics in starkly racial terms.”354  In controlling who could live in 
their neighborhood, these residents continued to promote a sense of community based on 
a common (ethnic/white) working class identity.  Indeed, claiming some sort of 
connection to the Back of the Yards was a way of burnishing your working class bona 
fides.  Various community organizations and publications regularly asserted that Back of 
the Yards was where everyone claims to have lived.  This contention, true or not, reveals 
much about the community’s identity, how it portrayed itself, and how it wanted to be 
viewed by outsiders.  There was a certain measure of pride in coming from the 
neighborhood which most of the rest of Chicago (and the rest of the nation) associated 
with the putrid odors of the meatpacking industry.  The community’s relative physical 
and social isolation made it rather insular and its identification with the packing industry 
gave it a bit of an inferiority complex.  While these qualities were essential in forming the 
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Back of the Yards Neighborhood Council and instituting its program to remake the 
neighborhood, they had the potential to make neighborhood residents distrustful of 
outsiders—a potential that was realized in the fight over neighborhood integration.  
Residents resented both African-Americans, whose movement into the neighborhood 
they felt would lower property values and lead to a re-slumming of the neighborhood, as 
well as the governmental officials who they felt were intent on forcing the community to 
integrate.  At the same time, however, the number of Mexican Americans, who occupied 
a rather unique place in the community, was increasing as these debates over Black 
integration were going on.
355
   
 However, implicit in this effort to keep people from leaving the community was a 
desire to keep others from moving into the neighborhood in the first place.  Joseph 
Meegan claimed, though, that “we are trying to keep people in the neighborhood, not 
keep them out.  Many families have lived here 30 or 40 years.  Their roots are here.  
Their interests are here.  We want to keep them here.”356  Much later he observed 
“anyone can move in but they have to conform.  They have to keep up their houses.  If 
they don’t, the council will get the city in.”357  At the celebration of the Back of the Yards 
Neighborhood Council’s 25th anniversary in 1964, Patrick L. O’Malley, a local 
businessman, argued, however, that “we must demand of our elected officials the same 
rights given other communities including the establishment of a branch department to 
fulfill many useful community activities, including the establishment and enforcement of 
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minimum housing standards.”358  We’ve also seen some animosity toward the UPWA 
within the community because of the union’s support of integration.    
 Such housing standards and restrictive covenants had been typically used to 
prevent integration.
359
  For example, the Woodlawn Property Owners League, a pro-
segregationist organization in an upscale neighborhood several miles southeast of the 
Back of the Yards published a pamphlet in the late ‘40s touting its efforts to help the 
community stating that “IT WORKS FOR THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE DISTRICT 
AND THE STABILIZATION OF REAL EASTATE VALUES through: 
 1.  Ceaseless vigilance in maintaining Woodlawn and the Washington Park  
 Club Subdivision as a splendid residential and business section; elimination  
 of vice, gambling and other deteriorating influences; and prompt legal action 
 to enforce the protective restriction agreements which protect Woodlawn and 
 the Washington Park Club Subdivision from invasion by unassimilable racial 
 groups. 
 2.  The promotion of proper maintenance of buildings and grounds by  
 property owners and their agents through repair and painting; lawn, garden   
 and shrubbery planting; and the removal of rubbish, debris and objectionable 
 signs. 
 3.  The renovation or removal of deteriorated buildings that are a detriment of 
 the community and tend to attract an undesirable tenancy.”360 
  
 The Chicago Defender also pointed to the lack of a restrictive covenant in a  
neighborhood near the Back of the Yards that was the site of some anti-Black violence,  
 
arguing that it led “anti-Negroes” to “resort to acts of vandalism.”361  Moreover, Arnold  
 
Hirsch argued that working class neighborhoods such as the Back of the Yards—those  
 
that weren’t covered by restrictive covenants—were much more invested in resisting  
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integration and “were most successful in maintaining their racial homogeneity.”362  He 
further speculated that the numerous housing alternatives for the middle class and the 
greater possibility of their flight to the suburbs explain why middle class neighborhoods 
changed most rapidly.
363
  In some ways, however, Back of the Yards contradicts this 
argument.  As I’ll show, neighborhood residents and institutions expressed tremendous 
fear about people fleeing to the suburbs which suggests, at least by the late 1960s, that 
this flight was a possibility, and one with a certain amount of attraction, for the working 
class residents of Back of the Yards.  
At any rate, there was clearly a fair amount of opposition to Black migration into 
the neighborhood.  Indeed, in 1959 the Daily News reported that “Back of the Yards has 
virtually no Negro residents although it is in the path of Negro expansion.  Many Negroes 
work in the nearby stockyards, but it is generally agreed they could not find homes in 
Back of the Yards.”364  In fact, by the 1960s Saul Alinsky had taken to publicly calling 
the Council, which he had help to found, as well as neighborhood residents, 
segregationists.
365
      
This chapter will explore the process by which the residents came to exclude 
African-Americans from the neighborhood and their complex reasons, often related to the 
decline of the meatpacking industry, for doing so.  Over time, then, the neighborhood 
came to be defined by race and racial exclusion rather than on the basis of a common 
occupation or industrial identity.  Ultimately, residents viewed white flight and the 
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potential influx of other racial groups as a form of blight over which the community had 
some measure of control, unlike the flight of industry.  
Residents felt entirely justified in keeping Blacks out of the neighborhood as they 
feared that an influx of African-Americans would lead to an increase in crime, a 
deterioration of the housing stock, and a decline in property values.  These attitudes were 
so pervasive that even some in the Black community felt that they were not without 
merit.  Indeed, Leonard Tinsley, an African-American letter writer to the Chicago 
Defender, claimed that one could not show white folks Black neighborhoods “and tell 
them we don’t harm a neighborhood and we make an effort to keep our property painted 
and free from rubbish—not with paper, old shoes, tin cans, dirty children and houses that 
look like the paint manufacturers had gone out of business.  This is what you’re trying to 
force on the white neighborhoods and they are resisting just like you or I would if we 
were white and living in a neighborhood where all the houses are painted and windows 
washed.”366   
He went on to recount a conversation he had with a white coworker about the 
deterioration of a housing project for African-Americans.  Tinsley explained that 
residents of the housing project could be excused for not maintaining the property 
because many of them had only recently moved from rural areas in the south where they 
didn’t have a “house with plaster, windows with glass, and paint on both sides of the 
house” and that they lacked the education to take care of something that they never had 
before.
367
  The white coworker, according to Tinsley, replied “look at Halsted street and 
the stockyards neighborhoods, most of those people aren’t long from Europe either.  
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They didn’t have a chance for an education, can’t read, write or make a lot of money.  
And they live in old frame houses.  But the neighborhood is free of rubbish, they wash 
the windows and paint the houses.  Some of your people are just plain lazy.”368 
Of course, white homeowners ignored the significant role of contract buying and 
exorbitant prices that Black home buyers had to pay in contributing to neighborhood 
degradation.  As Beryl Satter shows, Black homeowners were often forced to neglect 
basic maintenance, subdivide their homes to cram in extra tenants, and work long hours 
just to make their inflated monthly payments because they knew how easily they could 
lose those homes if they missed even one payment.
369
  The inevitable decline of 
neighborhoods that were transitioning from white to Black reinforced white racism and 
white residents’ ideas about the supposed inability of African-Americans to take adequate 
care of their neighborhoods.  As Satter argues, “if Black contract buyers saw themselves 
making heroic sacrifices against impossible odds to keep from falling behind on their 
payments, this was not how their white neighbors viewed the situation.  Whites saw 
population densities doubling, while garbage collection and other municipal services 
stayed the same or declined.  They saw unsupervised children flooding the neighborhood.  
They noted that buildings bought by African-Americans rapidly decayed.  Small wonder 
that whites blamed their Black neighbors for the chaos they observed.”370  This not to let 
white folks off the hook for their racism, however.  Such deteriorating conditions in 
transitional neighborhoods likely only confirmed white Chicagoans’ notions of their own 
racial superiority.     
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This effort to control who could occupy the land and concerns about integration 
as a precursor to neighborhood blight in many ways mirrored national political trends and 
fears of the urban white-ethnic working class generally.  The tumultuous 1968 
Democratic National Convention, which took place in the Back of the Yards’ 
International Amphitheater, highlighted the changing national political landscape and 
changes within the Democratic Party.  While the young and affluent protested the war 
and advocated for racial and sexual equality, the white ethnic working class backbone of 
the party (like those who populated the Back of the Yards) were driven by fear of those 
same issues.  That is, they feared that a slew of intersecting forces—forced integration 
and busing, sexual liberation, rising crime rates, urban riots, the ascendancy of youth 
culture, calls for racial equality—would threaten the neighborhood’s stability thereby 
erasing all of the progress that the Back of the Yards had made in the preceding two 
decades.  All of these fears—radicals provoking the police into a riot; young people, 
women, and African-Americans demanding a role in the political process; unpatriotic 
long-hairs insulting American values—were on display right on the periphery of the 
neighborhood and on residents’ TV screens.  The 1968 convention and riots seemed to 
confirm their worst fears. 
Still Back of the Yards residents did not begin voting Republican in significant 
numbers.  Indeed, economic issues that were still the bread and butter of the Democratic 
Party continued to heavily influence their voting decisions.  For instance, in the 1972 
election the Back of the Yards Journal published an article by the president of the 
Chicago Building Trades Council which listed the issues that residents needed to support 
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in order to “guard the gains they have made and the future.”371  These included such 
things as closing corporate tax loopholes, stopping the export of jobs, increased 
investment in public works, improving consumer protection, and ensuring workers’ right 
to unionize.
372
  Rather, it illustrates how cultural issues, particularly those predicated on 
fear—fear of integration, cultural permissiveness, increased criminality, secularization—
would come to compete with economic interests for people’s votes and signal the 
beginning of the shift of many white working-class voters to the Republican Party 
(although the majority continued to vote Democratic).  Indeed, Thomas Sugrue has 
shown how white working-class Detroiters began transitioning to the GOP beginning in 
the immediate aftermath of WWII over the racially charged issue of housing, a process 
that would be mirrored in Chicago and countless other Northern cities.
373
  
These fears were already apparent earlier in the decade, however.  In 1964, for 
example, one speaker at the Neighborhood Council’s 25th anniversary celebration urged 
residents to “quit being bulldozed by self-appointed long hairs.  Let’s have the guts to say 
that a book is dirt if that’s what we think it is…And if some beatnik welds together a 
collection of rusty cogwheels and old corset stays and claims it is a greater sculpture than 
Michael Angelo’s ‘David,’ let’s have the courage to say it looks like junk and probably 
is…Let’s blow the whistle on plays that would bring blushes to the stag parties staged by 
                                                          
371
 Thomas J. Nayder, “Labor calls for all-out vote on Nov. 7:  Go to polls Tuesday, Nov. 7, guard your 
gains & future,” Back of the Yards Journal, November 1, 1972. 
372
 Ibid. 
373
 See Sugrue, “Crabgrass Roots Politics,” 552 in which he argues that “as early as the 1940s, white 
politicians in the urban North began to identify the hot-button issues that motivated urban working-class 
and middle-class voters.  In the crucible of postwar northern cities undergoing profound racial and 
economic transformation, they fashioned a new politics that combined racial antipathy with a growing 
skepticism about liberalism.  The white rebellion against the New Deal had its origins in the urban politics 
of the 1940s and 1950s.  The local politics of race and housing in the aftermath of World War II fostered a 
grass-roots rebellion against liberalism and seriously limited the social democratic and egalitarian 
possibilities of the New Deal order.”  
  
151 
 
fraternal organizations…Let’s pay more attention to people like our Back of the Yards 
neighbors who are trying to do something for the good of others.”374    
Moreover, on multiple occasions in the early 1970s the Back of the Yards Journal 
published a full page advertisement entitled “I am a Sick American…” by an anonymous 
author which gave voice to all of these concerns and was emblematic of this change 
taking place both in the neighborhood and nationally among the white working class. 
This same ad was also published in other venues including the Lubbock Avalanche-
Journal on April 15, 1971 which suggests the national scale of these types of sentiments 
and the degree to which the Back of the Yards was similar to other white working class 
communities in their opposition to the leftward cultural and social shift of the 1960s.
375
  
The ad featured a drawing of a white, presumably middle class man with a tie, his sleeves 
rolled up, and peering pensively and ruefully over his glasses at what he considered the 
ills afflicting modern America.  It featured a litany of complaints: 
There are those who claim ours is a sick society; that our country is sick; 
our government is sick; that we are sick.  Well, maybe they’re right.  I submit that 
I’m sick…and maybe you are, too.  I am sick of having policemen ridiculed  
as some kind of folk hero. 
 I am sick of being told that religion is the opiate of the people, but  
marijuana should be legalized…   
 I am sick of paying more and more taxes to build schools while I see  
some faculty members encouraging students either to tear them down or burn 
them… 
 I am sick of riots, marches, protests, demonstrations, confrontations,  
and other mob temper tantrums of people intellectually incapable of working 
within the system… 
 I am sick of those who say I owe them this or that because of the sins  
of my forefathers—when I have looked down both ends of a gun barrel to 
defend their rights, their liberties, and their families… 
 Take note, all of you… you will not find me throwing a rock or a  
bomb; you will not find me under a placard; you will not see me take to the 
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streets; you will not find me ranting to wild-eyed mobs. 
 But you will find me at work, paying taxes, serving in the community 
where I live.  You will also find me expressing my anger and indignation to 
elected officials. 
 You will find me speaking out in support of those officials, institutions, 
 and personalities who contribute to the elevation of society and not its  
destruction.  You will find me contributing my time, money and personal  
influence to helping churches, hospitals, charities and other establishments 
which have shown the true spirit of this country’s determination to ease pain,  
suffering, eliminate hunger and generate brotherhood. 
 But most of all, you’ll find me at the polling place.  There—if you listen— 
you can hear the thunder of the common man.  There all of us can cast our vote—
for an America where people can walk the streets without fear.
376
 
 
Here, laid out in stark detail, were all the perceived problems that were plaguing, 
not just the community, but also the nation as a whole according to certain Back of the 
Yards residents and the publishers of the Back of the Yards Journal.  Here were the 
animosities that would animate opposition to integration of the neighborhood and the 
general backlash against the cultural change of the 1960s.  Particularly striking is the 
racial animosity undergirding the contention that certain (Black) people weren’t owed 
anything because of the legacy of slavery and racism.  It’s this anger that justified 
opposition to integration.  There was a belief that Black folks had no inherent right to 
move into the neighborhood because they had done nothing to earn it.  Residents owed 
them nothing.  Further, there was a fear that the permissiveness of the 1960s allowed 
criminals to run rampant, made the police unable to do their jobs, and made people 
fearful to walk down the streets.  Of course this concern with criminality was 
racialized—residents feared that allowing Black families to move into the neighborhood 
would lead to an increase in crime and that the police would be powerless to prevent it. 
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The ad is also interesting in its attitude toward protestors—such as those at the 1968 
Democratic National Convention.  They were depicted as spoiled; “the dirty, the foul-
mouthed, the unwashed,” unthinking, and unwilling to work within the system.377  
While this attitude would certainly be shared by many in the Back of the Yards, it 
exposes the extent to which the neighborhood was becoming separated from its industrial 
past.  As little as thirty years ago these very residents would themselves have been 
considered bomb-throwers, demonstrating under a placard demanding union recognition 
or striking for better wages and working conditions.  They were the ones who saw the 
police as corrupt for siding with the large packers.  They once viewed the government—a 
government that served the interests of large corporations and stood idly by as those 
corporations fled communities such as theirs, leaving thousands jobless and empty 
buildings in their wake—as sick.  The demands of this new generation, however, 
threatened to undo the tenuous position they had carved out for themselves by engaging 
in the same types of acts of protest.  Unable or unwilling to find common cause with 
those seeking to make the country live up to its ideals, they set about defending their turf, 
both literally and figuratively.   
 While residents were becoming hostile toward the beneficiaries of the social and 
cultural changes of the 1960s, they were particularly antagonistic toward African-
Americans.  In 1939, about eighty percent of the community’s families depended on the 
meatpacking industry for their income.  By the late ‘50s, that number declined to about 
thirty-five percent as residents began seeking work outside of the neighborhood.
378
  A 
lessening of the community’s physical isolation as well as the increased job opportunities 
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available for later generations of the neighborhood’s white ethnics allowed for this 
declining reliance on the packing industry, a process that began during World War II 
when whites could more easily find higher paying work in the defense industry.  
Increasingly jobs in the meatpacking plants were filled by African-Americans.  By the 
1950s, for instance, almost three-fourths of the city’s packinghouse workers were 
Black.
379
  The white residents of the Back of the Yards became less dependent on the 
packing industry and, consequently, had fewer interactions with African-Americans in 
the workplace.  In describing the multiethnic character of the community, Joseph Meegan 
argued that “it’s the old story.  You can’t hate the man you work with.”380  But Meegan’s 
explanation is too simple in many respects.  The union was only marginally successful in 
keeping control of white workers’ racism.  Moreover, as John McGreevy argues and as 
this study has shown, working class behaviors and consciousness are not formed 
exclusively or even mostly as a laborer but “consciousness developed in the home” and in 
the neighborhood.
381
   
 Further, as Mark Ellis, Richard Wright, and Virginia Parks argue, a study of who 
lives in a neighborhood rather than who works in that neighborhood “creates false 
impressions of urban areas’ ethnic and racialized spaces as fixed and misleadingly 
characterizes residential neighborhoods as the exclusive domain of those who live, rather 
than work, in them.”382  In part, at least, because of the decline of the meatpacking 
industry and the racially progressive UPWA, however, residents of the Back of the Yards 
sought to keep African-Americans from moving into the community, particularly after 
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they had ceased working in the neighborhood.  That is, after the decline of the industry, 
the Back of the Yards did become the exclusive domain of those who lived in the 
neighborhood.     
 The UPWA, from its inception, was an interracial union that actively challenged 
racism within the union and the packing industry, as well as nationally.  In fact, the 
NAACP awarded the union the Dorrie Miller award in 1958 for its outstanding civil 
rights record.
383
  As Chapter 1 showed the union understood that the packers’ decision to 
relocate plants from Chicago to rural areas in the South and West was motivated, at least 
in part, by racism.  Indeed, the state of Iowa, in an effort to attract industry from Chicago, 
advertised in 1950 that the state was 99.3 percent white and 94.7 percent native born.
384
  
As the UPWA declined in power and influence among white neighborhood residents 
(who were working in the industry in smaller numbers), it was unable or unwilling to 
diminish or tamp down the racial resentments of its white members.  This resentment 
manifested itself as residents sought to keep white folks from leaving the neighborhood 
and Black folks from moving in.
385
  Moreover, by 1950 UPWA District 1, which 
included Chicago, had an Anti-Discrimination department that sought to eliminate 
discriminatory practices both within the plants and in the community.  Such activities led 
to a fair amount of anger on the part of Back of the Yards residents and white union 
members toward the UPWA.
386
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 In 1940, the New City community areas (“those that have been used for the 
purpose of analysis by public agencies and private research groups in Chicago for over 
thirty years”387), that is largely made up of the Back of the Yards neighborhood, had just 
68 Black residents and 23 members of “other races” out of a total population of 
80,725.
388
  In 1950 there were just 112 African-Americans in all of New City and in 
1960, only 166 out of a total population of 67,428.
389
  In 1960, no census tract that made 
up the Back of the Yards had a Black population of even one percent.  Most didn’t have 
any African-Americans living in them and the tract with the highest percentage, .8 
percent, was located adjacent to the stockyards, presumably the most undesirable place to 
live in the community.  As late as 1970 only 3.5 percent of New City’s population was 
African-American and they almost all lived outside of the Back of the Yards.  Indeed, 
just one census tract in the Back of the Yards in 1970 contained a measurable percentage 
of Blacks (.2 percent).
390
  In 1980, African-Americans still only made up around seven 
percent of the population of the Back of the Yards and they were concentrated in two of 
the thirteen census tracts that comprised the neighborhood, although by this time 
Mexican Americans were the largest ethnic group.
391
 
 The magnitude of the community’s opposition to integration is evident in a 
scandal that occurred in late 1969 and early 1970.  Meegan and the Back of the Yards 
Neighborhood Council came under scrutiny for suspicion of misusing funds.  Every year 
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the Council put on a free Fun Fair for residents and former residents of the community.  
Daniel D. McCarthy, a local Republican official, charged that Meegan diverted proceeds 
from the Fun Fair to another community organization, the Back of the Yards Social 
Action Club, that supported integration of the neighborhood.
392
  “I am firmly convinced,” 
McCarthy claimed, “that the overwhelming majority of the supporters of the 
Neighborhood Council and the patrons of the Fun Fair would never have supported them 
if they had known that this is what their money is being used for.”393  He also alleged that 
there was a widespread rumor in the neighborhood that the city would purchase the fair 
site to build a public housing facility which would house African-Americans who 
residents believed were undeserving.
394
   
Leaving aside the validity of McCarthy’s claim of redirecting profits from the Fun 
Fair, his claim that most Fun Fair attendees would object to their money being used to 
support integration is particularly illustrative of racial attitudes in the neighborhood in 
this time period, or at least the acceptable discourse on the matter of racial integration.  
That he could so boldly claim that most Fun Fair patrons (which included a significant 
number of people who no longer even lived in the neighborhood) would strenuously 
oppose integration exemplifies why Alinsky would come to think of neighborhood 
residents, not without reason, as segregationists.  Indeed, in 1959 one Neighborhood 
Council official even claimed that “Negroes don’t have anything in common with the 
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people who live here” to justify their exclusion.395  At the very least, those on the Council 
who might have been in favor of peaceful and orderly integration were sufficiently cowed 
by such strenuous objections to integration that it became much more difficult to publicly 
back such a plan. 
 McCarthy went on to say that the charges he was leveling at the Neighborhood 
Council was “like going into a Black neighborhood, raising money for the SCLC 
(Southern Christian Leadership Conference) and then giving it to George Wallace.”396  
The incendiary nature of this claim is also rather telling and makes no effort to hide the 
segregationist attitudes of neighborhood residents (or at least McCarthy himself and those 
he claimed to speak for).  Essentially, he claimed that residents were staunch 
segregationists who would be appalled that their money went to support integration.  
Indeed, many members of the northern white working class, such as those in the Back of 
the Yards, had come to identify with Wallace for a complex set of reasons, not the least 
of which was opposition to integration.
397
  While Wallace may not have garnered a 
tremendous amount of support in solidly Democratic Chicago, these political appeals to 
race-based fears certainly had some purchase.
398
  Indeed, Thomas Sugrue shows that 
union members supported Wallace in huge numbers in Michigan, allowing him to win 
Michigan’s 1972 Democratic primary by sweeping every predominantly white ward in 
Detroit.
399
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McCarthy also expressed concern that the fair site was to be sold to the Chicago 
Housing Authority in order to build a public housing facility.  This claim played on fears 
of government-mandated integration which residents saw as having the potential to lower 
property values.  While such sentiments may not have been necessarily typical or 
expressed so boldly, McCarthy’s allegations were usually met with a defense of Meegan 
and the Council’s work generally rather than making a case for actually supporting 
integration which suggests that such arguments would not have met with a receptive 
audience regardless of Meegan’s or the Council’s actual views on integration.  At the 
same time, this whole controversy suggests that there wasn’t a consensus on the question 
of fighting to keep the neighborhood white and that there likely were some on the 
Neighborhood Council who favored integration.   
 McCarthy ultimately brought a suit against the Back of the Yards Neighborhood 
Council and the Social Action Club arguing that the Council and the Social Action Club 
diverted funds from the Fun Fair for the profit of Social Action Club leaders.  This was a 
less incendiary allegation than his initial racially-charged claims of impropriety (likely 
designed to garner at least the appearance of not being motivated solely by opposition to 
integration).
400
  The Free Fair (the name was later changed to Fun Fair) was a rather large 
affair that attracted people from all over Chicagoland to the Back of the Yards, including 
many former residents.  The 1965 Free Fair, for instance, drew an estimated 300,000 
people who came to participate in such events as hot dog and pie eating contests, longest 
pigtail contests, and amusement rides.  Celebrities also attracted large crowds and certain 
days dedicated to meeting members of the Chicago Cubs and White Sox brought in 
significant numbers of attendees.  While admittance to the fair was free, all of the other 
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attractions required payment.
401
  The Back of the Yards Social Action Club, while 
affiliated with the Neighborhood Council (indeed, Meegan was both Executive Secretary 
of the Council and Vice President of the Social Action Club), was a distinct entity for 
legal reasons.  As such the Social Action Club sponsored the Fun Fair and contributed 
$60,000-$75,000 
402
 a year to stage it. 
 In response to the suit that McCarthy filed, the Social Action Club felt compelled 
to publicly respond to the charges, clarifying its role in putting the Fun Fair on and its 
relationship to the Back of the Yards Neighborhood Council, and defending its work and 
reputation.  According to the statement by the board of directors of the Social Action 
Club published in the Back of the Yards Journal, the Club “engages in a variety of 
activities that are dedicated to the general welfare and good of the residents of the Back 
of the Yards Community.”403  Among these activities were supporting legislation that 
would have provided state aid to non-public schools (as the Back of the Yards contained 
20 non-public and 9 public schools which reflects that importance of religion in 
organizing community life) and purchasing abandoned land, clearing it, and selling it to 
companies that erect new housing.  Additionally, the Social Action Club sponsored a 
program to remodel homes in the neighborhood that it claimed was responsible for 
rehabilitating nearly 11,000 homes since the program’s inception in 1955.404  All of these 
programs aimed to prevent people from leaving the neighborhood (while, at the same 
time, discouraging new people from moving in.  
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 However, it was the Social Action Club’s stance on integration that was most 
controversial and opened it up to charges such as those levied by McCarthy.  According 
to the Club’s statement in response to McCarthy’s lawsuit “as a social action committee, 
the Back of the Yards Social Action Club has, on many occasions, taken a public position 
concerning current social problems of the day as they affect the Back of the Yards area.  
Necessarily the taking of such positions will undoubtedly displease some because no 
organization that takes any stance on any public issue can please all.  Thus, the Back of 
the Yards Social Action Club in December 1969 announced a position concerning orderly 
and uncrowded integration of public schools in the Back of the Yards area.  This position 
was severely criticized and opposed by a Daniel D. McCarthy, Chairman of the United 
Block Clubs.”405   
In highlighting McCarthy’s opposition to its stance on integration, the Social 
Action Club implicitly argued that the suit was without merit and, indeed, stemmed 
solely because of McCarthy’s opposition to integration.  Nevertheless, the Club felt it 
necessary to declare that his “charges are tantamount to an accusation of conversion of 
funds by the Social Action Club’s officers and directors….The charge is not true.”406  It 
further argued that “the Directors believe there has never been a fraud or deception 
practiced upon the Fair’s thousands of patrons” and that “the Club is prepared to answer 
any legitimate inquiry about its activities, bearing in mind that in the United States those 
who engage in social action activities have a constitutional right to do so and may not be 
called to account or impugned for their views, their positions, or their lawful actions.”407  
In order to defend itself the Club requested that the court appoint an independent auditor 
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to review “every book, record and voucher” as well as the Club’s officers’ and directors’ 
personal financial statements.
408
  Noticeably absent was any statement about the Social 
Action Club’s actual views on integration.   
Essentially the Social Action Club viewed this suit as a direct result of its support 
for orderly integration regardless of the content of McCarthy’s suit.  Clearly, the divisive 
issue of school integration had the potential to destabilize the community and threaten the 
existence of the very institutions (the Back of the Yards Neighborhood Council and the 
Social Action Club) and impugn the reputations of the leaders that had been largely 
responsible for turning the community from slum-like conditions to a model working-
class community. 
That’s not to suggest, however, that other organizations in the community rushed 
to condemn the Back of the Yards Social Action Club and its supposed pro-integration 
stance.  The publishers of the Back of the Yards Journal defended the club and its 
activities.  For instance, in reporting on the court-sanctioned audit of the Club’s records, 
the Journal published copies of the documents dealing with the Social Action Club’s 
purchase of land from the Chicago River and Indiana Railroad Company for the Fun Fair 
site, a transaction that was approved by the Illinois Commerce Commission, in order to 
prove that the Club’s actions were above board.409  In that same issue, moreover, the 
Back of the Yards Journal defended the work of the Social Action Club.  Under the 
headline “Fun Fair Proceeds Helped Build These,” it published photographs of homes 
that the Club helped to build using money from the Fun Fair.  In doing so, it noted that 
the “purchase of approximately 600 lots for new homes in this community came from 
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proceeds of the Back of the Yards annual Fun Fair” and that the homes pictured were two 
of the 49 new homes erected in the Destiny Manor subdivision.
410
  The Journal further 
celebrated the fact that the homes had appreciated in value from $26,000 to $40,000 
while also noting that “during the 20 to 30 years previous to 1954, very few homes had 
been built in this community” while also proudly claiming that “there are communities in 
Chicago in which no new homes or business structures were built from before World War 
I until less than three years ago.”411   
While this defense of the Social Action Club highlights the particular pride Back 
of the Yards residents took in turning their community around and their need to set 
themselves apart from other Chicago neighborhoods, it is also noteworthy in that it says 
nothing about the charges that McCarthy and others (including the Club itself) felt led to 
the scandal to begin with—the Club’s stance on integration.  Rather than defending the 
Club’s right to support integration or actually coming out in support of integration, the 
publishers of the Journal felt compelled to defend the Social Action Club’s integrity and 
the good work it had done in helping to rebuild the community and its housing stock.  
Regardless of the paper’s stance on integration, it likely realized that a full-throated 
defense of integration or the Club’s pro-integration stance would have generated a fair 
amount of controversy and ill will.  Indeed, at a time when the problems of integration 
and busing were roiling other Midwestern and Northern cities, the Back of the Yards 
Journal remained silent, typically choosing to avoid comment on racial issues.
412
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Indeed, it is often difficult to determine racial attitudes of the neighborhood or the 
editorial staff of the Journal because of this silence.  Instead, information must be 
gleaned by what is left unsaid and unreported.  A particularly glaring example of this 
racial blind spot is the stark contrast in coverage the Back of the Yards Journal gave to 
the assassinations of Martin Luther King, Jr. and Robert Kennedy.  There is no mention 
of MLK’s death and the subsequent violence (both nationally and in Chicago) 
surrounding it in the pages of the Journal.  However, Robert Kennedy’s assassination 
generated multiple headlines and an extended debate on the need for better gun control 
laws.
413
  Whereas other media outlets heaped scorn on Black protestors in the aftermath 
of King’s assassination the Journal’s silence likely stemmed from its apparent 
unwillingness to comment on racial matters of any kind. 
In August of 1970 Joseph Meegan appeared before the state’s Charitable 
Solicitation Committee which was convened by the Illinois General Assembly to inquire 
into the allegations surrounding the Neighborhood Council and the Social Action Club.  
In his prepared remarks Meegan outlined the history of the two organizations and 
highlighted the good work they did for the people of the Back of the Yards such as 
combating urban blight, advocating for the interests of neighborhood residents with a 
variety of governmental agencies, and supporting legislation perceived to be beneficial to 
the community.  Noticeably absent from Meegan’s remarks, however, was any mention 
of the present controversy or the role that the Social Action Club’s stance on integration 
played in the scandal.  Likely, he realized, much like other members of the community, 
that even if he supported integration, other residents vigorously opposed it.  More vocal 
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support might have engendered great hostility and delegitimized the Neighborhood 
Council and the Social Action Club in the eyes of many Back of the Yards Residents. 
In the end, however, Circuit Court Judge Nathan M. Cohen dismissed McCarthy’s suit 
charging the two organizations with defrauding the public by diverting funds in early 
1971.  The Neighborhood Council and Social Action Club had requested an independent 
audit of their records which the court ordered.  Judge Cohen’s examination of the audits 
found “no evidence of a single penny being diverted to any defendant in the complaint” 
and that the complaint was without “a scintilla of evidence offered by the plaintiff in 
support of it.”414   
While the outcome was ultimately favorable for both organizations and their 
officers who were charged in the complaint, their guilt or innocence is largely irrelevant.  
Rather, this suit and the scandal surrounding it highlight the degree of opposition to 
integration in the Back of the Yards or, at the very least, the limits of pro-integration 
rhetoric in the community’s discourse (despite the fact that there probably was some 
support for integration on the Council).  McCarthy’s charges against two organizations 
that did a tremendous amount of work to turn the neighborhood around and maintain its 
(albeit tenuous) status reveal just how much integration threatened that status according 
to some neighborhood residents.  Residents didn’t want proceeds from the Fun Fair, 
which financed much of the Social Action Club’s work, to help pave the way for 
potential integration of the neighborhood, despite all of the other good work that the 
Neighborhood Council and the Social Action Club did to preserve the community.
415
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If McCarthy’s crusade against the Social Action Club revealed the limits of 
integrationist sentiment in the community, another much more tragic and violent episode 
showed how fears of segregation actually played out in the community.  On Septermber 
1, 1971 two 13-year-olds were shot and killed in an outbreak of racial violence in the 
neighborhood.  Helene Navarro and Robert Leonard, both white, were felled by stray 
bullets as some young Black men sought to strike back at their white tormenters who had 
been throwing rocks and bottles at them.
416
  Two men, Duffie Clark and Ray Stafford, 
would be charged in the killings.  As the neighborhood transitioned in the early ‘70s with 
a small number of African-Americans moving in, white residents made it known that they 
were unwelcome, often resorting to petty violence.  Duffie Clark had been the victim of 
previous attacks shortly after he and his family had moved into the neighborhood earlier 
that summer.  During one such incident, which involved a group of white kids throwing 
rocks and shouting “Get outta here, nigger!  You don’t belong here!” as he walked his 
dog, a white man of Lithuanian and Italian descent named Sam Navarro chased the white 
troublemakers away.  Navarro apologized for the behavior of the mob and told Clark “if 
you ever have another problem, come see me.  My door is always open to you.”417  The 
next time Navarro heard of Duffie Clark was when he was told that Clark killed his 
daughter Helene.
418
    
What seems like a rather straightforward incident of racial violence had an 
interesting twist, however, and reveals the complex nature of the neighborhood’s racial 
transition.  Navarro’s actions, both before and after his daughter’s slaying, show that 
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some in the neighborhood would tolerate peaceful integration.  Several days after the 
killing, Navarro published a call for calm and an end to racial violence in Chicago in the 
Tribune.  Rather than seeking revenge, Navarro instead asked for help in solving the case 
in order to “help save some other innocent Black or white human being from being 
senselessly destroyed.  In this way we can come closer to loving and understanding each 
other.”419  Navarro’s willingness to assist his new Black neighbors and call for calm in 
order to prevent an escalation of racial violence show that not everyone in the 
neighborhood was against integration.  Yet, at the same time, Navarro feared for his 
family’s safety and was concerned about crime in the neighborhood.  Indeed, Helene 
Navarro was killed shortly after the family came back from a trip outside of the 
neighborhood.  They had spent the afternoon looking at houses with a realtor near 
Midway airport.  According to Navarro, “Anywhere the neighborhoods got mixed, that 
kind of thing [violence] happened.  I felt I had to move—I was afraid my kids wouldn’t 
be safe.”420       
By the 1960s there was a sense that crime was potentially returning to the 
neighborhood and residents linked the rise in crime rates (or at least the perception that 
they were rising) to African-Americans, whose numbers in the neighborhood were still 
miniscule.  In particular, community members feared that integration of schools and the 
building of public housing would lead to increasing criminal activity.  Daniel McCarthy, 
for instance, drew a direct line from integration to ghettoization.  Others were more subtle 
but still equated African-Americans with public housing and criminality.  For example, at 
a speech before the Neighborhood Council celebrating its 25
th
 anniversary, a local 
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businessman argued that “the theory that misbehavior can be cured by pulling down 
tenements and erecting in their places elaborate public housing is not holding water.  The 
crime rates continue to rise along with our outlays for social service.  We speak of 
underprivilege.  Yet the young men who swagger down the streets, boldly flaunting their 
gang symbols on their Black jackets are far more blessed in creature comforts than 90% 
of the children of the world.”421   
Indeed, by the end of the 1960s Back of the Yard residents were growing 
increasingly worried about gang activity, criminality, and vandalism—problems which 
had plagued the neighborhood throughout much of its history but which residents had 
worked tirelessly to eradicate.  For instance, the Neighborhood Council’s September 
1969 meeting featured a speech by Commander Edward L. Buckney, head of the Chicago 
Police Department’s Gang Intelligence Unit.422  Council President John Sanchez urged 
“that all Council delegates, local clergymen, public and parochial school teachers, 
recreating leaders, Big Brothers, and others interested in the problems facing youth 
arrange to be present at this important meeting” underscoring how big of a menace such 
criminality appeared to neighborhood residents.
423
  In addition, the Neighborhood 
Council sponsored a seminar entitled “The Prevention and Treatment of Juvenile Welfare 
Problems” in 1972 that was attended by members of a variety of local organizations to 
hear experts report on the problems of juvenile delinquency.
424
  In October of the same 
year, a Chicago Police Investigator, Anthony Rigoni, was on hand at a meeting of  
Neighborhood Council delegates to give a talk on the “Perils of Narcotics” and display 
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samples of marijuana, heroin, LSD and other “drugs now causing what is considered the 
number one crime problem in the nation.”425  Despite this perception that crime was on 
the rise, crime rates were actually declining in the late 1960s.  For instance, serious crime 
in the neighborhood declined 4.4% in February 1968 compared to the same period the 
previous year while the city-wide crime rate increased 8%.
426
    
In addition, the perceived danger of vandalism prompted the Back of the Yards 
Council’s Junior Citizens organization (made up of representatives of all seventh and 
eighth grade classes in the neighborhood’s 29 public and private elementary schools) to 
sponsor a poster and essay contest on “its barbaric mindlessness and its destructive 
effects wherever it occurs.”427  The Back of the Yards Journal published several posters 
on its front page, including one asking “This Neighborhood is Beautiful.  Why Ruin It?” 
making explicit the slippery slope from vandalism to community decay.
428
   
The problem of vandalism was seen as such a threat to the neighborhood’s 
stability that it impelled the Journal’s editor, Chris Magee, to take the unusual step of 
publishing an editorial on the front page.  In a hyperbolic tour-de-force filled with 
imagery of pollution, Magee lamented the disastrous effects that vandalism wrought not 
only on the neighborhood, but on the vandal himself.  The vandal, however, was a 
metaphor for the community as a whole.  He argued that the vandal was harmed “by 
learning to use his mind destructively rather than as a creator of the useful and the 
beautiful, by teaching himself how to ruin and pollute his neighborhood with the feces of 
his mind rather than learning to develop and elevate it above the condition in which he 
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found it…”429  Further, “what the destroyed does not realize is that he is dragging his own 
mind through the muck, polluting his own inner environment….One creates an 
environment of beauty and joy within himself by what he thinks and does or he creates an 
inferno of dismal ugliness, a chaos of senseless graffiti and the ruin of dreadful night as 
his personal dwelling place.”430  The vandal became a stand-in for the community itself 
and the embodiment of the anxiety residents felt over the potential deterioration of their 
community.  The community could choose to address the problems and prevent them, or 
it would descend into chaos, ugliness, and slum-like conditions.  Due to the number of 
deteriorating packinghouse buildings, vandalism likely was an actual problem.   
There was a further fear of how outsiders viewed the community—that rather than 
merely giving the appearance of a slum, the neighborhood would actually become one:  
“Such a person [the vandal] has far more to fear from himself, from his inner self, than he 
has to fear from social outrage or the police, for what he does becomes his identity as a 
human being.”431  That is, if residents allowed these problems to persist, they would 
implicitly condone them and lead the neighborhood to become identified, once again, as a 
home of corruption, vice, crime, and delinquency.  Moreover, if this was permitted to 
happen, the neighborhood would not be able to save itself as it had in the past:  “He 
becomes the embodiment of what he thinks and does, and eventually he is unable, even if 
he chooses, to reverse a course that, too late, he realizes is destroying him.”432  Here, 
then, the links between the environment of the neighborhood and its identity were made 
explicit and reveal the tremendous unease about its future.  Vandalism “creates in himself 
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[the vandal] a cancerous psychological force that moulds his future.”  The fears of some 
evil force lurking below the surface were omnipresent.  Vandalism was only the external 
symptom of a much larger and much more dangerous problem that needed immediate 
attention or the neighborhood faced certain death.  All of this highlights the sense of 
urgency and foreboding that many in the Back of the Yards felt about the neighborhood’s 
future.  
Moreover, it shows that many in the neighborhood were quite concerned with the 
physical deterioration of the neighborhood—deterioration that was brought on, in large 
part, by the wholesale abandonment of the community by the packing industry.  The 
vacant land and crumbling packinghouse infrastructure would have seemed to many in 
the community as providing the very real potential for crime and vandalism. 
Deindustrialization (along with its deleterious effects on the built environment) and 
community decline were inextricably linked.       
These fears about Back of the Yards’ decline would eventually come to be 
realized.  By 1980, the Chicago Tribune was publishing stories about the changing 
neighborhood.  In one such article, long-time resident John Schmitt reminisced about 
running a gambling operation and associating with moonshiners and bootleggers while at 
the same time lamenting “the changes, and how people can’t walk alone at night.”433  An 
Irish priest from the neighborhood said “look around now.  See the gutted houses.  They 
are lairs for robbers and gangs, and nobody does anything about it.  Sure the council gets 
things done but not here.  Nobody cares.”434  Such lamentations were surely the product 
of a nostalgic longing for the neighborhood’s and the resident’s past regardless of how 
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much the Back of the Yards had actually fundamentally changed.  In fact, Schmitt’s fond 
recollection of his days associating with criminals doesn’t seem that different from the 
current conditions that they deplored.                
The prevailing feeling amongst those old-timers who remained in the 
neighborhood (and outside reporters) was that the neighborhood had fundamentally 
changed, however, and that change was for the worse.  Of course, the change they were 
talking about, both implicitly and explicitly, was racial as well as physical.  Schmitt’s 
observations reveal the racial nature of these complaints about the changes taking place 
in the Back of the Yards.  He looked back wistfully on the days when the neighborhood 
was considered a slum, when gambling and bootlegging were omnipresent and accepted, 
even by the local clergy.  Now, however, the neighborhood was unsafe.  The only thing 
that had truly changed, however, was the racial makeup of the Back of the Yards.  It had 
transitioned from a dangerous slum peopled by Irish, Germans, and Eastern Europeans to 
a dangerous slum peopled by Mexican Americans and African-Americans interrupted 
only by a brief time when the community was able to transform itself into a relatively 
stable, clean, safe working-class community and spare itself from the wrecking ball of 
urban renewal.   
 The story of how the community was able to spare itself from the wrecking ball, 
however, explains much about later opposition to any perceived changes taking place in 
the neighborhood.  Residents and community organizations felt that they had worked 
industriously to pull themselves up out of the mire (both literally and figuratively) to 
make something of their community.  They had thrown off the stigma that outsiders had 
attached to the neighborhood—that it was poor, dirty, stench-filled, ugly, deteriorating, 
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and crime-ridden—and made their community a model for similar working-class 
neighborhoods across the nation.  Moreover, they had done all of this themselves without 
any help from outsiders or the government (a somewhat dubious claim it should be 
noted).  Residents felt that all of that work was threatened by the many forces arrayed 
against the neighborhood, however—the decline of the packing industry, the 
unwillingness of politicians to listen to their complaints, their inability to control the type 
of industry that moved to the neighborhood, and the supposed threat posed by forced 
integration.   
Further, Arnold Hirsch argues that residents of Back of the Yards (and similar 
white ethnic neighborhoods) had achieved a tenuous whiteness at precisely the time that 
they perceived that whiteness to work against them.  According to this line of thinking, 
white ethnics worked hard to reach a measure of respectability which afforded them a 
measure of nascent white privilege and, therefore, the right to control their neighborhood 
but the Civil Rights movement threatened to undo those gains.  All of this led these white 
ethnics to believe that the traditional and natural racial order was being subverted and 
they began to lash out at a variety of enemies (the NAACP, the federal government, the 
Urban League, the UPWA, the Catholic Interracial Council, and the Chicago Housing 
Authority among other leftist groups) who were thought to be conspiring against their 
interests.
435
 Coupled with this was a fear of intermarriage and “race mixing” that many 
white ethnics felt would undermine their precarious whiteness.  For instance, white South 
Deering residents who fought violently to prevent integration of the Trumbull Park 
Homes housing project reportedly feared “that it won’t be long now and negroes and 
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whites inter marrying will be a common thing and the white race will go down hill.”436  
In reality, however, these supposed enemies were hardly working against the white 
ethnics (the CHA in the early 1950s, for instance, actively disregarded its own policy on 
integrating housing projects and Chicago police often actively ignored violence 
committed by white rioters
437
) and whatever gains African-Americans made only 
marginally made up for centuries of oppression. But this didn’t make Back of the Yards 
residents’ fears any less real as many felt that any gains made by Blacks necessarily 
entailed a diminishment of white rights.       
At any rate, Meegan laid out the rationale for rebuilding the community in 1959:  
“Every time you clear a slum, you create another one.  Our goal here is all building 
violations corrected, every old home remodeled, and a new home on every vacant lot.  In 
that way we will preserve our community.”  Perhaps the most important organization in 
achieving those goals, trying to prevent a return to slum-like conditions in the 
neighborhood, and in keeping people from leaving for the suburbs was the Neighborhood 
Council’s Conservation Committee.  According to the Committee itself, the very future 
of the neighborhood depended on how effective it was in carrying out its purpose “to 
preserve the community from blight, flight and neighborhood decay” and that its “work is 
never done.”438  The work of the Conservation Committee and its claims of its necessity 
and ceaseless work reveal the degree to which many in the neighborhood felt the 
community’s position to be tenuous.   
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Furthermore, it shows that fears that the neighborhood would decay to its 
previous conditions were omnipresent.  Residents, the Neighborhood Council, and the 
Conservation Committee viewed the neighborhood as always teetering on the precipice 
and there was a constant struggle to bring it back from the ledge.  Fears persisted that the 
slightest change in the neighborhood (whether it was the presence of trucking terminals 
and other undesirable industry, the noxious odors associated with rendering plants, 
houses in need of a paint job, trash on the streets, empty storefronts, or African-
Americans moving into the Back of the Yards) could potentially push it over the brink.  
It’s important to understand these fears in order to understand the Conservation 
Committee’s efforts which, intentional or not, had the effect of preventing African-
Americans from moving into the neighborhood in significant numbers at least into the 
1980s.   
Indeed, in a Chicago Tribune article dealing with the neighborhood’s transition in 
the early 1980s and Joseph Meegan’s hold on power in the neighborhood, reveals the role 
that race played in maintaining his influence in the community:  “Meegan’s total control 
and influence ends at Garfield Boulevard on the south, and at Racine Avenue on the east.  
But it’s probably a voluntary relinquishing of power, because past those boundaries it’s a 
story of Black people, crime, high unemployment, and abandoned houses.”439  
Essentially, community organizations and the residents themselves viewed housing 
rehabilitation and other work to maintain the community as inconsistent with integration.  
As Arnold Hirsch argued, the Back of the Yards “successfully resisted integration 
pressures because they had no choice.”440  Many in the neighborhood felt that the 
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community could either continue to fight off the ever-present threat of blight, flight, and 
slum-like conditions, or it could integrate but it couldn’t do both.  Similarly, Thomas 
Sugrue argues that “all but the most liberal whites who lived along [Detroit’s] racial 
rontier believed that they had only two choices.  They could flee, as the vast numbers of 
white urbanites did, or they could hold their ground and fight.”441  According to many in 
the community, integration necessarily entailed the physical deterioration of the 
neighborhood and its ultimate reversion to a slum. 
This cross-ethnic cooperation (to keep African-Americans out of the 
neighborhood) was not always the norm for the neighborhood, however.  According to 
the Tribune in 1960, “once seething with national and racial tension, once tautly divided 
into hostile camps which pitted Poles against Germans, Slovaks against Lithuanians, and 
everybody against the Irish, the Back of the Yards has gradually discovered that there is 
no future in hate….Now people are finding a common bond in community interests, in 
their children’s welfare, in their need for security, and instead of regarding each other 
narrowly as Irishmen, Bohemians, or Mexicans, they know their neighbors as Pat, 
Jaroslav, and Tomas.  ‘International marriages’ are not infrequent and cause barely a 
ripple of dissent.”442  Such erasure of ethnic distinctions reveal the formation of a 
common white identity in opposition to the supposed threat posed by Black migration 
into the neighborhood.  Or, as George Lipsitz argues, “white ‘unity’ rested on residential 
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segregation and on shared access to housing and life chances largely unavailable to 
communities of color.”443   
Moreover, white ethnics began to deploy a language of fundamental rights (which 
marginalized groups such as workers and African-Americans, inspired by the New Deal, 
had also begun to employ to empower themselves) to demand the right to racially 
segregated neighborhoods.
444
 The segregationist South Deering Bulletin’s slogan, for 
instance, was “White People Must Control Their Own Communities.”445  One observer 
even noted that “the white population has come to believe that it has a vested, exclusive, 
and permanent ‘right’ to certain districts.”446  White workers in Philadelphia who 
resented governmental attempts to desegregate building trades unions argued that “the 
established and well-earned rights of white people are being imperiled in the fight of 
Negro leadership against unions” and denounced these desegregation efforts as 
“discrimination against white persons.”447  On the whole, the white working class came 
to view such things as affirmative action as “part of a larger cultural attack on the white 
working-class world launched by protestors and abetted by ‘liberals’ in the federal 
government.”448      
As early as the 1960s and certainly by the 1970s, Mexicans in Back of the Yards 
played a significant role in this unified front against the intrusion of African-Americans.  
Even if they weren’t necessarily seen as white by the neighborhood’s white ethnics there 
was nevertheless a certain affinity between the community’s Mexican American and 
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white ethnic population by this time, an affinity that was premised on their shared 
Catholicism and their mutual dislike of African-Americans in the surrounding 
neighborhoods.
449
   
Indeed, in There Goes the Neighborhood:  Racial, Ethnic, and Class Tensions in 
Four Chicago Neighborhoods and Their Meaning for America William Julius Wilson 
and Richard P. Taub argue that “if there was a commonality between Latinos and whites 
in Dover, it had to do with their response to African-Americans.  Latino residents of 
Dover, including recent arrivals, were no more amenable to living with African-
Americans than were residents of Eastern European descent.  Racism in Dover was 
exacerbated by the fact that many residents of the nearby Black community were 
destitute, so knowledge about African-Americans drawn from adjacent areas reinforced 
the stereotype of Black poverty.”450  This situation would have been similar to that which 
was playing itself out in Back of the Yards.   
As Andrew Wiese argues, “many working- and middle-class whites—especially 
immigrants and their children, whose adaptation to American society involved the 
adoption and manipulation of its racial hierarchies—the coming of African-Americans 
threatened their efforts to rise in status and stability in white American society.”451  This 
was particularly true of Back of the Yards residents whose ethnic differences became less 
important as African-Americans seemed poised to migrate into the neighborhood.   
Certainly people found common cause in promoting the interest of the community, 
security, and their children’s welfare but that common cause was often based on racial 
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exclusion.  Indeed, Daniel McCarthy, who brought the suit against the Back of the Yards 
Neighborhood Council and Social Action Club, argued that “when a school gets an 80-20 
racial balance, whites start running.  You just get an all-Black school in a white 
neighborhood and extend the ghetto.”452   
While McCarthy’s views might not be entirely representative of the 
neighborhood, white ethnics were clearly coalescing around opposition to neighborhood 
integration.  Indeed, Arnold Hirsch has shown that in Chicago housing riots of the 1940s 
and 1950s, no one ethnic group predominated among those arrested—Poles, Italians, 
Irish, Slavs all set aside their differences to face a common enemy.  Or, as the Chicago 
Defender put it, “although there was no unity in the language backgrounds [of the rioters] 
they had a common…hatred for Negroes.”453  
In addition to trying to preserve the racial homogeneity of the community, Back 
of the Yards residents were also trying to preserve its built environment.  The 
Conservation Committee played a significant role in rehabilitating the community’s 
housing stock, demolishing vacant and decaying structures, and ensuring that buildings 
were in compliance with housing codes and zoning ordinances.  The Back of the Yards 
Journal repeatedly published stories concerning housing renovations, encouraging home-
owners to work with the Neighborhood Council to secure financing to improve both the 
outward appearance of their homes as well as their structural integrity and landscaping.  
For instance, in January 1967 it highlighted before and after pictures of renovations that 
homeowner Frank Pancewicz had done to his home at 2248 W. 54
th
 Street with help from 
the Back of the Yards Neighborhood Council.  The Journal touted the home’s 
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modernization “with the installation of an Oriental-type canopy, one of the new plastic 
siding materials, aluminum doors, windows, and eaves, cement steps and various other 
features.”454  While the aesthetics of such an improvement are certainly debatable, the 
renovations were in line with mid-‘60s ideas about materials and home architectural 
details required to meet respectable middle-class ideals.  Indeed, beginning in the late 
1950s the Journal repeatedly featured pictures of homeowners installing aluminum 
siding, citing its aesthetic and long-term economic benefits that were tantamount to free 
advertising for local home improvement companies.
455
  By the late 1970s the Journal had 
progressed to selling homeowners on the benefits of vinyl siding over aluminum.  Many 
such improvements were only cosmetic, however.  Back of the Yards’ housing stock was 
relatively old and in need of more serious rehabilitation.   
In that same issue, the Back of the Yards Journal featured another example of the 
community’s efforts to keep white people from abandoning the neighborhood—the 
building of new modern housing, clearly linking housing rehabilitation with residential 
segregation.  In this case, it was a plot with three new homes facing Winchester Ave. just 
south of 49
th
 Street that were in the process of being built and that had already been sold 
and would be ready to occupy by spring.
456
  To assist in the purchase of such homes, the 
Journal advised that “in keeping with President Johnson’s message to Congress with 
respect to assistance to qualified people seeking to own their own homes, Anton G. 
Florian, secretary of the American Savings and Loan Association of Chicago, 1824 W. 
47
th
, announced that mortgage money is available at American Savings at reasonable 
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interest rates to qualified home buyers.”457  In fact, the Journal often highlighted the 
activities of local banks, construction companies, home-improvement contractors and 
other businesses involved in renovating or building houses in the neighborhood as a form 
of free advertising as long as they were involved in some way in carrying out the goals of 
the Neighborhood Council with regards to renovating the community in order to maintain 
neighborhood stability. 
For instance, in 1965 the Journal prominently published a series of photographs 
celebrating four homeowners who renovated their homes as well as the construction 
companies that did the work and the financial institutions that financed the projects.  
These home improvements, which included such things as porch renovation with 
wrought-iron railings, vinyl siding, new cement steps, and aluminum porch canopies, 
were on “four of the many homes throughout the community that have been well-
maintained and remodeled in keeping with the conservation program of the Back of the 
Yards Neighborhood Council” according to the Journal.458  In publicizing such 
renovation work, the Journal encouraged others to do likewise while also instilling pride 
in the homeowners who it recognized.   
Moreover, it encouraged local banks and construction companies to provide their 
services at reasonable rates by giving them free publicity.  Indeed, in the same issue of 
the Journal that featured these well-kept homes, it also published a “BYNC Honor Roll” 
of “financial institutions in the area which have indicated that they will actively 
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participate in the Back of the Yards Council’s Community Conservation program.”459  
The Back of the Yards Neighborhood Council had invited 34 banking institutions to 
“participate in its campaign to spur home building and remodeling in the community”460  
This campaign was, according to the Back of the Yards Journal, a “nationally acclaimed, 
successful conservation program that has been financed by the people themselves through 
their own private savings institutions and without federal aid.”461    Further, the Journal 
featured two such financial institutions each week for further promotion in a separate 
article detailing the banks’ histories and services. In this way, local banks were given free 
publicity while residents were encouraged to patronize these local institutions that were 
portrayed as having the community’s stability and best interests at heart, indicative of the 
neighborhood’s relative insularity. 
This program continued well into the 1970s.  In 1978, for instance, the Journal 
was still encouraging residents to patronize local banks who actively participated in the 
Neighborhood Council’s Community Conservation Program.462  In doing so it advised 
homeowners that the neighborhood enjoyed the lowest tax rate in the country and that 
home improvement work would not lead to an increase in property tax assessments.  The 
Journal further pointed to this program as evidence of the community’s stability:  “there 
is a population of nearly 100,000…More than 90 per cent of the homes are owner 
occupied or owned by residents of the community…More than 800 new homes have been 
financed by local savings institutions in the past years…There is little available vacant 
residential property available in the area…The 100 per cent participation and cooperation 
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of local savings institutions continues to help preserve the community from blight, flight, 
and decay…The combined effort demonstrates that these financial firms are an integral 
part of the community responding to this program as well as being included in other 
facets of community life.”463       
The Back of the Yards Journal also regularly featured new homes for sale such as 
in the fall of 1964 when it announced that “qualified buyers can select and purchase new 
homes in Back of the Yards and occupy them before Christmas” and encouraged “area 
residents” to visit two model homes at 4303 S. Wood and 4911 S. Wood—the former, a 
one floor model, had 5 ½ rooms with three bedrooms, a full basement, and a picture 
window, while the latter, a bi-level, featured five rooms with three bedrooms.
464
  The 
homes also featured such amenities as “ornamental iron railings,” “pre-finished kitchen 
cabinets, vinyl asbestos kitchen tile, pantry,” “seven large closets,” “front and rear door 
chimes,” “and large light sliding door medicine cabinet, shower in bath tub.”    The 
Journal had previously published photos of the two model homes and again had 
encouraged “area residents” to attend an open house.465  It also directed people to contact 
the construction company, A-M Sunrise Construction, for further information, again 
providing essentially free advertising for local businesses who were involved in 
rehabilitating the community.
466
  All of this also points to the preference for local 
companies in rehabilitating the neighborhood.  
In addition to private dwellings, the Journal regularly publicized local businesses 
that improved the outward appearance of their stores.  One such instance provides a good 
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example of the type of rhetoric employed in celebrating these improvements.  When 
Martin’s Florist did some work on its exterior in 1967, the Journal published before and 
after photos and asked “What makes a fine community?  Most experts will agree that 
people and their attitudes are what makes an area neighborly.  Pride in property, 
conscientious application to responsibility and a genuine patriotic love are qualities 
which have made the Back of the Yards areas such a fine place in which to live.”467  The 
ad celebrated Martin’s Florist, which had been “established in the community for 27 
years” and which had been awarded the Back of the Yards Neighborhood Council’s Blue 
Ribbon Award for “beautifying their area by splendid upkeep of their property” for 
putting its profits “to work for the community” by modernizing its business.468  These 
improvements included a remodeling of the store’s façade with “stone plastic siding, all 
new trim and windows, aluminum door, tile floor on the inside” as well as the addition of 
new card cabinets for its large selection of both English and foreign language greeting 
cards, which highlights the still multi-ethnic and multi-lingual nature of the community 
even into the 1960s.
469
   
The Back of the Yards Neighborhood Council also sponsored a contest in 1969 to 
win free vinyl siding, in cooperation with the manufacturer which was giving a 
demonstration of its products at the Fair Grounds.  The winner would receive enough 
siding to cover either the front of one’s home or the entire garage (which reveals the 
degree to which many of the improvements and modernization efforts that the 
Neighborhood Council and the Journal promoted were more concerned with surface 
appearance, the illusion of modernization, and how the community appeared to outsiders 
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despite claims that these changes would be lasting and help solidify the community—
both literally and figuratively.)  In publicizing the contest (the coupon required for entry 
was printed in the Back of the Yards Journal) the Journal again published before and 
after pictures showing the supposed benefits of vinyl siding:  “solid vinyl siding and other 
building material products made of this plastic substance such as gutters, downspouts, 
shutters, roof edgings and soffit panels, are impervious to damaging climatic conditions.  
They do not peel, blister or rot like wood, nor corrode, pit or dent like metal.”470  The 
accompanying before picture showed “the deterioration of a home over a period of time.  
Paint erodes, wood is worn and damaged, shingles loosen and blow away, gutters sag, 
eaves warp, shutters splinter.  Age and assaults by the environment penetrate the skin 
deep beauty.”471  However, after the application of solid vinyl siding and trim accessories 
the beauty of the same home was described as “solid, tough.  It goes completely through 
the material, a shield to oppose the onslaughts of wind, weather and temperature.”472   It 
is telling, however, that in all of these efforts to promote home improvement the Journal 
rarely mentioned internal improvements.  
In touting such comforts and modern amenities in these new homes, the Journal 
emphasized the modernization of the neighborhood in trying to encourage people to stay, 
rather than flee to the suburbs.  While the Back of the Yards Journal served other 
Southwest Side neighborhoods including McKinley Park, Bridgeport, and Gage Park, the 
wording of such advertisements showed that they were intended for people who were 
already residents of the Back of the Yards or, at the very least, emphasized the relative 
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insularity of the neighborhood to dissuade those from outside of the area from thinking 
about moving to the community.   
One of the main problems the Conservation Committee identified was the large 
number of empty storefronts which it felt detracted from the community and encouraged 
vandalism.  In order to combat this form of blight as well as to deal with the problem of 
insufficient housing which could force people to leave the neighborhood, the 
Conservation Committee encouraged conversion of these empty storefronts into 
dwellings.  The Neighborhood Council, for instance, sponsored a series of seminars on 
housing issues, one of which focused on the conversion of empty storefronts to apartment 
buildings.
473
  One speaker at the seminar, Harry Chaddick who was a member of the 
Chicago Zoning Board of Appeals and Zoning Ordinance Review Committee, argued 
against not only vacant storefronts but also “low-grade businesses” such as junk yards, 
equipment yards, and auto repair shops that were located illegally in residential areas.
474
  
Such buildings destroyed the residential character of the neighborhoods and “it is not 
only better for the neighborhood but cheaper to convert such stores into apartment 
buildings, Chaddick argued.
475
  The Back of the Yards Journal regularly featured pictures 
of such conversions, in support of the Conservation Committee’s efforts.   
In addition to encouraging housing rehabilitation and the building of new homes, 
the Back of the Yards Neighborhood Council also called for demolition of housing that 
couldn’t be repaired and other decaying structures that contributed to neighborhood 
blight.  For instance, in 1966 the Neighborhood Council began a survey of local alleys to 
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determine the number sheds and shacks—which were inherently considered eyesores—
and to inform owners of such buildings of a program the Council undertook with the 
cooperation of the city’s Building Department to remove them free of charge.476  A 
similar program was also in effect in 1975 when the Back of the Yards Journal published 
several pictures of unsightly garages and sheds and advised that “THE NEW PROGRAM 
WILL HELP ELIMNATE EYES-SORES SUCH AS THOSE PICTURED ABOVE.”477 
Back of the Yards—A Nice Dry Place to Live 
 Related to trying to physically improve the housing structure and build new 
homes, one of the main problems the community faced was white flight to the suburbs.  
Community organizations, therefore, had the related goals of improving infrastructure 
and quality of life, and preventing people from leaving—often by playing up the 
advantages of living in the Back of the Yards while rather comically highlighting the 
travails of suburban living.  Again, like much of the work done in the neighborhood, the 
actions taken to achieve these goals were not necessarily predicated on or motivated by 
racial exclusion.  Rather racial animosities tended to be well-hidden, merely the subtext 
of what, on the surface, appeared to be laudable goals to maintain the stability and 
livability of the neighborhood.  This tension—between the overt and covert goals 
animating neighborhood rehabilitation and revitalization—is particularly evident in 
Joseph Meegan’s defense of the Neighborhood Council’s and the Social Action Club’s 
work in 1959:  “We are trying to keep people in the neighborhood, not keep them out.  
Many families have been here 30 or 40 years.  Their homes are here.  Their interests are 
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here.  We want to keep them here.”478  That Meegan was put on the defensive about 
keeping people out shows that these charges were being leveled at the community at the 
same time that it was still trying to recover from the loss of the meatpacking industry and 
that questions about housing, race, and industry were often intimately intertwined. 
 The Neighborhood Council and the Back of the Yards Journal often went to great 
lengths to play up not only the strengths of the neighborhood but also the disadvantages 
of moving to the suburbs.  For instance, throughout the 1970s it published an article titled 
“Buying Home Elsewhere May be a Headache.”479  The article listed all of the 
unforeseen expenses that might await someone who was trying to buy a home outside of 
the neighborhood.  These included such things as increased property taxes, particularly to 
pay for future schools in the area; future expenses for paving streets and constructing 
sidewalks and curbs, and the potential for flooding in the area due to inadequate or 
nonexistent sewer systems.
480
     
 This was a common theme throughout the 1960s and ‘70s in the pages of the Back 
of the Yards Journal.  It often warned about the dangers and inconveniences that awaited 
people who moved to the suburbs as well as touting the benefits of staying in the 
neighborhood.  For instance, the Journal often published pictures of flooding in the 
suburbs.  After one such flood in 1973, it seemed to take particular joy in publishing 18 
pictures of the damages that took up an entire page as well as a comprehensive list of the 
69 suburban communities that were affected by the flooding.
481
  While some of the 
pictures featured neighbors helping each other, the Journal seemed to delight in 
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publishing such pictures as a one that showed a flooded basement that was captioned “An 
indoor pool?”482  The previous year the Journal featured a picture of a flooded basement 
under the headline “Back of the Yards is Dry—Many Taverns but No Floods.”483  The 
caption warned that “persons planning to move into other communities would be wise to 
consider the advantages of buying a houseboat since conventional dwellings elsewhere 
have proven to be unexpectedly vulnerable to unconventional circumstances.”484  
 The Journal also regularly published a side by side comparison of the 
neighborhood and the suburbs.  According to the chart, the Back of the Yards was “where 
nearly everyone claims to have lived and where children are wanted and appreciated” and 
asked “where else will you find in a community: 
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To Worship:  24 churches 
 
To Learn:  34 Schools 
 
To Play:  12 public parks and playgrounds 
                20 church social and recreation centers 
 
To Save:  27 savings institutions 
 
To Work:  Industries provide full employment in the       
community with living wage for all.  Many people can 
walk to work. 
 
Low Taxes and Rent:  Compare with your friends 
elsewhere! 
 
Shopping:  Hundreds of local stores located in business 
districts, shopping centers, and on arterial and residential 
streets where you can buy anything for less. 
 
Transportation:  15 minutes to the Loop by car on the Dan 
Ryan, the Stevenson Expressway and the Damen Avenue         
Skyway.  Public transportation by bus, every four blocks, 
east, west, north, and south. 
 
Fire Protection:  Five fire stations 
 
Law Enforcement:  Three Police Districts 
 
Health Protection:  Served by five hospitals and a great 
number  of doctors and dentists. 
 
A community of 12, 000 homes with over 10,000 lately  
             remodeled and more than 600 homes recently  
             constructed. 
 
Property Owners:  80% live on the premises 
                              10% live in the immediate area 
                              10% live outside of the community 
24 National groups 
More than 34 Mothers Clubs 
Forty youth groups for boys and girls 
Senior Citizens 
Junior Citizens 
Clubs for residents 
  
THINKING OF MOVING? 
Compare What You Have Now: 
What will a new home cost?  What can you sell your home for 
now? 
Compare your present taxes with those you will have to pay. 
Are the churches and schools paid for? 
Are there parks and playgrounds nearby? 
Are the streets and alleys paved? 
How are the street lights? 
Do the streets and basements flood? 
Are there places to work nearby or will you have to travel a 
long distance? 
Are there nearby stores in which to shop? 
Are children wanted? 
Is there public transportation nearby? 
Are there places to save? 
Can you afford to change? 
How will it affect your future economy and your increased 
expenses? 
How will it affect your retirement? 
What have you got to gain? 
DID YOU KNOW? 
1.   In Back of the Yards you can remodel you home without an 
increase in taxes, according to Assessor P.J. Cullerton.  Always 
get a building permit where necessary. 
2.  Vacant stores can be converted into living quarters by 
getting a zoning variation 
3. F.H.A. and conventional loans are available in local savings 
institutions at a fair interest rate. 
4.  New homes are being constructed for sale. 
5.  Aluminum siding is lifetime and never needs painting. 
6.  You should never purchase an older home or building 
without making sure the owner provides you with a Certificate 
of Inspection showing that there are no building violations 
which have not been corrected.  Purchasers of buildings under 
contract must be given a certificate of compliance showing that 
there are no violations at the time of purchase.  The contract 
may be voided if the building had violations not corrected prior 
to the purchase. 
7.  If you are renting an apartment, makes sure you have an 
entrance and an exit to an outside doorway or stairway.  You 
should also have hot water, a bathroom with a shower or tub, 
and wash stand. 
8.  Stores may not be used for living quarters.  It is against the 
law for a family to live in a one room store. 
Figure 12: Thinking of Moving? 
485
 
The implications of such comparisons were clear—the Back of the Yards had all 
of the amenities that homebuyers could possibly be looking for while the suburbs were a 
drain on people’s finances.  The suburbs required higher taxes, more money to pay for 
churches and schools, and were highly inconvenient for a variety of reasons.  The Back 
of the Yards was, according to a large headline in the Journal, “a nice dry place to 
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live.”486  To be certain, the neighborhood also had to fight against other drawing points of 
suburbia including less dense population and federal policies that generally encouraged 
suburbanization and made it financially more attractive to potential home-buyers.
487
    
 Moreover, the suburbs held particular perils for the elderly.  According to a report 
in the Sun-Times (which the Back of the Yards Journal reprinted with the preface that 
“Back of the Yards seniors enjoy lavish luncheons regularly—unlike their counterparts in 
suburbia”) the elderly suffered a variety of problems as a result of moving to the 
suburbs.
488
  Namely, poverty forced senior citizens to depend on county programs to 
provide them with meals.  However, the main problem was the lack of transportation, the 
poor planning, and physical sprawl of the suburbs that condemned seniors to being 
isolated from friends and family, unable to travel to doctors or to shopping centers, and 
taxed out of their homes by unscrupulous county assessors.
489
  York Township supervisor 
Donald G. Swan, acknowledged the problem and argued that the elderly were often better 
served by living in large cities:  “they have their transportation taken care of in big cities.  
In order to do a really good gob in setting up a retirement community in the suburbs, you 
need some medical facilities on the premises.  And you need a bus service.  This sends up 
the cost of such homes and eliminates from residence in them those people who really 
need such homes, who don’t have the money or means to live alone.”490  As the white 
population of the neighborhood aged, such concerns about the elderly took on increased 
importance. 
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 In addition to warning about the pitfalls of buying a home elsewhere, the Journal 
also regularly warned about the problems associated with selling a home.  It frequently 
published an article entitled “Selling your home not as easy as you think” that listed 
many of the hidden expenses home sellers were required to pay as well as the 
bureaucratic hurdles they had to jump in order to sell their homes.
491
  These included 
such expenses as the legal fee paid to real estate brokers and the cost of repairing building 
violations as well as ensuring that the building meets the long list of requirements that the 
FHA laid out in order to obtain the necessary Certificate of Inspection.
492
  The Journal 
also warned of the pitfalls of selling by Contract for Deed—a method of selling a home in 
which the buyer pays a small down payment and agrees to make regular payments to the 
seller until the home is paid off and the seller gives the buyer the deed to the property.   
According to the Journal, quite often the buyer lets the home fall into disrepair and the 
owner is left to pay for the repairs that are necessary to make the building compliant with 
building codes.  More often, however, contract buying was used to defraud Black home 
buyers who were desperate for adequate housing and to escape Chicago’s overcrowded 
Black belt.   
 Selling a home could potentially not only cost an exorbitant amount of money, it 
could also get a homeowner killed, at least according to the Neighborhood Council.  The 
Back of the Yards Journal regularly published a warning that “property owners in the 
Back of the Yards who are receiving unsolicited phone calls from strangers representing 
themselves as real estate agents or brokers making inquiries of the owners regarding the 
sale of their home are urged by the Back of the Yards Council to protect themselves from 
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such calls or written solicitations.  Robberies, assaults and even murders have often 
resulted when widows, elderly persons, and even families have responded to unsolicited 
phone calls and admitted strangers to their homes.”493   
 The Neighborhood Council also warned residents about unethical real estate 
agents who would purchase homes for much less than they were worth.  The Journal 
cited the example of a 79 year old widow who sold her house for $9,000 to an agent, 
supposedly after a referral from a neighbor.  The agent made a few minor repairs and 
then sold the house for $18,000.
494
  If the Neighborhood Council had prior knowledge of 
the sale, it would have prevented it from going through.  In similar fashion, the Journal 
warned potential buyers of building by citing an example of a buyer who bought a 
building in the neighborhood only to find out that it needed significant repairs in order to 
clear up a multitude of violations.  The Journal suggested that because the buyer had 
dealt with a real estate agency and a Savings and Loan that were from outside the 
neighborhood, they “failed to protect the buyer and depositors” and were “evidently more 
interested in [their] commission than [their] obligation to the customer.”495  While such 
claims as these might be hyperbolic and meant to instill fear in people who were 
contemplating selling their home and moving out of the neighborhood, there were 
legitimate reasons for dissuading people from responding to such offers.     
 Block busting (or panic peddling)—the term for unscrupulous real estate agents 
and speculators hastening the turnover of white neighborhoods to Black ones by making 
white homeowners fear a decline in property values if they didn’t sell their home quickly 
before more African-Americans moved in—was seen as a real problem, both nationally 
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and in Chicago, especially by the late 1960s and early ‘70s as such practices were quite 
widespread.  Typically, white homeowners would be offered less than their homes were 
worth and Black buyers would be charged well over fair market value with the real estate 
agents greatly profiting on the sale.  Real estate speculators would entice white 
homeowners to sell low by making them fear an influx of African-Americans into the 
neighborhood (which would depress property values).  These panic-peddlers would then 
turn around and charge Black buyers well over fair market prices, greatly profiting on the 
sale.  For instance, the case that spurred a movement in the 1950s by lawyer Mark Satter 
and various leaders in the Black community to eliminate such contracts in Chicago saw 
real estate speculator Jay Goran buy a cramped hundred year old house in Hyde Park for 
$4,300 and sell it to a Black couple, Albert and Sallie Bolton for $13,900 the next 
week.
496
   
 Moreover, the panic peddlers would charge exorbitant fees to the homebuyers and 
include language in the contract’s (often unread or poorly understood) fine print that 
allowed for the speculator to evict the buyers if they missed any of their payments.  In the 
Boltons’ case, the house was in such disrepair that expenses became too much and they 
eventually missed a payment.  Goran moved to evict them and repeat the process with 
other potential Black home buyers which meant the Boltons would have lost close to 
$3,000 in down payment, fees, and home improvements in addition to their house.
497
  
According to Mark Satter, speculators “use the home as a ‘bait’ to defraud the Negro out 
of a substantial sum of money and then push the Negro out into the street [in order to] 
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defraud another party.”498  Similar situations played themselves out countless times 
across the city (and nationally) which ensured that The Neighborhood Council, with the 
support of the Journal, was rather effective in preventing panic peddling in the 
neighborhood and was quite instrumental in the passage of anti-block busting legislation 
by the Illinois legislature.   
 The law, which went into effect on October 1, 1973, authorized the state to revoke 
the license of real estate agents who engaged in panic-peddling.
499
   It also established a 
Real Estate Recovery Fund to compensate homeowners who were defrauded by unethical 
real estate agents.
500
  Prior to the law’s passage, block busting only violated the rules of 
the Illinois Department of Registration and Education, the agency that licensed real estate 
brokers.
501
  An earlier law made it unlawful: 
 (a) To solicit for sale, lease, listing or purchase any residential real estate within the state 
 of Illinois, on the grounds of loss of valued due to the present or prospective entry into the 
 vicinity of the property involved of any particular race, color, religion, or national origin 
 or ancestry. 
 (b) To distribute or cause to be distributed, written material or statements designed to  
 induce any owner of residential real estate in the State of Illinois to sell or lease his  
 property because of any present or prospective changes I the race, color, religion, or 
 national origin or ancestry of residents in the vicinity of the property involved. 
 (c) To intentionally create alarm among residents of any community by transmitting in 
 any manner including a telephone call whether or not conservation thereby ensues, with 
 a design to induce any owner of residential real estate in the State of Illinois to sell or 
 lease his property because of any present or prospective entry into the vicinity of the  
 property involved of any person or persons of any particular race, color, religion or  
 national origin or ancestry. 
 (d) To solicit any owner of residential real property for any reason related to a transfer  
 of interest in such property who has filed an affidavit with the Illinois Commission on  
 Human Relations stating that such property is not for sale, except that this paragraph 
 shall not apply if the affadavit is subsequently withdrawn.
502
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Such practices now became a violation of state law, however.  According to Governor 
Dan Walker, “for the first time we have real safeguards against the despicable practices 
of block-busting and panic peddling.  This bill provides true consumer protection.”503   
 The Neighborhood Council saw block busting and panic peddling as a serious 
threat to community stability.  In urging members of the clergy, delegates of church and 
school organizations, and representatives of the community’s Mothers Clubs to attend a 
meeting to discuss the new law, it cited the “fear and flight” caused by block busting as 
partially responsible for the decline in non-public school registration.
504
  The law didn’t 
seem to have an immediate effect, however, as a year later the Journal reported that 
unscrupulous real estate agencies that engaged in panic peddling had begun to move into 
the neighborhood.
505
  According to the Journal, property in the suburbs was becoming 
difficult to sell “due to large down payments requested and high interest rates.”506  As a 
result, “real estate solicitors are focusing their efforts on trying to induce home owners in 
older well-established communities to sell their homes and move to the promised land of 
suburbia.”507  The Journal went on to list all of the familiar benefits of living in the 
neighborhood and the drawbacks of the suburbs and concluded that “the soundest advice 
that can be offered to home owners in Back of the Yards is to be content and happy with 
where you’re living.  The flight to the suburbs, with the excessive cost of gasoline for 
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travel into the city, the traffic congestion, and the time it takes to get to work makes it 
almost prohibitive for anyone to sell his home and buy elsewhere.”508      
 Despite the apparent animosity toward African-Americans moving into the 
neighborhood, the Back of the Yards was significantly more welcoming to Mexican 
Americans despite the fact that there was some tension between Poles and some of the 
earliest Mexican migrants to the neighborhood.
509
  While the Near West Side was the 
main point of entry for and largest settlement of Mexicans in Chicago, people of Mexican 
descent began moving into the neighborhood in small but not insignificant numbers 
beginning in the 1920s to work in the packing industry.
510
  While Mexicans wouldn’t be a 
majority in the neighborhood until the 1980s, their influence on the neighborhood was 
already becoming apparent by the 1960s.  At the same time that African-Americans were 
dissuaded from moving to the Back of the Yards, residents displayed a rather remarkable, 
if somewhat paradoxical, ability to integrate Mexicans and Latino culture into the fabric 
of the community because of their shared Catholicism.  
 John McGreevy argues that “contact between Euro-American Catholics and 
Spanish-speaking immigrants occurred in a different context” than did interactions 
between white ethnic Catholics and African-Americans.
511
 By the 1960s Mexican-
American leaders in Chicago (and Latinos in other northern cities) had begun to identify 
themselves as “white” and compared their immigrant experiences to those of Italians and 
Poles.  Even though there were still tensions between Mexican Catholics and Euro-
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American Catholics in Back of the Yards and elsewhere, a shared religious identity 
ensured that Mexicans moving into a Catholic neighborhood wasn’t necessarily seen as a 
catastrophe, unlike the movement of African-Americans into the community.  For 
instance, when Black Catholics families who were attempting to integrate the Trumbull 
Park Homes in South Deering attempted to attend mass at Saint Kevin’s, they were often 
met with outright hostility and violence by their fellow white parishioners.
512
  In fact, one 
Black man felt compelled to sit behind his wife with his “forty-five” when “she got on 
her knees and prayed” in order to protect her.513  According to McGreevy, “the very 
presence of Mexicans or Puerto Ricans in a parish community might signify to Euro-
American Catholics that the new group was not ‘Black,’ regardless of physical 
features.”514  Moreover, “shared responsibility for neighborhood institutions, in other 
words, was plausible.  Transition from a heavily Italian area to a predominantly Mexican 
one guaranteed turmoil, but in contrast to the transition to an overwhelmingly Protestant 
population, it did not automatically portend a crisis in parish finances or the potential 
collapse of the parish school.”515  In this way, Mexican residents of Back of the Yards 
found themselves increasingly a part of the neighborhood’s social and religious fabric. 
 For instance, in the fall of 1969 the Back of the Yards Neighborhood Council’s 
Education Committee, in cooperation with Felician College, offered a conversational 
Spanish course which would allow students to be proficient enough to communicate with 
Spanish speaking people.
516
   The Journal advised that “teachers, clergymen, merchants, 
doctors, professional men in all areas, police officers, and public officials are invited to 
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attend the sessions.”517  The Journal advertised the course several other times throughout 
the fall semester under the headline “Be a Standout Neighbor Learn to Speak Spanish” 
while noting that there was still time to learn “the art of conversing with your Spanish-
speaking customers, employees, and neighbors.”518  Learning Spanish was becoming 
necessary not only to conduct business but to be a good neighbor.  Joseph Meegan hoped 
that “everyone will take advantage of these classes as there is a vital need for Spanish 
speaking people in all aspects of civic activities in this neighborhood.”519  This, as much 
as anything, reveals the shifting ethnic character of the neighborhood but rather than 
lament this demographic shift there seemed to be a willingness to not only accept the 
change but to adapt to it rather than forcing Spanish-speakers to conform.  Classes such 
as these recognized the prevalence of Latinos in the community and the necessity of 
learning Spanish in order to do business, teach, or participate in other facets of 
community life.  
 The Journal also publicized that the Chicago Board of Elections would publish 
special elections materials for the 1972 election to assist those voters who spoke Spanish.  
While this was mainly to assist people of Puerto Rican descent (it was assumed that 
naturalized citizens would have to be proficient in English) it shows how willing people 
in the neighborhood (and in Chicago generally) were to integrating Spanish-speaking 
people into the community.   The Journal noted, for instance that the Illinois legislature 
had authorized driver’s license examinations to be given in Spanish in addition to 
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printing voting machine instructions in Spanish and allowing for special public school 
classes in Spanish.
520
 
 Even earlier, there is evidence of the type of interethnic socializing and dating 
between white ethnics and people of Mexican descent.  Here, for instance is a picture of 
two men of Mexican descent at a bar with two women—one of eastern European descent 
and one with a Greek surname.  While the couple on the left appear rather cold, the 
featured couple, Dave Rodriguez and Connie Jvarsky appear quite intimate as they are 
both smiling and he has his arm around her.  That the two couples seem to be on a date 
and took a picture to commemorate the event suggests that such inter-ethnic dating was 
not considered taboo, even in the 1950s. 
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Figure 13: Dating in Back of the Yards
521
 
 This was not always the case, however.  Beginning with the first wave of Mexican 
immigrants in the 1920s and escalating in the 1930s tension and outright violence 
between the white ethnic residents and the Mexican newcomers was frequent.  Robert 
Slayton details how “the Europeans tried to keep them inside their tiny enclave and 
generally avoided all contact with them.  Some places, like the parks, were off limits, and 
there were other boundaries that Mexicans could not trespass, especially at night.”522  
Fights between the two groups  were relatively common and “dating between a European 
and a Mexican was also out of the question.”523  By the 1950s, then, just as the 
neighborhood was undergoing a significant physical transformation, dealing with job 
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loss, suburbanization, and the supposed threat from Black migration into the community, 
Mexicans were becoming more assimilated into the culture of the neighborhood.   
 The election of John Sanchez as Back of the Yards Neighborhood Council 
President in also signaled the increasing numbers and clout of Latinos in the Back of the 
Yards.  Sanchez, a lifelong area resident who was the director of the Central Mental 
Health Center, Vice President of the St. Rose of Lima Federal Credit Union, and 
Delegate to the Neighborhood Council among a host of other positions, defeated past 
President Daniel Magner in 1969.
524
    
 The neighborhood also featured an annual 10-day Latin-American Festival at 
Immaculate Heart of Mary church.  The festival typically featured a variety of 
entertainment, food, music, and dancing.  The 1967 festival, for instance included a 
Mexican music trio from La Margerita Restaurant, the Trio Camperos from the Carta 
Blanca Restaurant, as well as Irish music group the Shannon Rovers and a polka band led 
by Joe “Pat” Patterik reflecting the multi-ethnic nature of the neighborhood and the 
degree to which Latinos were becoming absorbed into community life.
525
  The 1964 Latin 
Festival featured various prizes including a trip to Mexico.
526
   
 In 1973, the Back of the Yards Council’s Mother’s Club also sponsored a trip to 
Mexico City.  The tour guide for the trip was Carmen Velasquez, a former social worker 
for the Neighborhood Council who was currently attending the Universidad de las 
Americas in Pueblo for her master’s degree.  Rather than being an opportunity to visit 
family in Mexico, however, the trip seems to have served as an educational opportunity 
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and form of cultural enrichment for non-Latinas—of the 38 women to make the trip, only 
one was Latina.
527
  Just like the Spanish language classes a trip such as this highlights 
how Mexican culture was being integrated into neighborhood life in much the same way 
that other ethnic communities in the Back of the Yards had been.  That is, rather than 
being forced to assimilate and sever ties to its homeland and its culture, the Back of the 
Yards Mexican-American community was able to flourish and weave itself into the 
neighborhood’s social fabric, taking its place along the various other ethnic communities.   
 Indeed, the demographic changes taking place in the Neighborhood had become 
quite evident by the 1970s when Latino population expanded greatly.  For instance, the 
sales force at Ferrell-Hicks Chevrolet featured four men who spoke Greek, Chinese, 
Spanish, Israeli, Polish.  The sales manager explained “We wanted to hire people from 
minorities so that we can better serve the entire community.”528  The Journal also 
reflected this change in the neighborhood.  For example, it published Rev. Patrick J. 
McPolin’s speech at the “Amigos for Daley Dinner”, “Mexicans in Chicago,” in both 
Spanish and English.
529
  
 Despite the increased visibility of Latinos and Latino culture in the neighborhood, 
many nevertheless felt that they lacked the political power that their increasing numbers 
would seem to warrant.  In response to the perception that Back of the Yards 
Neighborhood Council leaders were ignoring the growing Hispanic population, young 
organizers founded the United Neighborhood Organization in 1980.  According to 
Graciela Silva Schuch, one of UNO’s founders, “many of our members think the 
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neighborhood council is unwilling or unable to address Latino needs.”530  A bilingual 
weekly newspaper also began publication in 1981.
531
 
 However, as the neighborhood got older and white ethnics moved to the suburbs, 
the Mexican-American population came to dominate the neighborhood from the 1980s to 
the present.  Much of the apparent acceptance of Latinos was likely based on a common 
religious identity.  As the 1970s progressed and the neighborhood became more socially 
and culturally conservative, Latinos also began to wield more political influence.
532
  The 
Back of the Yards Journal, for instance, began regularly publishing anti-abortion articles 
in the 1970s and sponsoring bus trips to protest pro-choice legislation.  Much of this was 
premised on the Catholic Church’s opposition to abortion, which allowed for a sense of 
common identity to develop between the neighborhood’s Mexican population and the 
overwhelmingly Catholic white ethnics who remained.  For example, the Journal 
published “March for Life Parade in Loop Saturday,” in October 1973 which observed 
that “the keynote speaker of the rally will be the very articulate Black Baptist minister 
who heads the North Star Mission in Chicago, Rev. Henry Mitchell.”533  Other articles 
encouraged participation in anti-abortion parades such as one in 1972 that noted “the 
purpose of the parade is to publicly demonstrate the commitment of the people of the 
Back of the Yards to the dignity and reverence for human life, and to show their public 
resentment to enactment of proposed pro-abortion laws in the legislature of the State of 
Illinois and the Congress of the United States.”534          
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Those white ethnics that remained were overwhelmingly Catholic which gave 
them common cause with the Catholic Mexicans who likewise resisted integration.  
According to Beryl Satter, the vehement white Catholic opposition to integration, in 
addition to being an “understandable defense of the parish as sacred space” was likely 
explained by “the fact that the arrival of Blacks meant that the neighborhood would be 
redlined and property values would decline.  For the white working class in general, 
property—the investment of a lifetime, often representing decades of sacrifice—was their 
only security for old age.”535  Furthermore, “home ownership represented stability, 
respectability, status and community” which had been denied to these white ethnics in the 
early decades of the twentieth century.
536
  Satter concludes “small wonder, then, that 
many experienced the arrival of Blacks in their communities as an assault upon their 
hard-earned status.”537   
Homeownership rates amongst all immigrant workers but especially Catholics, 
both in Back of the Yards and nationally, tended to be higher than rates for native born 
middle class whites beginning in the early decades of the twentieth century.
538
  Much of 
this had to do with the immovability of the parish and the desire of many ethnic Catholics 
to live within close proximity to their particular ethnic church.  Saul Alinsky, for 
example, described the Catholic Church’s particular struggles with neighborhood 
integration as a “foreign language national parish established to serve one particular 
group [and] faced with a fearful dilemma when the prospect of a radical change in the 
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population’s composition arises.”  He also stated that “when a community changes from 
white to Negro, the Catholic church is in a different position than Protestant and Jewish 
churches.  It has a bigger real investment.”539   In the decades after World War II ethnic 
divisions amongst the community’s Catholics gave way to inter-ethnic cooperation that 
came to see religious affinity trumping ethnic affiliation.
540
  In this way, Mexican 
residents of the neighborhood came to be seen not as ethnically or racially distinct, but 
rather as part of the larger Catholic community in Back of the Yards.    
 Moreover, many Latinos in Chicago in the 1970s (by which point they made up 
about 25% of the city’s total population) also expressed an unwillingness to work with 
African-Americans and Catholics as a whole were more likely than Protestants of Jews to 
express negative attitudes toward African-Americans.
541
  For instance, a 1977 report by 
two Northwestern sociologists found “very little enthusiasm for an alliance with Blacks 
or other minorities” and concluded that many Latino leaders had an “antipathy toward 
other minorities seen as competitors for the largesse of the system.”542  This general 
distrust of and antagonism toward African-Americans likely explains, in part, Mexicans’ 
assimilation into the Back of the Yards’ social fabric.  In essence, their unwillingness to 
work politically or live alongside African-Americans mirrored other earlier immigrant 
groups in their efforts to become part of the broader white society.  On the whole then, 
Catholics in Back of the Yards “did not respond to these African-Americans as simply 
‘workers’ or ‘ethnics’—they also responded in ways that reflected the manner in which 
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religion had structured their lives.”543 While Catholic residents’ desire to maintain their 
Catholic community and keep property values relatively high certainly influenced their 
actions, there is no doubt that their unwillingness to allow orderly integration was 
overwhelmingly influenced by racial considerations and not merely economic concerns. 
 As the packing industry left Back of the Yards, then, the white residents (and later 
Mexican residents) sought to exert some control over who could live in the 
neighborhood.  Decaying industrial infrastructure and its attendant increase in crime 
coupled with the related threats of white residents fleeing to the suburbs in the wake of 
Black migration into the neighborhood combined in the minds of many residents to make 
it seem that the community was teetering on the brink.  According to many white 
residents, the clearest way to prevent it from tipping over the edge and becoming a slum 
once again was to prevent whites from leaving and African-Americans from moving in.  
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Chapter 4 
 
“I’m Not Altogether Sure Chicago Will Miss It:”  The End of an Era and 
the Meanings of Deindustrialization   
The Greek word for “return” is nostos. Algos means “suffering.” So nostalgia is the 
suffering caused by an unappeased yearning to return. 
--Milan Kundera, Ignorance
544
  
 By 1980, then, it was clear that something essential about the neighborhood had, 
in fact, changed.  In “Places and Their Pasts” Doreen Massey, argues that occupants of a 
particular area often formulate essentialist constructions about a place and its character in 
which “influences, ‘invasions,’ developments from outside are to be resisted.”545  
However, “what such constructions fail to realise, or to admit, is that places are always 
already hybrid.”546  Moreover, “the new ‘intrusions’ are no more from outside, nor more 
‘out of place’, than were in their time many of the components of the currently accepted 
‘character of the place.’”547  Indeed, Back of the Yards residents, in seeking to defend the 
“essential” character of the neighborhood ignored the degree to which that character was 
itself constructed, influenced by outside forces, and always changing.   
 The community had once been wholly separate from the city of Chicago (which 
only annexed the former Town of Lake in 1889) existing as a rural outpost in the swampy 
hinterlands of the city and only becoming consumed by and entwined in the spread of the 
urban environment in the intervening years.  Outside forces—the packers and the land 
they owned, the interstate highway system, railroad barons, livestock growers, as well as 
city, state, and federal officials and policies also did their part to shape and determine the 
character of the neighborhood.  The demographics of the neighborhood were constantly 
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changing, as well (as we have seen).  Initially peopled by Germans and Irish the 
neighborhood saw an influx of eastern Europeans by the turn of the twentieth century.
548
  
By the 1970s the once small Latino population had grown considerably to the point that 
they now constitute the largest segment of the neighborhood’s population with 
significant, although smaller, numbers of African-Americans.  All of which is to say that 
residents who sought to maintain the neighborhood and feared its fundamental alteration 
or demise were trying to hang on to an idealized past that never truly existed.  Or, as 
Massey argues, residents had a “feeling that there is or has been some kind of disruption 
between the past of these places and at least some elements of their present or their 
potential future.”549  To be sure, “‘the past’ is seen in some sense to embody the real 
character of the place.”550  It is this belief that manifests itself in such things as the 
billboards proclaiming that everyone claims to be from Back of the Yards and arguing 
that the horrid smells that enveloped the neighborhood were something to be proud of.  
Moreover, “tradition may well become a hindrance to progressive change.  A singular 
sense of the past, and its relation to the present, become assumed, closed down as areas of 
contestation or debate.”551   
 However, “traditions do not only exist in the past.  They are actively built in the 
present also.  The concept of tradition which sees in it only nostalgia understands it as 
something already completed which can now only be maintained or lost.  It is something 
from which we feel ourselves inexorably, inevitably, distant.  Talking of places as 
‘unspoilt’ evokes just this notion.  So do many aspects of place-conservation, which are 
                                                          
548
 See, among others, Jablonsky, Pride in the Jungle, 25-48 and Barrett, Work and Community in the 
Jungle, 64-107. 
549
 Massey, “Places and Their Pasts,” 183.    
550
 Ibid. 
551
 Ibid., 184. 
  
210 
 
all too often attempts to freeze a (particular view of a) place at a (selected) moment in 
time.”552    
 This is ultimately the problem that plagued (and, to a certain extent, continues to 
plague) Back of the Yards.  But the neighborhood is unique in certain regards as well.  
Rather than being bound by their past and attempting to return to it, the neighborhood and 
its residents up until the 1980s at least were trying to move beyond the industry which 
stigmatized the neighborhood.  While many in the community sought to erase all 
reminders of the packing industry’s history in Back of the Yards, they nevertheless were 
not attempting to do away with the community’s long-established character as a blue-
collar neighborhood that was dependent on industry.  Massey’s argument is also 
complicated by the fact that residents didn’t view Back of the Yards as unspoiled terrain.  
Indeed, the neighborhood had been utterly spoiled by the packing industry and it 
threatened to continue to spoil the community by its absence and its abandonment of 
packing industry infrastructure which further scarred the landscape.  As in many other 
cities and neighborhoods that were highly dependent on industry, then, Back of the Yards 
residents were attempting to remake their communities into something better while still 
being constrained by their past.  
 In that sense, then, there is something quintessentially American about Back of 
the Yards and its historical trajectory.  It is a neighborhood that was born of the demands 
of corporate capitalism on the fringes of the city to take advantage of the open space 
afforded there and the technological developments of the time—the very same factors 
that would be its ultimate undoing.  The immigrant workers who flocked to the 
community toiled endlessly and led miserable lives in deplorable conditions because the 
                                                          
552
 Ibid. 
  
211 
 
packers could get rich by doing so and had the political and economic might to ensure 
that their interests were protected, just as immigrants did in countless other communities 
(and would continue to do in the mostly rural communities to which the packinghouses 
moved in the latter decades of the twentieth century).    
The process which created the neighborhood would be repeated, then, just in new 
locations.  It remains to be seen, however, if the new immigrant workforces are able to 
organize against the packers in the same way that they did in the 1930s and ‘40s.  After a 
relatively brief time in the post-war period when the workers were able to band together 
and carve out some concessions for themselves and their families which held the promise 
of middle-class respectability, those in power once again exerted their authority by taking 
it all away, moving to areas of the country that would allow for their further plunder.  All 
the while the residents of the neighborhood defined themselves by their work in that 
industry and even after the industry abandoned them they continued to look back on an 
imagined past as they sought to shore up their paltry gains lest some newcomers take 
away even those meager advancements.        
 On the other hand the residents of the neighborhood were also characterized by a 
remarkable lack of sentimentality.  While they still wanted to maintain the racial and 
industrial character of Back of the Yards, they recognized that the economic and 
demographic shifts that saw their jobs leave for the rural Midwest and South meant that 
those jobs weren’t coming back and that this presented the possibility of remaking the 
neighborhood into something better.  Even while the first signs of impending doom were 
making themselves apparent in the middle of the 1950s, Back of the Yards residents were 
attempting to throw off outsiders’ assumptions about the neighborhood—that it smelled, 
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was dirty, dangerous, and polluted—while striving for middle class respectability, the 
markers of which included such things as clean and safe neighborhoods.  This effort was 
by no means abandoned as the packers themselves abandoned Back of the Yards in 
droves.  Indeed, it became imperative to maintain the appearance of respectability, hard 
work, and dedication as the neighborhood’s industrial character was fundamentally 
altered in order to maintain the community’s identity as a paragon of working class 
democracy and the American Dream.           
    The power of this vacant land and these abandoned and derelict structures in the 
following images, therefore, lies not just in their ability to invoke nostalgic longing in the 
workers and residents who yearned for a past that was somehow better but they also serve 
to remind working class communities generally of their ultimate lack of power.  As 
Steven High argues in Corporate Wasteland:  The Landscape and Memory of 
Deindustrialization, an abandoned cork mill in Pittsburgh (and, by extension, similar 
forsaken structures in cities around the country) “is testament to the inability of working 
people to control the destructive forces at work in Pittsburgh and across North 
America.”553  
 High also argues that he and photographer David W. Lewis have taken up 
Jefferson Cowie’s and Joseph Heathcott’s call to “rethink the chronology, memory, 
spatial relations, culture, and politics of what we have come to call deindustrialization”554 
by “interrogating the cultural meaning of industrial ruins themselves” and delving “into 
the landscape and memory of deindustrialization” in part through the examination of 
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photographs.
555
  Such an approach forces scholars to “move beyond either nostalgia or 
populist criticism, and lead[s] into the heart of a dilemma which is, in so many ways, an 
imaginative as much as an historical challenge:  how to think about, and respond to, and 
understand these profound changes.”556  An examination of the physical decay of the 
neighborhood’s built environment will do just that as well as reveal how the physical 
manifestation of these changes affected those who experienced them.    
 The images in this chapter of the industrial devastation in Back of the Yards differ 
from what today is known as ruin photography (or, less charitably, “ruin porn”) which is 
a rather recent photographic trend that uses abandoned and crumbling urban 
infrastructure as its subject—the visual representation of the urban crisis.  While some 
celebrate the aesthetics of such images of decay, others are more critical arguing that ruin 
photography is exploitative, sensationalistic, and that it ignores broader questions about 
systemic poverty and the structural problems that have led to such urban decay.  As John 
Patrick Leary argues “so much ruin photography and ruin film aestheticizes poverty 
without inquiring of its origins, dramatizes spaces but never seeks out the people that 
inhabit and transform them, and romanticizes isolated acts of resistance without 
acknowledging the massive political and social forces aligned against the real 
transformation, and not just stubborn survival, of the city.”557  Most of the photographs in 
this chapter were taken by amateur photographer Casey Prunchunas, a member of the 
Oak Lawn Camera Club, who in the 1950s began contributing to the Chicago Historical 
Society’s collaboration with Chicagoland amateur camera clubs to document day to day 
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life in the city.
558
  Rather than celebrate or aestheticize the decay of the packing industry 
and its infrastructure, Prunchunas’s images sought to capture a transitional moment in the 
history of the neighborhood and Chicago as a whole.  Many of these photographs 
attempted to preserve a part of the community’s past before it was gone forever and 
document the ways in which Back of the Yards and the built environment of the 
community was undergoing a fundamental transformation.  While there is an element of 
sentimentality to these pictures that document the ending of an era they aren’t 
exploitative.  Even if most of the professional media paid little attention to this industrial 
demolition in Back of the Yards and there was little in the way of “highly ritualized” 
ceremonies that “dramatized the changes underway” these images nevertheless “lent 
authority and legitimacy to the idea that” the neighborhood was “making the transition to 
a post-industrial era.  The message seemed to be that there was no going back.”559  
 By examining some of the images of the decline of the packing industry in Back 
of the Yards, I hope to be able to get at some of the larger meanings of what this process 
of industrial abandonment meant for people in the community and what it can tell us 
about the broader trend of deindustrialization nationally as this “is not simply an 
economic process, but a cultural one as well.”560  That is, workers and community 
residents interacted with these physical reminders of the neighborhood’s past in a variety 
of ways that had nothing to do with the supposed economic rationale of 
deindustrialization.  The ruins would be able to evoke a complex (and perhaps 
contradictory) set of responses—from anger (at various groups of people or at no one at 
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all) to frustration to sadness to optimism. These structures and their demolitions would 
have had a profound and complex impact on the people who lived and worked in the 
neighborhood—capable of simultaneously producing anger at the multiplicity of forces 
that conspired to bring about this destruction and sadness at a passing way of life.  
Figure 14: “Demolishment of Wilson & Co. Bldg. 41st-42nd & Ashland”  Source:  Chicago History Museum 
Stockyards Demolition Folder 2 
 
For instance, this image, captioned “The End of an Era” depicts the demolition of 
a Wilson and Co. building at 41
st
-42
nd
 and Ashland Ave.  Here, the building is exposed to 
the elements in a scene that looks reminiscent of a war zone and while the caption 
suggests an almost inevitable and wistful passing of time, the implied violence and 
destruction suggest something more nefarious.  Indeed, Swift maintained a photography 
collection that included images of its plant in Hamburg, Germany in ruins in the 
aftermath of World War II.  Those images don’t look all that dissimilar to the pictures of 
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the packing industry buildings being demolished in Back of the Yards.  While it might 
seem hyperbolic, it wouldn’t be too much of a stretch to suggest that deindustrialization 
and the attendant decay of the built environment might have a similar effect on people 
who lived and worked amongst buildings destroyed in war.   
To be sure, an era—one characterized by manufacturing and the ability of the 
working class to carve out at decent life for themselves working in those factories—is 
coming to an end.  But there is a fair amount of uncertainty about what will replace it and 
how the neighborhood will cope with those changes.  This image also gives the 
impression that not only is this way of life—which allowed for a measure of dignity in 
industrial work—ending, not only are the packing plants leaving the neighborhood, but 
on a much larger scale it seems to suggest that “industries that once symbolized 
modernity and progress have come to represent an antiquated and polluted past that 
should be put behind us.”561  Moreover, these types of changes are not the natural and 
inevitable byproduct of a value-neutral system or the rational dictates of the market.  
Rather, they are the workings of a system in which corporate power, corporate interests 
take precedent over the needs of industrial workers and the residents of a community that 
depend on the industry that is abandoning them.  There has been a conscious effort to 
allow scenes like this to play out on the streets of Back of the Yards.  
In 1959 the NBC series “Chet Huntley Presents” produced a show on the decline 
of the packing industry in Chicago.  Huntley likewise talked about the passing of a way 
of life.  He was much more sanguine about the neighborhood’s prospect’s, however: 
“Those who could moved from the steam and sweat of the hog scalding tank to the 
dignity of the corner tavern owner.  Their houses were mean and shapeless.  But they 
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found exultation building churches in the characteristic shapes of their central European 
origins.  When the children grew up they tried to leave the neighborhood and those who 
couldn’t at least left the stockyards.” Back of the Yards’ identity as the center of the 
packing industry “has now ended.  I’m not altogether sure Chicago will miss it.  The 
thousands who must find new jobs will miss it of course….It’s citizens can hardly mind 
losing the half-derisive stereotype of national butcher.  In other words, Chicago can 
afford to be merely nostalgic.”562  From the perspective of 1959, the neighborhood’s 
prospects may have seemed bright but it became evident that even if the rest of Chicago 
might not miss the packing industry, Back of the Yards certainly would.  Nor could the 
neighborhood afford to be merely nostalgic.  It had to deal with the loss of these jobs and 
had to live in close proximity to the packing house infrastructure that was falling around 
them.      
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Figure 15: Wrecking of Swift & Co. General Office NE Corner of 41
st
 Place and Packers Ave.  Source:  
Chicago History Museum, Stockyards Demolition Folder 1 
  
 Kathryn Marie Dudley argues that “the symbolism of a plant closing is about the 
meaning of change itself.  The abandonment, gentrification, and outright destruction of 
old factory buildings signifies not just social change, but a particular kind of social 
change.  When chrome and glass skyscrapers rise out of the rubble of an industrial plant, 
when bombed-out factories are left to crumble in urban wastelands where vibrant 
communities once thrived, the message is not just about the inevitability of change, but 
about the obsolesence of the past.”563  Although she was discussing deindustrialization 
since the late 1970s, her claims still apply in part to the transformation of Back of the 
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Yards.  While there has been little in the way of gentrification in the neighborhood, 
scenes  such as the one above of the wrecking of the Swift and Co. general office on the 
northeast corner of 41
st
 Place and Packers Avenue also signaled a significant social 
change. 
 In that same episode of “Chet Huntley Presents” Charles Hayes, the UPWA 
District 1 Director is shown speaking near the shuttered packing plants.  While lamenting 
the loss of jobs he also describes the area in 1959 as “already looking like a ghost 
town.”564  Huntley expanded on this imagery describing the packinghouse infrastructure 
as “abandoned and falling apart” and the railroads as “choked with years of weeds.”565  
Scenes such as the wrecking of the Swift offices and others reinforce this image of 
abandonment.  Despite the dense population of the neighborhood, the crumbling packing 
industry structures gave the appearance of a desolate ghost town.  It was this impression 
that residents hoped to avoid as they felt it would promote vandalism and criminality.  
Compounding the problem was that now a national spotlight shown on the community’s 
problems at the precise time that other national media were celebrating Back of the 
Yards’ turnaround.   
 Moreover, the abandonment and demolition of Swift’s general office highlighted 
the meatpackers’ final break with the neighborhood.  At the industry’s height, workers 
and company officials shared physical space.  Rather than locating corporate offices in 
the Loop or at least at a comfortable remove from the foul odors and sights of the packing 
plants most of the major packers maintained offices within the yards so even middle-class 
managers up to the highest echelons of the company traveled into the neighborhood for 
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work before returning to their suburban homes in the evening.  Even though they lived 
separately and management certainly wasn’t down on the killing floor or intimately 
involved in the more unsavory aspects of meatpacking, they nevertheless worked in 
relatively close proximity to the packing plants and stockyards and would have found the 
foul odors, animal carcasses, and blood-covered workers impossible to ignore.    
 But the removal of corporate offices represented a clear break along class lines.  
To be sure, Back of the Yards was always a working class neighborhood but the fact that 
corporate officers and managers worked there as well and the fact that they would not 
suffer in nearly the same ways as those workers who had no choice but to remain in the 
community (or in its immediate vicinity in the case of Black workers) and see the vacant 
land and crumbling buildings everyday spoke volumes about the workers’ place in 
society.  Estes Payne, the subject of the NBC documentary on the downfall of the 
packing industry whose story began this dissertation, and other workers like him had to 
deal with the visual reminders on a daily basis of their place in the social hierarchy 
whereas those making the decision to close these plants were insulated from the negative 
effects of those decisions.  Indeed, Payne took the NBC cameras through the remnants of 
the Armour plant where he worked which was reduced to a “heap of rubble,” “burning 
timbers,” and “broken bricks.”566  Living in close proximity to boarded up buildings or 
acres of vacant land meant community members, including a great many who worked for 
much of their lives in the packing plants or had family members who did, were unable to 
shake the notion that their lives, their livelihoods, their neighborhoods were not important 
to the nation’s economic and ruling elite.  Their feelings and their economic well-being 
played no role in the decision whether or not to close a packing plant and put thousands 
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of people out of a job.  To these workers, packing company officials only cared about 
their ability to make as high a profit as possible.  The demolition of the Swift general 
office building, then, would have been the ultimate symbol of working class 
powerlessness and the hubris of the powerful.   
 This attitude was perhaps best summed up by William Buckholtz, a Morrell 
worker, who declared that “my scars are many:  on my hands, arms, heart, mind and soul.  
I have learned that I am nothing to any packer but a fucking piece of dirt.”567  While 
Buckholtz made this observation in 1989 and also reserved some vitriol for union leaders 
who he felt were indistinguishable from company officials, he nevertheless emodied the 
changes that were fundamentally altering the packing industry since the middle of the 
century.  Packinghouse workers in Chicago and elsewhere likewise felt powerless to 
oppose the might of the packing companies and they realized their ultimate insignificance 
to those running the companies.    
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Figure 16: “Looking West from 5th floor—Exchange Bldg.” Source:  Chicago History Museum, Stockyards 
Demolition Folder 1. 
 
Figure 17: “Demolition of Union Stockyards looking Southwest” Source:  Chicago History Museum, 
Stockyards Demolition Folder 1. 
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Figure 18: “Loading truck with remains of pens at Union Stockyards” Source:  Chicago History Museum, 
Stockyards Demolition Folder 1. 
 
Figure 19: “View of Stockyards Area looking SW from 5th floor of Exchange Bldg.” Source:  Chicago 
History Museum, Stockyards Demolition Folder 1. 
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Figure 20: “Union Stockyards” Source:  Chicago History Museum, Aerial Views of Chicago. 
 
The preceding five images showcase the vastness of the stockyards and the 
barrenness of the landscape after their demolition.  The aerial view above also makes 
clear how isolated the neighborhood was from the rest of Chicago by the packing 
industry infrastructure.  The livestock runs and pens covered acres of land in the 
neighborhood.  After they were demolished, this emptiness became a problem for 
community leaders who needed some type of industry to fill this hole in the landscape for 
obvious reasons.  This vast expanse of real estate needed occupants to provide jobs for 
neighborhood residents and tax revenue for local government.  This area would 
eventually become the Stockyards Industrial Park but, as we’ve seen, the light 
manufacturing that replaced the packing plants and stockyards in no way could match the 
grandeur or dominate the landscape the way that the packing industry did.   
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Figure 21: “Wilson & Co. #2”  Source:  Chicago History Museum, Stockyards Demolition Folder 2. 
 
 Scenes like the one above would have been particularly troubling to former 
packinghouse workers and community residents as a whole.  Here, a Wilson building has 
been allowed to fall into disrepair before it would eventually be demolished.  Such sights 
likely would have reinforced residents’ sense of powerlessness to clean up the 
neighborhood and former workers’ disdain for the packing companies.  Not only had the 
packers eliminated thousands of jobs from the community, they also left the physical 
reminders of that abandonment.  The building was open to the harsh Chicago winter and 
snow-covered rubble was strewn throughout the surrounding land.  This was what 
residents feared when they talked about the empty packing plants as a form of blight or 
pollution.  And while the smells associated with the packing industry were certainly 
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impossible to ignore, such landscapes littered with debris and crumbling buildings were 
much more tangible reminders of the neighborhood’s and the workers’ past as well as a 
marker that the community’s future was in doubt.  Such crumbling buildings also 
projected an image of desolation and abandonment which, according to residents, would 
have been a haven for criminals and vandals.     
 Not only were such partially demolished structures an eyesore but also a danger to 
residents.  Moreover, buildings such as these would have contributed to outsiders viewing 
the neighborhood as a slum—a description that residents were eager to cast off.  
Neglectful actions on the part of the packers, such as those that allowed for the 
proliferation of similar such blots on the landscape, made it increasingly difficult for the 
community to shake off its stigma as a slum.  Such crumbling buildings would have been 
particularly galling as residents worked tirelessly to clean up their own homes and to call 
delinquent landlords or homeowners and business owners with code violations to account 
for their inability to maintain their properties.  At a time when the aesthetics of the 
neighborhood were generally changing for the better, when residents were working 
diligently to clean up trash and renovate homes and businesses, when a well maintained 
house was viewed with a fair amount of pride, the fact that factory owners were permitted 
to let their buildings fall into disrepair must have felt like a slap in the face to many Back 
of the Yards dwellers.   
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Figure 22: “Demolishing of Pens at Union Stockyards” Source:  Chicago History Museum, Stockyards 
Demolition Folder 2. 
 
 On the last day of operations of the Union Stockyards, when the construction 
(destruction?) equipment had already begun to dismantle the animal pens and runs, 
student filmmaker Mark Mamalakis interviewed several of the workers, some of whom 
had worked in the yards for 50 years.  Even young people seemed to realize the import of 
the event.  A brother and sister that Mamalakis talked to, whose grandfather worked in 
the packing plants expressed their dismay at the decline of the industry.  The young boy, 
for instance said “I don’t think they should tear it down ‘cause it’s a history to our city.  
It’s been here all our life.  We just can’t do nothing about it,” highlighting the sense of 
powerlessness that many felt.
568
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took it.  I guess they’re going to build factories.”  He didn’t seem convinced that this was 
a good idea.  His older sister empahsized the human costs associated with 
deindustrialization:  “My Grandfather Connors used to work up here.  When he found out 
they were going to tear it down he started crying.”  As the equipment went to work 
demolishing the stockyards infrastructure one visibly distraught worker who first went to 
work in the yards in 1915 likewise was overcome with emotion:  “they’re beautiful 
memories in the past but very sad today.  I can’t believe it.  Almost tears come to my 
eyes.  And I’m not the only one that feels that way.  I think 85% of the men in this 
building feel that same way.”  Another said simply “I’m going to miss my friends 
here.”569      
 
Figure 23: “Main Entrance to Exchange Building Before Demolition”  Source:  Chicago History Museum, 
Stockyards Demolition Folder 2. 
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Figure 24: “End of the Exchange Bldg.”  Source:  Chicago History Museum, Stockyards Demolition Folder 
2. 
 
 These two images of the Exchange Building, before and after shots, also highlight 
the abandonment and neglect of the packing companies.  The Exchange Building was the 
home to the stockyards offices and just like the demolition of the Swift general office 
building, the Exchange Building’s demise also signaled the powerlessness of workers but 
it also symbolized the community’s ultimate break from the packing industry.  In the first 
image, it’s clear that prior to demolition the Exchange Building had been allowed to fall 
apart.  There are multiple broken windows and the front doors have also been broken, 
allowing easy access to the inside.  A desk with some of its drawers removed also sits 
outside.  This building, once the  workplace of upper management and the company elite 
has been abandoned to the elements and vandals symbolizing the companies’ ultimate 
contempt for the neighborhood.   
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Figure 25: Stockyards Gate.  Source: Library of Congress, LC-HS503- 993 
  
 One of the few structures in the Back of the Yards that remains to celebrate the 
history of the neighborhood is the Stockyards Gate which was once the entrance to the 
stockyards, as I discussed in Chapter 2. Built in 1879 and located on Exchange Avenue, it 
was commissioned by John B. Sherman, superintendent of the yards at the time, designed 
by the architectural firm Burnham and Root, and features the bust of Sherman’s prize-
winning bull.  The city assumed possession of the gate in 1971 when the yards closed and 
it gained recognition as a Chicago Landmark in 1972 and a National Historic Landmark 
in 1981.
570
    
 As Steven High argues in discussing the prevalence of similar such reminders on 
the landscape of America’s former industrial glory, “these physical remains serve as 
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reminders that workers who once stood at the centre of local life are now relegated to the 
periphery.”571  While Back of the Yards may not have undergone the same process of 
gentrification as other North American industrial neighborhoods (including a great many 
in Chicago itself), its mills and factories not (yet) “converted to condominiums and art 
galleries” the effect is the same.   
 Workers and the work they did that quite literally defined life in the community 
have been all but erased.  The neighborhood may still be called Back of the Yards but the 
yards and packinghouses are no longer.  Light industry has returned to the neighborhood 
(although not providing the same number of jobs or the same wage levels) as the 
Stockyards Industrial Park came to occupy former stockyards land.
572
  The entrance gate 
to this industrial park also pays tribute to the industry which once occupied that same 
land.  It incorporates the Union Stockyard Gate into its design but again the effect is one 
that marginalizes workers, both those who once worked in the packinghouses and the 
stockyards and those who currently work in the industrial park.  The high point of the 
neighborhood is relegated to a romanticized past, one that is never coming back.   
 The industrial park gate is a daily reminder, moreover, of the fact that the packing 
industry has essentially ceased to be in the neighborhood and that the various light 
industries that have moved in will never be able to replicate the meatpacking industry’s 
size and dominance of the neighborhood, its landscape, and its residents—for better and 
for worse.  Current workers may no longer feel the same sense of importance and 
grandeur or the same ties to their fellow workers as those former packinghouse workers 
did who found themselves densely packed in the packing plants with thousands of other 
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workers living similar lives and from similar backgrounds (despite ethnic differences).  
This feeling that the workers were a part of something so big and so central to life in and 
the very existence of the community is something that the current industries that occupy 
former stockyards land and employ several hundred workers at most are unable to 
reproduce.  This is one of the myriad ways that working class life has been fractured as 
communities such as Flint, Michigan and Youngstown, Ohio that were once wholly 
dependent on and defined by a single industry have seen their ways of life disrupted or 
destroyed when those industries abandon their communities.  The effect has been to 
fragment working class communities and to hinder the formation of working class 
identity and, hence, organizing against the multiple powerful forces that are arrayed both 
nationally and locally against workers.  It is much more difficult to organize for and enact 
any change when working in a factory of a hundred workers than it is in a factory that 
employs several thousand workers who you can be confident share some of your 
grievances.   
 Indeed, as High argues, “industrial ruins are memory places, for they make us 
pause, reflect, and remember.  But remember what, and to what end?”  Further, “if 
memory places bind people and communities together, and are symbolic in nature, then 
these abandoned mills and factories unite displaced workers in a memory community of 
‘anger and sorrow.’  These physical vestiges even become symbolic sites of identity for 
those workers who have come to identify with their displacement.”573  This process is 
evident in Back of the Yards as the few historical monuments testifying to the greatness 
and expansiveness of the packing industry elide the role that workers played in the 
formation of that industry and in the stabilization of the community.  Moreover, the 
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physical remnants of the industry—vacant land and derelict buildings—serve to remind 
workers and residents of the neighborhood of their general powerlessness to prevent the 
flight of industry and the concomitant slow decline and decay of the community as a 
whole despite their best efforts to prevent and reverse it.  The present pales in comparison 
to the imagined past, itself a romanticized construction.       
 
Figure 26: Stockyards Industrial Park Gate.  Source:  University of Illinois-Chicago  
(http://www.uic.edu/orgs/LockZero/5image/Bpt21.html: accessed Jan. 10, 2014).   
 
As the 1970s came to a close, it was becoming abundantly clear that the 
neighborhood was undergoing some fundamental and irreversible changes.  The 
packinghouses and associated industries weren’t coming back, for better and for worse.  
Those industries that eventually moved in after the meatpackers abandoned Back of the 
Yards didn’t provide the same number of jobs or wages as high as those that were 
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available when the union was at its most influential in the 1940s and 1950s.
574
  In 
addition to the psychic landscape, the physical landscape was fundamentally changed as 
well.  The multistory packinghouses with their chimneys belching fumes, the maze of 
livestock pens and runs, and the smells associated with all of them no longer dominated 
the landscape or the air.  To be sure, there were reminders of the neighborhood’s past 
glory as hog butcher to the world.  Much of the land that once processed thousands of 
animals a day, turning them into everything from steak, hams, sausages, bacon, and hot 
dogs, to soap, lard, gelatin, brushes, and buttons now sat vacant or, worse, occupied by 
crumbling packinghouse structures.   
 The people who occupied the land were also changing.  By the 1970s, the Latino 
population was increasing significantly and African-Americans began to move into Back 
of the Yards in higher numbers, testament to the fact that the white ethnics who lived 
there for a hundred years were abandoning the neighborhood just as the packinghouses 
had done and serving as evidence to those white residents who remained of the 
neighborhood’s supposed further decay.  As of the 2000 Census, the neighborhood was 
50 percent Latino and 35 percent African-American.  Twenty nine percent of the people 
in Back of the Yards were foreign born and almost 35 percent lived below the poverty 
level.
575
  A 2011 article in the Chicago Tribune reported that in the 2010 census the 
percentage of Latino residents had risen to 59 percent while the number of Black 
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residents dropped to 31 percent.
576
  In a way, the neighborhood has come full circle. Once 
a home to impoverished immigrants it has become so once again. 
 The images of this decay and demolition reveal the changing nature of the 
neighborhood and allow us to get at how living in close proximity to this physical 
deterioration would have affected Back of the Yards residents.  They also help to explain 
the linking of decaying infrastructure and fears of criminality with the changing racial 
composition of the community and subsequent efforts to prevent that racial change.  To 
many Back of the Yards residents, blight and the movement of African-Americans into 
the neighborhood were intimately linked and both threatened to turn the neighborhood 
back into a slum.   
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Conclusion 
 Robert Slayton argues that “Back of the Yards was the prototypical working-class 
community.  Formed by giant corporations, the neighborhood breathed, ate, and slept 
according to the packers’ dictates.  The companies that controlled the wages and working 
conditions also shaped the industrial landscape to their own requirements.  Rebellion 
seemed useless:  for seventy years, all attempts to challenge this power failed 
dismally.”577  While he is certainly correct that the packers wielded disproportionate 
influence over the geography of the neighborhood and that residents were often 
powerless to impose their will, this only tells part of the story.  The white ethnic residents 
of Back of the Yards grappled daily with the reminders of that powerlessness in the form 
of the decaying packing industry infrastructure.  Yet they also were able, for a time, to 
exercise some control over who could occupy that landscape.  And while what happened 
to Back of the Yards might be read as a lament for a lost way of life and disdain at 
corporate abandonment of a community, a more optimistic understanding might view the 
neighborhood’s transformation in a more positive light as a triumph over neighborhood 
segregationists.  To be certain the neighborhood today faces a host of problems including 
unemployment and high crime rates.  Yet the history of the neighborhood also shows that 
the people in the neighborhood are quite capable of dealing with such problems and 
transforming Back of the Yards into a model working-class community. 
 This dissertation has examined that process of transformation and how residents 
of the neighborhood dealt with the changes taking place around them, but it also asks as 
many questions as it answers and highlights further areas of inquiry.  In particular it 
raises questions about the modern packing industry and whether today’s mostly 
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immigrant labor force is capable of organizing against the power of the large 
meatpacking corporations.  It also raises questions about the manner in which meat is 
produced and the consequences this has on the health of the workers, animals, consumers, 
communities, and the environment.   
Indeed, despite the increase in humane slaughter laws, which many packers 
argued would render older urban packing plants obsolete, in many ways the packing 
industry today has become less humane.  While the actual moment of slaughter might be 
more painless today (and even this is debatable), the raising of livestock in cramped 
unsanitary conditions, their treatment in industrial feedlots (complete with rampant 
illness and horrible pollution) means that humane slaughter laws have done little to make 
the processing of meat less deplorable for the animals themselves or the workers in the 
packing industry.  As Wilson J. Warren also argues, “as union protections have declined 
and speed-ups have increased tremendously, animal cruelty has also probably 
increased.”578   This situation is no doubt exacerbated by modern meatpackers’ influence 
over government which ensures that there aren’t enough government inspectors to 
adequately oversee packing plants and guarantee food safety, worker safety, or animal 
welfare.  Moreover, this control of the government and legal system has recently shown 
itself in the variety of laws that states such as Iowa have passed that make the video 
recording of abuses in the packing plants and stockyards—activism that’s meant to shine 
a light on inhumane and unsanitary conditions—illegal.  In many ways, then, the 
meatpacking industry has become much more inhumane.  
The packinghouse has become not only less compassionate for the animals, but 
for the workers as well.  Indeed, animal rights activist Peter Singer even recognizes that 
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inhumane treatment of animals is linked to poor conditions for the workers themselves:  
“Much of the suffering that occurs in slaughterhouses is a result of the frantic pace at 
which the killing line must work.”579  What we are ultimately seeing, then, is a return to 
the cruelty, barbarity, and callousness of The Jungle after a brief interlude in which the 
union was ascendant and workers enjoyed a fair measure of control over the workplace 
and the assurance that the union had their safety as a top priority.  As Eric Schlosser and 
others describe, however, today’s mostly immigrant workforce situated in rural areas 
invisibly toils in conditions that would have been recognizable to their eastern-European 
immigrant counterparts in Chicago almost a century ago.    
Whereas the American public was duly outraged by the horrific conditions Upton 
Sinclair described in The Jungle (although Sinclair himself lamented the fact that they 
were more upset about the unsanitary conditions of their food rather than the barbarous 
treatment of the workers), we seem to have lost the capacity for such righteous 
indignation.  The latest exposés about the deplorable state of affairs in the meatpacking 
industry tend to be met with a collective shrug of indifference from the American public 
and those with any power to enact any serious reforms.  While I am certainly not 
operating under the delusion that this work will lead to any reform effort or that it will 
make the case as eloquently and evocatively as people such as Michael Polan and Eric 
Schlosser, I do hope that it will help to explain how conditions have deteriorated so 
rapidly for packinghouse workers and their communities.
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modern Americans are more concerned with animal welfare (including those animals 
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awareness about the conditions faced by the workers who make their meat for them, 
which contribute to the violence they perpetuate against animals.  Consumer pressure to 
change workplace conditions might make the industry not only safer for workers but also 
more humane for the animals that are part of it.”581   
 An examination of the politics of the white working class in places such as Back 
of the Yards also has the potential to reveal quite a bit about broader national political 
shifts since the 1950s.  What happened in the Back of the Yards presaged a more recent 
rightward shift of the white (particularly male) working class.  The same forces at work 
half a century ago that made the white working class resent the challenges posed to its 
relative privilege by women and minority groups demanding equal rights and African-
Americans potentially moving into the neighborhood are today responsible for growing 
racial and economic resentment on the part of the children (and grandchildren) of those 
white workers who lost their jobs in the packing plants beginning in the 1950s.  To many 
of these folks (both in the past and present), the institutions—corporations, the 
government, and unions to a certain degree—that were supposed to defend their white 
male privilege had failed them.  It became apparent to workers that corporations to which 
these workers dedicated their lives and limbs were free to abandon them in pursuit of a 
few extra dollars.  The government, for its part was either complicit in this abandonment 
or unwilling to prevent it.  This was made all the more galling because in the immediate 
postwar era the white working class, which viewed homeownership as essential to 
citizenship, had come to expect the government to provide assistance in securing a home 
and to protect their segregated neighborhoods.
582
  Moreover, all the while supposedly 
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undeserving groups were enjoying the advantages that traditionally and rightfully 
belonged to these maligned white male workers. 
According to Michael Kimmel, today’s white male conservatives come from the 
large number of disaffected men who feel alienated by government:  “They complain that 
they are squeezed between the omnivorous jaws of global capital concentration and a 
federal bureaucracy that is at best indifferent to their plight and at worst complicit in their 
demise.”583  These mostly white men who are members of the middle and working-class 
have been subject to the whims of global economic markets and battered by the 
accompanying job losses and declining wages.  While dealing with these economic 
stresses, their traditional privileges have been challenged by social movements such as 
feminism and demands for Black Civil Rights.
584
  Indeed, the loss of jobs coupled with 
the sense that their neighborhood was threatened by a variety of outside forces, all of 
which appeared to be arrayed for the benefit of people unlike themselves, gave the 
impression that residents of the Back of the Yards’ way of life was under attack.  All of 
which made it necessary to mount a vigorous defense of their power and white privilege.  
As sociologist Lillian Rubin puts it, “It’s this confluence of forces—the racial and 
cultural diversity of our new immigrant population; the claims on the resources of the 
nation now being made by those minorities who, for generations, have called America 
their home; the failure of some of our basic institutions to serve the needs of our people; 
the contracting economy, which threatens the mobility aspirations of working class 
families—all these have come together to leave white workers feeling as if everyone else 
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is getting a piece of the action while they get nothing.”585  These are not recent trends, 
however.  We see clear evidence of it happening in Back of the Yards by the middle of 
the twentieth century.   
 While it might seem a stretch to draw a straight line from Back of the Yards’ 
white residents’ defense of “their” neighborhood to the modern conservative movement 
that fetishizes individualism, is hostile to government, celebrates corporatism, and draws 
its political strength from religious conservatives, what happened in the neighborhood in 
the three decades after the Second World War is certainly part of this larger narrative.  In 
essence, white Back of the Yards residents came to view themselves as victims of a 
whole host of forces that were conspiring against them despite their apparent racial 
privilege in much the same way that  modern conservatives, despite their overwhelming 
political power, wealth, and racial privilege do.  These white ethnics’ mentality in this 
period was one that positioned them as having pulled themselves up by their bootstraps 
against a variety of impediments (city, state, and federal governmental policies, anti-
immigrant sentiment, elitist disdain for the working class, among others) which allowed 
them to transform and stabilize their neighborhood.  As industry and jobs began leaving 
the neighborhood and as Blacks seemed poised to move into it, however, residents felt 
that all of their hard-won gains were threatened by their underserving racial inferiors who 
were aided and abetted by the government which failed to protect residents’ rights as 
whites.  As Thomas Sugrue argues, they “came to expect a vigilant government to protect 
their segregated neighborhoods” and by the 1960s, when this seemed to no longer be the 
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case, the white working class began to resent government intervention.
586
  While this 
attitude seems preposterous in retrospect and ignores the multiple ways that Back of the 
Yards residents benefited because of their race and their relative political power within 
Chicago, it nevertheless was quite real (although it has to be said that there were some 
residents who favored orderly integration and racial equality in housing).  Concomitant 
with all of this, we also see the white working class transitioning toward a politics of 
social and cultural (i.e. religious) values over economic interests.      
The decline of the meatpacking industry in Chicago in the 1950s is also important 
because it illustrates, in certain ways, the playbook that would be employed by the 
political and economic right in the succeeding decades.  For instance, the packing 
companies’ efforts to break the union by moving to states that were more hostile to union 
organizing also foreshadows the more recent efforts undertaken by conservative state 
governments (supported by right-wing institutions like the American Legislative 
Exchange Council and backed by conservative billionaires such as the Koch brothers) to 
pass so-called Right to Work laws and other anti-union legislation in states such as 
Wisconsin, Indiana, Ohio, and Michigan. These laws today intend to erode what’s left of 
the power of unions even in states that traditionally have strong support for unionization 
and relatively high numbers of union membership.   
Anti-union efforts have obviously been going on for quite some time—even at the 
height of unionization.  Beginning in the 1950s meatpacking companies (particularly the 
Big Four) began to actively support Right to Work laws (which essentially outlawed the 
closed shop and diminished union membership), particularly in the South and Midwest at 
the same time that they were attempting to move operations to these areas that were more 
                                                          
586
 Sugrue, “Crabgrass-Roots Politics,” 564. 
  
243 
 
hostile to unions.  They did so under the guise of individual freedom and autonomy for 
workers and the argument that union membership infringed upon workers’ rights and 
their ability to take home more of their pay without having to support supposedly bloated, 
corrupt, leftist, freeloading unions and their executives (never mind that the packing 
companies paid workers in these non-unionized plants and in states that were hostile to 
unions much lower wages than they paid in places like Chicago).   
Arguments of this type are still typically employed by the modern conservative 
movement in arguing against unions and for Right to Work laws—economic freedom for 
both workers and employers (i.e. the freedom for workers to make less money and for 
employers to take home a much larger share of profits) is not only desirable but necessary 
in order to stimulate economic development and ensure individual liberty.  That is, again, 
the market supposedly dictates that workers get the short end of the stick while giving 
them the impression that it’s for their own economic well-being.  Moreover, unions are 
portrayed as somehow contrary to American values.  This idea that individual freedom 
trumps the common good is mirrored in other aspects of the story of the Back of the 
Yards—namely the breaking down of the social contract that says all Americans share an 
obligation to take care of each other, particularly those less fortunate, and the removal of 
public funds for private gain.  These laws, which are not a recent phenomenon, and the 
meatpackers’ influence over governmental regulation have led to the return of terrible 
working conditions for modern workers.   
 Other basic tenets of modern conservatism are also evident in the decline of the 
meatpacking industry in Chicago.  In addition to complaining about the power of the 
union and workers’ unfair wage demands, packing companies also argued that they 
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suffered under an unfair tax burden.  According to the packers, this heavy taxation not 
only hindered the companies’ ability to turn a profit, it also was detrimental to the 
workers themselves.  That is, if taxes on the meatpacking companies remained high, they 
would be forced to lay off workers.  Not surprisingly, this also allowed the packing 
companies to argue that they needed to move to states with a lower tax burden (which, 
not coincidentally also happened to be more anti-union) in order to remain competitive.  
While this mobility of capital is nothing new
587
 and corporations have always complained 
about taxes, many—both scholars and the public—assume that these are more a product 
of the recessions of the 1970s and growing subsequent competition from overseas 
manufacturers and, as such, globalization served as a convenient scapegoat when a 
company wanted to shift operations in search of cheaper labor and lower taxes.  The 
decline of the Chicago’s packing industry reveals, however, that this has had a much 
longer history and that the corporate anti-tax consensus which has come to dominate the 
past several decades was already in evidence in the 1950s.
588
   
 Likewise the modern right-wing bugaboo, government regulation, was also seen 
as unduly onerous by the meatpackers by the middle of the twentieth century.  As I’ve 
already mentioned, packers argued that humane slaughter laws made updating older 
plants in cities such as Chicago prohibitively expensive.  In addition, a burgeoning 
environmental (or at least anti-pollution) movement was beginning to force meatpackers 
to rein in some of the worst environmental abuses that led to such deplorable conditions 
in places like Back of the Yards.  Again, such regulations allowed packers to claim that 
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economics forced them to abandon urban packing plants while, quite clearly, they were 
doing so in order to break the union and ensure higher profits for themselves.        
 The relative power of the packing companies, even at a time of high rates of 
unionization, and the fact that the packers were able to essentially win against one of the 
most powerful unions in the country also speaks to the corporatization of the government.  
Certainly close ties between business and government isn’t a recent phenomenon but 
there is a general consensus that the 1950s were a time when workers typically found 
more allies within government and that corporate leaders, even if they didn’t necessarily 
think so, were forced to at least pay lip service to the idea that the balance of power 
between capital and labor should be somewhat more equal in order to ensure prosperity 
for all and a growing middle class.  The fact that the UPWA and the Back of the Yards 
community were more or less powerless to prevent the large meatpackers from 
abandoning the neighborhood in order to break the union and ensure higher profits and 
more dividends for stockholders somewhat belies the idea that this was a time period 
characterized by a tenuous and grudging balance between labor and capital.  Corporate 
leaders and their allies in government ensured that corporate profits took preference over 
the well-being of workers and their communities.     
 The story of the meatpackers’ desertion of Chicago, then, also helps tell the story 
of the origins of modern-day conservatism.  While it’s typically assumed that the modern 
evangelical/corporatist/economic conservative coalition that is the contemporary 
Republican party has its genesis in the reaction to the 1960s and the recessions of the 
1970s, the arguments about the onerous wage demands of the unions which hindered the 
workers’ economic freedom, unfair tax burdens on corporations, and opposition to 
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governmental regulations that pervade much of the rhetoric of modern corporate (and 
religious) conservatives were employed by the meatpackers in arguing for the necessity 
of abandoning the Back of the Yards beginning in the 1950s.  The fact that the packers 
were able to do so against strenuous worker and community opposition highlights the 
degree to which corporate interests were seen as paramount, something that has become 
even more apparent in the following decades culminating in the rash of corporate bailouts 
in the recent recession while working people and the poor bore the brunt of the economic 
disaster.    
Despite the challenges that the community faced and continues to face, including 
high crime and unemployment rates, in many ways Back of the Yards remains what it 
always had been—a working class neighborhood that’s home to a vibrant immigrant 
community.  And indeed, there are reasons to be optimistic about the future of Back of 
the Yards.  The neighborhood is home to a vibrant and thriving Mexican-American 
community.  Many of the institutions such as the Back of the Yards Neighborhood 
Council that were instrumental in the neighborhood’s turnaround in the middle of the last 
century remain in place.  Jobs are returning (albeit slowly) to the industrial park of former 
stockyards land.  All in all, then, Back of the Yards resembles much of working class 
America—increasingly Latino, primarily confined to relatively low-paying jobs, living 
amidst the reminders of the challenges of deindustrialization, but with the possibility of 
another turnaround in fortunes.     
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